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Introduction
Strange Brew-Punishment and Political Ideals

Though I didn't know it yet, I started writing this book when I moved
to Philadelphia, into an apartment that was two blocks away from what
appeared to be a medieval castle. The stone walls are dizzyingly highthree or four stories at least-and the front gate, complete with menacing spikes, is flanked by little breaks in the fortress walls that appear to
allow shots to be fired from within. The building was Eastern State Penitentiary, the first full-fledged penitentiary in the United States and the
object of study by foreign visitors such as Alexis de Tocqueville and
Charles Dickens. It was one of the largest and most expensive buildings
built in the United States at the time of its completion in 1829, and it
takes up eleven acres in the midst of what soon became a lively urban
neighborhood. The stone walls are so thick that the expense of tearing
it down was enough to deter even the most avid redevelopers.
Today, community groups help provide attractive landscaping
around the building, farmer's markets are held in the parking lot, and I
even buy my Christmas tree there every year. The colossus is integrated into everyday life. I am reminded of the building's strangeness
only by visitors who are both awestruck and confused by the incomprehensible architecture. Were there medieval settlements-in
Philadelphia? The expanse of stone was designed to intimidate, and it
still succeeds in the task. Yet the fortress has become a familiar part of
the landscape, and even its neighbors overlook the intrusive aspect of
it. The building personifies state punishment, though in a different way
than was intended. The initial recognition may be shocking-remember the first time you understood that some people are put in jail, forever-but then we become accustomed to it. That is, we forget about
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the awesome power until we are forced to confront it through a shocking revelation, its direct intrusion in our lives, or the perspective of outsiders. As someone engaged in the study of politics, it is my central task
to help bring a new awareness to these aspects of the political landscape that we take as settled or no longer even notice.
A few months after I moved to Philadelphia, I was asked to help
organize a group that would think about how to decrease recidivism in
those coming out of Philadelphia's current prison system. It was a task
force on "reentry" and "reintegration"-was there any way to bring
this population out of exile and back into the community? Ex-prisoners,
parole officers, victims' rights groups, prison administrators, district
attorneys, and criminologists sat around a table and talked once a
month. There was a fundamental inability to decide on the basic story.
Prisoners' rights advocates saw reintegration as contingent upon
everyone understanding their punishment, their incarceration, as
unjust. They could look around them and see that the prisons were full
of minority males with little economic opportunity. Their incarceration
was a reflection of social injustice as much as their individual crime.
Why should they want to reintegrate into a political system that victimizes them and violates its own tenets of equality and justice?
The other group, the majority of those sitting around the table,
assumed that the ex-offenders had something to prove to everyone
else. They needed to amend for their crimes and prove that they had
been rehabilitated by their incarceration. They needed to demonstrate a
moral conversion before everyone would feel safe welcoming them
back into the community. Not surprisingly, a standoff ensued. It was
unclear who the victims were, who needed to make amends, and who
was culpable. One of the curious dynamics of this group was that those
who had experienced incarceration firsthand lacked general credibility.
Punishment seems a particularly difficult subject to broach politically
because those who are subject to it have no legitimate voice in any public debate in regard to it; and the rest of us take it for granted that it
works just fine, particularly since it doesn't influence our daily lives. It
is the colossus that we have become accustomed to. For others, however, it becomes the catalyst for radicalization, and the point where the
ideals of a polity are most evidently betrayed.
I had been accustomed to think of punishment as an expression of
force, a way of tracing the administration of power. Consider the common etymology of the words execute and executive; the ability to punish

INTRODUCTION

3

displays where the power of command rests. Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish laid bare the history of punishment to demonstrate the
shift in the constitution and exercise of political power; and though his
argument is that political power is decentralized, he examines punishment largely as displaying executive capacity. We can be certain that
the power to punish expresses ultimate authority and that those who
are punished have less power than those who administer it.
Most of the current literature on punishment reflects this basic
understanding. Punishment is seen as both an expression of and a tool
for consolidating power, and also reflects historical and current racial
and socioeconomic inequalities. This straightforward view of the relationship between power and punishment was challenged by my experiences teaching standard courses in the history of political thought. In
the midst of utopian treatises, discussions of justice, and debates about
the troubling division between thought and action I kept stumbling
into yet another discussion of punishment. Why was this brutal,
unpleasant intruder lurking in utopian visions and idealistic political
constructions?
This book began as the answer to that question, and it contains many
discussions about the role that punishment plays in various works of
political theory. But like all works of political theory, this one is also
concerned with the world outside of its pages. The primary purpose of
this text is to look at punishment as a central problem of political order.
Sociologists, legal scholars, and criminologists study penal regimes: the
discipline of political science, with notable exceptions, has ceded this
ground. 1 This is a terrible mistake: as I will demonstrate, punishment is
both a uniquely revealing lens into how political regimes work as well
as a central problem for political administration that requires careful
negotiation of the stated ideals of a polity in the exercise of power.
One of the most consistently complex problems facing political theorists is understanding where power comes from. We have rightfully
become increasingly dissatisfied with visions that focus only upon the
state or even its figureheads. Yet understanding how behavior, law,
institutions, perception, and ideals all work together in creating a political system is difficult to conceptualize. Examining punishment allows
us to see the intersection of all of these different elements.
More than that, punishment allows us to see political order in
dynamic fashion. To claim that consent, perception, display, and recognition playa role in the maintenance of political order is to say that rela-
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tionships form the basis of political order. Relationships may sound
like a static element, but they change repeatedly: consent isn't established just once, and perceptions aren't cemented in a moment of time;
instead they change, break down, are reaffirmed or altered. How is it
that regimes lose legitimacy even if their institutions remain in place?
How is our support of a political order brought into question? These
questions are just as important as examining how the status quo is
maintained. Perception as a component of political order is difficult to
account for on its own-like studying how a mirror distorts objects
without being able to study the reflected object. Examining punishment
allows us to understand how the perception of the public itself confers
political legitimacy and sovereignty; only a legitimate entity can punish, all others abuse.
My other point, that punishment is a problem for political regimes,
relates to this first one. Unjust punishments have served as a catalyst
for uprisings at more than one point in recent history, and it is no accident that prisoners often become martyrs and then leaders as in the
cases of Vaclav Havel and Nelson Mandela. For a state to punish does
not seem remarkable-after all, it has that power. For a state to punish
over a long period of time and not generate resistance to that expression of its power is a much more difficult, and rare, feat. It can only do
so through a complex negotiation of idealism and force, which is why
punishment, even though it is a universal attribute of regimes, is simultaneously one of their most difficult tasks. This fraught relationship
between idealism and pragmatism in state punishment requires a more
extensive introduction.

Political Idealism and Punishment
Most famously, both Aristotle and John Locke maintained that political
order is distinct from other kinds of human collectivities. What separates the polis from other kinds of associations is a matter of considerable contention, but for the purpose of this argument I agree that it is
distinct. The polis is marked by a juxtaposition of idealistic or normative
elements with the problems of administration. It is impossible to find a
regime entirely without norms, though it is all too easy to see regimes
that fail to act according to these stated norms. Conversely, governmental administration could never be driven by ideals to the exclusion of
practical considerations. Hence, one aspect of political order is the need
to relate political ideals to the administration of a population.
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State punishment exclusively reveals this interaction between ideal
and pragmatic in political orders. First, it is the gap between normative
and material that causes punishment. Punishment is administered only
when an ideal fails to be realized, whether that is obedience to the king,
laws, or social norms. State punishment is an attempt to reconcile disorderly realities or citizens with the ideal order. Though punishment
rarely, if ever, produces ideal behavior or citizens, punishing those
behaviors that fall outside of the norm reaffirms the state's commitment to that ideal. The effects of punishment are certainly embedded in
the bodies and spirits of those subjected to it, but the rationale behind
the practice displays an allegiance with an ethereal vision.
Second, punishment invites examination of whether the exercise of
state power is actually bounded by its declared ideals. Weber's famous
dictum that the state is defined by a monopoly of legitimate violence is
important here. 2 The state is allowed a unique prerogative to capture,
hold, even kill or maim its citizens. What makes such essentially brutal
acts legitimate? The answer to this question is different in every regime;
however, all states punish in the name of an ideal. Practices of punishment that continually contradict the stated ideals of a regime can ultimately lead to political destabilization. This is not an empirical study of
exactly when such a tipping point occurs; however, one of my tasks is
to reveal the fraught relationship between ideals and the administration of painful sanctions as one of the most difficult and central aspects
of political order.
The claim that punishment is related to the idealistic claims of a
political order should invite skepticism. After all, today punishment
appears most frequently to be a violation of ideals of justice. To someone who is alarmed by the new severity in the penal code and administration of criminality in the United States, this sounds like an especially
dubious theme to propose at this particular juncture. In the United
States in the past twenty months we have debated whether it is right to
execute persons who committed crimes when they were juveniles or
mentally impaired, we have looked at pictures of prisoners being sexually molested, abused, and even killed by U.S. military police, and we
have discovered secret prisons around the world intended to make our
enemies disappear forever. While it may be an expression of the sheer
power of the United States to engage in these activities, it is difficult to
envision them as a reflection of our political ideals.
When a state punishes, its ideals are on display and at stake. To think
of punishment as an ugly necessity that has no relation to the more
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lofty aspirations of justice leads to an ever more egregious and potentially destabilizing exercise of the state's prerogative to administer pain
to those subject to it) Just as a state should enter warfare and condone
the sacrifice of its soldiers with trepidation, a state also needs to pay
meticulous attention to its practices of punishment or risk its authority.
Recently, the understanding of how integrally related punishment is to
the stated ideals of a polity has been lost. We may not realize or understand th~t punishment is an expression of our ideals, but it nonetheless
remains such.
As this seems a particularly untimely argument to make, a brief
examination of past understandings of the relationship of punishment
and justice is in order. The Greek words time (honor) and poine (punish)
come from the same Indo-European root. 4 Implicit in the Greek understanding of both of these words is a reciprocal relationship, that every
action demands a reply, a belief evident in Aristotle. An unjust action
violates the proportional; therefore punishment is required in order to
reassert the proportionality of justice. "As the unjust in this sense is
inequality, the judge tries to restore the equilibrium. When one man
has killed and the other been killed, the doing and the suffering are
unevenly divided; by inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to
take away his gain and restore the equilibrium." It is crucial that the
loss of proportionality not be perpetuated by the punishment; there is
not a simplistic reversal whereby the judge subverts the offender as he
or she had subverted the sufferer. "The only difference the law considers is that brought about by the damage: it treats the parties as equals."5
State punishment cannot create victims.
Punishment is the infliction of pain. But for Aristotle, it is also the
assertion of goodness. Because it is necessary in response to an infraction, and because it is done with the intention of reasserting balance, it
is the source of goodness. It is preferable for a society never to punish,
and a state that punishes without absolute necessity is no longer just.
The measure of a just punishment is that it reestablishes proportionality in response to a crime. Even if the punishment itself is an equivalent
action, such as capital punishment in the case of murder, if it is done
out of necessity and in the interests of equality, it meets the standards
of the good.
Hegel also elaborated a theory of punishment along these lines,
through the distinction between revenge and punishment. Revenge is
the natural right of the injured to inflict pain upon the perpetrator. In
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Hegelian terms, the right of revenge is pursued out of a position of particularity; it has a personal dimension, which then reasserts the rights
of the particular person who has been wronged at the expense of the
universal. When punishment is levied in court, however, particularity
of revenge is replaced by the universality of injured right.
Instead of the injured party, the injured universal now comes on the
scene, and this has its proper actuality in the court of law. It takes
over the pursuit and avenging of crime, and this pursuit consequently ceases to be the subjective and contingent retribution of
revenge and is transformed into the genuine reconciliation of right
with itself ... by the annulment of the crime, the law is restored, and
its authority is thereby actualized. 6
The reassertion of the power of universality over the particularity of
injury or crime establishes the rule of law again. By punishing infractions in the name of its universality rather than in the name of a specific
victim, the law is able to reassert its own dominance and the value of
the universal over the particular, again and again. 7 The necessity of
punishment may seem to indicate a lapse in the power of the law, but
in the act of punishing, the law is reaffirmed. It is crucial to understand
that the power of the law is not reaffirmed through its ability to expel
members from the social body, or inflict pain, but rather because the
values of universality and right are upheld in the process of punishment.
Hegel is clear that the assertion of the law through punishment is not
achieved at the expense of the criminal who is punished. The prosecuted do not lose their rights or membership in the state through their
punishment. Instead, Hegel argues that the punishment itself is a
reflection of the criminal's rights, and ultimately an embodiment of his
will. Only a free, rational person can undergo punishment. Through
punishment, the state reaffirms that the criminal is a responsible agent.
The injury which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly justas just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom,
his right; on the contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e. in his objectively embodied will, in his action. The
reason for this is that his action is the action of a rational being and
this implies that it is something universal and that by doing it the
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criminal has laid down a law which he has explicitly recognized in
his action and under which in consequence he should be brought as
his right. 8
It is the criminal's right to be punished since rights derive from our
existence as universal beings. Hegel also explicitly links the pain of
punishment with the reassertion of justice. He argues that the person
being punished has endured a sort of psychic split. As part of the universal, in repudiating the universal by breaking the law, she has
rejected a part of herself. Philippe Nonet has explored Hegel's argument and asserts that the pain of punishment heals the split within the
offender. Pain literally brings the offender back to the truth of universalism. 9 Hence, it is the relationship to the universality of the state and
the law that creates punishment: all other retributive pain that derives
from a particular relationship or injury is revenge.
What both Aristotle's and Hegel's descriptions of punishment have
in common is that punishment is the reluctant office of the law and
state. The state serves as the instrument of legality here; it cannot punish with the intent of enforcing or asserting its own power. Only if it
meets the criteria of necessity and judiciousness can the state punish
with impunity. Punishment then emerges as one of the crucial ways to
measure the rule of law. How we punish reveals whether a society
adheres to the rule of law. It is not the punishment itself that reasserts
the rule of law, but rather the process used to determine whether a punishment is needed and what it shall be.
This notion that punishment needs to be dispassionate in order to be
just is reflected in U.S. jurisprudence. For instance, in Coppedge v. United
States the Court observed, "The methods we employ in the enforcement
of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the
quality of our civilization may be judged."lo Recognizing that the
impulse for revenge may be strong, the law must stand in opposition to
these impulses to reassert both the rule of law and the right accorded to
all individuals. In McCleskey v. Kemp Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion observes, "Those whom we would banish from society or from the
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to be heard
above society's demand for punishment. It is the particular role of the
courts to hear those voices, for the Constitution declares that the
majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the conditions of social
life."" The law must stand outside the impulse for revenge and engage
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only in judicious punishment if the rule of law is to persist. Note that
these arguments admit that the thirst for revenge is real and strong, yet
they share the faith that the law can substitute for these passions and
restore universal right. A law that punishes to reassert right, not to
instill fear of the sovereign or to express the outrage of the people, is
considered the clearest indication of the ability of law to constrain and
govern political power.
But others, following in the tradition of Nietzsche, assert that stateadministered punishment is merely the codification and formalization
of the right of revenge. State punishment is an extension of the group
cohesion that results from an expression of the natural desire for
revenge. One dominant theme in punishment literature examines how
the process of punishment is used as a tool of social cohesion. Which
groups are exorcised and punished? What society criminalizes is often
a method of governing the boundaries of membership. As soon as
someone strays outside of accepted behavioral norms, punishment is
wielded to increase compliance. But being able to punish is also a privilege of belonging in the group itself.
In Shirley Jackson's story liThe Lottery," village members all gather
together excitedly for what initially appears to be a sort of festival or
raffle. One woman is randomly selected, and the rest of the village then
stones her. Social cohesion is built through the active prosecution and
exclusion of others-the rewards of group membership become crystal
clear at such a moment. Those who punish are reaffirmed as members
of the community. The power of the community is expressed when it
punishes; the members of the community bond through their imposition of pain upon outsiders. In Jackson's story, there is no need for a
crime, either real or imagined; it is the practice itself that breeds cohesion. "The Lottery" starkly conveys this message, but the same story is
told by studies that show those who are most fearful of crime are least
susceptible to it. The impulse to punish or exclude need not be rooted
in any specific experience of victimization.
Any school playground in the world would reveal the cohesion of
social groups through punishment and exclusion; punishment is necessary for the existence of the group, not because of the inevitability of
crime. However, this example of the schoolyard suggests an important
distinction between punishment conducted by social groups and the
state. Unlike schoolchildren, the modern state does not punish simply
because it can-rather, it must punish in the name of a value or ideal.
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While group cohesion certainly can result from and even be the key
motivation behind state punishment, I find the relationship between
the act of punishing and the stated ideal most intriguing. The juxtaposition between pursuing a greater good and administering some sort of
pain is improbable, difficult, and revealing.
Punishment and Political Order is not attempting to displace the sociological analysis of punishment but to supplement it. Social dynamics
unquestionably impact the practices of state punishment. However, so
do the stated ideals of a polity. I propose that practices of punishment
force institutional powers and social groups to contend with political
ideals. Punishment is where the ideals of a polity come to be dramatically situated in close proximity with the realities of governance, and
thereby it provides the most difficult case in the expression of political
order. Can a state appear just, even as it administers pain?
The answer to this question depends upon two different components. The first is the perception of those within the political order.
There is no empirical distinction between the exercise of tyranny and
the administration of punishment; it is entirely a matter of perception.
Punishment seems to provide a strong catalyst for reflection upon the
government; it draws attention to the exclusive prerogatives of state
power, and to the vulnerabilities of citizens before this power. For this
reason, dissatisfaction, dissent, or mere discomfort with a regime can
frequently appear or be mobilized around practices of punishment.
Punishment can cause fissures within the polity to grow, or it can create martyrs, solidifying a perception of betrayal by the state. A central
theme throughout the chapters that follow is exploring the cultivation
and evolution of these perceptions around state punishment as an integral element in political order-and its undoing.
It is simple to say that a polity is committed to justice; the difficulty
comes in whether it is able to demonstrate that commitment to justice
even in the administration of pain. If a regime cannot offer some rationale-whether that be service to God, impartial courts, the light of reason, or the necessity of power-and thereby convincingly assert that
the administration of pain serves justice, state punishment becomes
simply the exercise of brutality by one person over another with less
power. No wonder the question of punishment plays such a prominent
role in political theories throughout history: if punishment is mere
opportunism, then political ideals can be nothing other than a flimsy
scrim masking oppression. Can the exercise of state power, even at its
most extreme, serve an ideal?
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Political order offers the possibility that human beings can construct
an earthly system that redeems our existence. One common aspect of
all religious orders is that they offer an understanding of suffering as
redemption. As soon as states punish in their own name, not that of
God, then they have taken on a task of great magnitude. Political orders
that administer suffering in the form of punishment must also promise
redemption from this pain through the realization of a greater ideal
(explored more fully in chapters 1,2, and 7, this volume). This study has
forced me to consider whether political orders have established an
impossible task for themselves: can an earthly order really redeem
human suffering? Is the punishment done in the name of worldly
ideals too difficult to justify? While it is often argued that the desire to
limit state power is what created liberalism and its emphasis upon the
sanctity of individual rights and bodies, all liberal regimes make exceptions in the case of punishment. Justifying punishment by relating it to
some kind of idealism is a dynamic in all political orders. Punishment
demands the most precise balance between serving an ideal and serving power.
Studying both the history and present exercise of state punishment
suggests that most regimes are not up to this difficult task. The prerogatives of power hold an irresistible allure, and I doubt very much
whether any instance of state punishment is completely devoted to
ideals of justice. In fact, I have come to wonder whether the pivotal role
that punishment must play in secular political systems is one of the
most enduring weaknesses in any modern regime. To administer pain
in the name of worldly ideals requires the sort of discipline and justification that could never be achieved consistently. Consider, for example, the juxtaposition of Aristotle's claim that the state must punish to
reassert the good with his knowledge of the trial of Socrates. You could
argue that Aristotle was defining an ideal as a response to this travesty
of justice; on the other hand, you could argue that just punishment is an
impossible standard to uphold. Though the rewards, redemption, and
punishments of the afterlife are impossible to discern, judge, and
debate, the costs, pain, and problems of earthly punishment are readily
available for us to question. Secular states must be able to punish in
their own name, but this fact is nonetheless the Achilles' heel of any
regime. Punishment provides the foundations of political order, but
they are invariably Manichaean.
The seven chapters that follow move from the largest theoretical
issues of politics and order to more specific case studies in contempo-
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rary American politics while pursuing two central themes. The first is
punishment as a central problem for a political regime: how can a state,
charged with the protection of a people, administer pain? Many of the
most distinctive features of modem political governance have been
developed in managing this paradoxical prerogative. The definition of
sovereignty, the stated relationship between idealism and pragmatism
in the administration of a regime, and the movement of redemption
into the political realm are three methods that have allowed states to
legitimate practices of punishment.
The second unifying theme in my discussion is the ever-shifting relationship between a regime and a given population that makes up the
most essential element in any political order. Punishment uniquely
reveals this dynamic element of political order. While state punishment
normally demonstrates the ability of a regime to administer a population, it can at times also be destabilizing, creating resistance to and critique of a regime. Many studies of punishment have concentrated on
the first dynamic, but they have neglected the potential for change that
can arise as a result of punishment that is perceived as illegitimate.
Chapter 1, "The Whip of Utopia: On Punishment and Political
Vision," introduces both themes through utopian and dystopian political visions. Sir Thomas More's Utopia is framed by discussions of penal
practices in sixteenth-century England, leading into a comparison with
the more pragmatic Utopians who enslave their criminals to do necessary public works. More helps us to understand how punishment
serves as a means by which to understand the constant negotiation
between the needs of political administration and the aims of justice.
Franz Kafka's "In the Penal Colony" presents a decidedly dystopian
vision of punishment, relating it to the pursuit of ideals as well. Both
More's and Kafka's works present instances of punishment to stimulate
a response in their readers, displaying the crucial elements of audience
and perception in the development of just punishment and political
regimes.
The second chapter, '''Man's Life Is but a Prison': Human Reason,
Secular Political Order, and the Punishments of God," explores the
movement of suffering and redemption from the religious realm into
the political one through The Book of Job and Hobbes's Leviathan. In the
Bible, human suffering was explained as a punishment from God, thus
bestowing a logic to pain as well as offering the hope that such pain will
be redemptive. Hobbes takes up the challenge of Job and creates a state
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that will make human suffering conformable to human logic. However,
this shift means that state punishments also need to provide the hope of
redemption, something that is exceedingly difficult to achieve. Hence,
punishment both demonstrates and provides the catalyst for the secularization of human order but displays how unstable the foundations of
this order can be.
In chapter 3, "Earthly Divinity: Punishment and the Requirements of
Sovereignty," I investigate the development of modern conceptions of
sovereignty. The odd combination of immanence and transcendence in
the modern state can be viewed in light of state punishment, and in
fact, this combination is one of the central ways of legitimating such
punishment. The connections with the previous chapter are apparent,
as sovereignty is a trace element of the divine that survives in secular
political regimes.
Chapter 4, "Severing the Sanguinary Empire: Punishment and Early
American Democratic Idealism," explores the early American republic
and the role that punishment played in the struggle to break from
England's colonial empire and in the definition of the new state. This
chapter demonstrates the potential relationship between idealism and
punishment most clearly-a connection which seems exceptionally
weak today. The contrast between this early democratic idealism and
the subject of chapter 5, "Punishment in Liberal Regimes," which
explores classical liberal political thought and the contemporary penal
regime in the United States, could not be more stark. Here I look at liberal exceptionalism in terms of the punishment that is at the foundations of liberal thought. Punishment has always served a particularly
important role in the development of liberal principles such as responsibility and personhood. The social contract regime, based upon
notions that are simultaneously concrete yet ethereal, requires punishment to make itself tangible. Understanding these elements in liberal
political thought in part helps to explain what penal practices accomplish today in the United States, and why it is difficult to critique them
on purely economic, racially unjust, or utilitarian grounds.
Chapter 6, "Hitched to the Post: Prison Labor, Choice, and Citizenship," continues my study of contemporary U.S. penal practices but
links them to neoliberal economics. One of the most important and
compelling strains of political analysis of punishment emphasizes its
economic function. While I generally agree that there is a crucial political economic component, I present the cases of prison labor in an era of
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deindustrialization to argue that the connection is not always straightforward. Prison labor is not utilized to extract labor-in fact, it is generally spectacularly unproductive-but rather is a mechanism for
enforcing the presumptions of neoliberalism. Though focused on different aspects of current politics, both chapters 5 and 6 help explain the
relationship between penal practices and liberal ideals of individuality,
contract, and freedom in the United States. Though the penal system is
anything but egalitarian, nor does it promote individual liberties, it
needs to be viewed in relation to liberal idealism, not as a deviation
from it.
Finally, chapter 7, "Punishment and the Spiral of Disorder," is an
exploration of punishment as a destabilizing force in contemporary
U.S. international politics. This conclusion is more suggestive than
comprehensive, as this topic deserves a full-length exploration. I
include this discussion to examine how punishment can playa crucial
role in international as well as domestic regimes, and also as a sober
reminder that an unjust penal regime can reach over oceans and touch
the lives of citizens of other regimes. The exposure of prisoner abuse in
Abu Ghraib, the continuing discussions of prisoner treatment in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, and the revelation of secret prisons in
Eastern Europe have catalyzed world opinion against the U.s. government, as would be predicted by the arguments in the rest of the book.
The dynamics of perception and the awareness first introduced in
chapter 1 become especially important here. Perhaps the most revealing perspective one can gain on practices of punishment is from the
eyes of an outsider. Would you want such practices to become emblematic of your regime? The fictional scenarios spun by More and Kafka
have come to fruition, as punishment has come to represent the regime
of the United States in an unfavorable light. Partly out of discomfort
with this fact, American support of the country's missions abroad and
the aims of the War on Terror measurably waned with the publicizing
of the abuse. Illegitimate use of the power to punish can backfire, leading to a depletion of legitimacy and hence the power of command.
Let me conclude with one final reason to rescue the relationship
between political idealism and punishment. After all, we have no way
to evaluate the ethics or inherent justice of systems of punishment if we
do not remember that punishment is supposed to be an expression of
justice, not merely power. When we focus on institutional practices of
punishment, or sociological accounts of punishment and membership,
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we look at punishment as a practice of power. While it is certainly that,
it is also linked to the ideals inherent in a political order. This book
addresses the lacunae in the literature by presenting the central role
that punishment plays in different seminal works of political theory. I
do so not to replace the other readings of punishment that are more
familiar but to complement them. For this reason, this text, while
dwelling primarily upon these works of political theory, will also bring
in these sociological, economic, and historical studies of punishment.
Seeing how theories of punishment relate to practices of punishment
reveals a central dialectic in politics-the struggle between ideal and
real. And to bring up these idealistic foundations of punishment is not
to fit a flowered glove over an iron fist but to have a firmer understanding of exactly what we betray when we engage in practices of
punishment that are inherently unjust.

CHAPTER 1

The Whip of Utopia
On Punishment and Political Vision
He who will not listen must feel.
--German proverb

Utopias and dystopias amplify the powerful ambiguity of all political
philosophy as thinking that nonetheless tries to accomplish change.
They are fictional accounts that are deliberately ahistorical and present
dreams or nightmares-not manifestos that demand action. As Judith
Shklar notes, "It is a vision not of the probable but of the 'not-impossible.'" We tend to dismiss utopian visions as fantastic or idealistic to a
fault: a proposal that is labeled "utopian" is not destined for realization.
Paradoxically, the limitations of utopias as blueprints provide their
political salience. Utopias present a viewpoint unmarred by history or
necessity; in contrast to utopia" all historical actuality is het:e brought to
judgment ... and found wanting."l The power of utopian writing
springs from the careful presentation of contrast: contrast between the
culture being presented and the reader's and/or writer's own, and
between idealism and practicality. Dystopias also bring a shock of
recognition through comparison. Here is a distasteful vision. What elements of this picture can be found in your own world?
In this chapter, I look at two pieces of writing from remarkably difJerent ages and orientations that fulfill the political function of utopias
and dystopias: Sir Thomas More's Utopia and Franz Kafka's "In the
Penal Colony." The parallels between the two pieces are striking, even
though the tone of each work could not be more different. Travelers
cross cultural and political boundaries and present their wisdom to an
audience. The message of each is sufficiently ambiguous and uncomfortable to propel a shift in perception on the part of their readers. Both
texts frame their message by focusing on practices of punishment. Here
I will explain how this thematic focus is closely related to the overall
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purpose of both texts to shift the political consciousness of their audience. Punishment allows More and Kafka to mobilize their readers:
how will you respond to this exercise of power? What practices of state
power do you accept as given, and why? Furthermore, examining practices of punishment displays how a regime itself negotiates between
the demands of rule and the pursuit of justice. Both utopian thought
and punishment serve as a catalyst: they offer the pointed opportunity
for reflection and critique. How do we judge the exercise of power in
relation to its larger ideals, and how are we to respond, given this
newly found awareness?
More and Kafka both drive home the message that political orders
are contingent upon the proclivities, not only of their rulers, but also of
the population at large. An outside perspective stirs our consciousness;
we evaluate the strange world being presented, but then, ideally, we
tum these trained eyes onto our own systems and start to consider
what an outsider would say. Punishment as the central theme in both
of these texts helps to intensify this process of political reeducation in a
number of ways.
First of all, it brings the incomplete nature of political regimes into
sharp focus. The basic task of political order is to create harmony out of
what is a volatile and varied population. For this reason, the unruly
aspects of human existence are rarely glimpsed in tracts of political philosophy and most works of political science today. Political philosophy
is often engaged in composing systems that neutralize or eliminate
human imperfections; recent political science strives for empiricism
and predictive capabilities, hence the out of the ordinary is "controlled" or registered in "standard deviations." Nonetheless, anything
involving human beings strays from the ideal-type. Political orders
invariably contain ideals that are imperfectly realized: therefore a clash
between ideal and empirical is bound to occur. Even if our theories and
models do not acknowledge this chasm, political regimes must find
some way of dealing with the troubling propensity of human beings to
nonconformity. This gap between human behavior and political ideals
is occupied by state punishment. The nagging reality that accompanies
the impulse to political idealism is the mortality and bodily existence of
human beings. The body that desires, bleeds, kills, and dies is the
inescapable ground of human life: it administers and requires punishment to bring it into line with the promise of order. Punishment is
where the ideal of perfect administration collides with our moral and
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material weakness. It is one thing to have an ideal, another thing altogether to realize it. Emphasizing this difficulty allows both More and
Kafka to deny their readers the simple denigration of the real in favor
of the ideal; instead they are forced to reckon with the need to balance
both aspects in a regime.
Second, punishment not only points toward the unrealized promise
of political order; it also provokes the question, What efforts to realize
an ideal are appropriate? More and Kafka both present punishment as
an expression of a regime's ideals, not just its brute powers. From the
perspective of an outsider as provided by More and Kafka, we reconsider accepted forms of punishment and are forced to judge which
practices are truly appropriate in the name of realizing ideals. As Corey
Robin points out in Fear: The History of a Political Idea, the horrors of the
twentieth century have led us to regard idealism with suspicion. Totalitarian regimes are commonly blamed upon "ideas that cast death ... as
a way, the way, of life."2 George Kateb describes a similar dynamic in
his essay "The Adequacy of the Canon," arguing that what he terms the
"hyperactive imagination" is culpable for the mass atrocities of the
twentieth century. He describes the hyperactive imagination as "the
rabid capacity to make the present absent, to imagine a different reality,
to have designs on that reality."3 What characterizes this imaginative
capacity is the ability to see a vision of what can be to the complete
exclusion of what is, combined with the drive to tum that vision into
reality. While Kateb's examples are extreme, which is appropriate to
his task of explaining the catastrophes of our times, this dynamic is
present in the more mundane acts of state punishment, as both More
and Kafka make clear. Most people would regard killing, maiming, or
depriving personal freedom in the name of an ideal with considerable
suspicion. Yet this is precisely what states do when they punish.
Clearly individual rights are subordinated to some ideals today, no
matter how fervently we think we distrust this sort of activity.
But Robin's observation about the ideologically wary population of
the early twenty-first century prods me to argue that the other optionrelinquishing any ideal at all-is just as tragic. If idealism leads to egregious actions, it is tempting to conclude that it is simply a dangerous
element in politics. Sh.ould we do no more than embrace .order f.or the
mere sake of order? I d.on't think s.o. Clearly the c.orrect balance must be
a dedicati.on to ideals that is n.ot my.opic, and a willingness to envisi.on
alternatives while ackn.owledging material preconditi.ons and limita-
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tions, which ultimately is the message presented by Utopia and "In the
Penal Colony."4
Both texts are deliberately disorienting, helping us to see that the
question of how to relate political ideals and a given population cannot
be definitively resolved; rather, it is the negotiation between the two
that composes political citizenship. In these texts, and in our lives, punishment provides a clear forum for the negotiation between rights and
pragmatism and the cultivation of legitimacy and stability for a political regime. By making these points through the presentation of punishment, both More and Kafka bring an urgency to our ability to grasp
these dilemmas of political thought. In punishment, the ethereal
debates about theory and practice contained in virtually all tracts of
political philosophy fall to the ground in a most spectacular fashion;
questions of principle and right become ones of life and flesh.

Punishment in Utopia
In a letter, Erasmus reported that Sir Thomas More had initially written

only the second book of Utopia that described the practices and society
of the Utopians but then later wrote the first "because it was needed."
So rather than being a straightforward account of a fictive society, there
are two different worlds represented in Utopia, and it is in the juxtaposition of the two that the book's central themes and brilliance are
achieved.
Sir Thomas More's Utopia begins by setting the stage of Raphael
Hythloday's detailed account of the political and social order of Utopia.
Thomas More is in Flanders during a journey for the business of state,
when his friend Peter Giles introduces him to Raphael Hythloday, who
has traveled the world and combines the wisdom of a philosopher and
the scientism of an explorer. The second book is the traveler's account
of Utopia; the first book is a dialogue between Giles, More, and Hythloday that frames the story of the second.
The themes of the first book are complex, but two important elements emerge from the seemingly secondary introduction. The first is
that Hythloday is established as a reliable source, unsullied by service
to any of the powers that be, in marked contrast to More himself who is
in Flanders serving the Crown. This is one of the most central problems
for anyone interested in political reform: only those subject to a political order would be motivated to reform it, but they lack the perspective
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to know what the alternatives are. The purpose of utopian works is to
insert the outside perspective into a given political context, thus achieving a destabilization of perception. Greatly impressed by Hythloday's
acute observations and knowledge of different political orders, the narrator, More, wonders, "why do you not enter into the service of some
king ... this learning of yours and your knowledge of peoples and
places would not only serve to delight him but would also make you fit
to inform him."5 Hythloday recoils at the suggestion saying he would
not want to be enslaved by any king. A king's ear is deaf to all but the
counsel he seeks, and Hythloday would prefer to be pursuing the truth
than currying favor.
When Peter Giles first introduces Hythloday to More, he tells him he
is a voyager "like Plato," immediately linking his geographical wisdom
with the same remove as the philosopher. Plato wanted philosophers to
rule, because they would ensure the persistent impact and enlightened
judgment of the outside perspective. Quentin Skinner has discussed
this dynamic in More's Utopia and termed it the problem of counsel.
Hythloday uses this interchange as an example of his unwillingness to
compromise, and how this truthfulness would be poorly received by
rulers. The struggle over counsel and politics is also autobiographical:
Skinner reports that More had agreed to go into the service of Henry
VIII immediately before writing the book. 6 Though Hythloday insists
that he is not to be corrupted by service to actual powers, the text of
Utopia suggests otherwise. Hythloday's indignant protestations can be
read as signaling that the suggestions that follow are uncorrupted by
proximity to power. After his cantankerous pronouncement regarding
the state's creation of thieves, Hythloday's powerful listeners do entertain alternative notions of punishment. And while the first book of
Utopia insists that princes spurn wise counselors and vice versa, the second book plainly offers Hythloday's services by recounting his story.
Hythloday's perspective as an outsider makes him bring reformatory
ideas to English penal practices, but it also establishes to the reader the
necessity of seeing one's order from the outside. More points out the
paradox that guides his utopian project: only the wisdom of outsiders
can provoke this kind of self-reflection and the potential for reform.
The content of this debate over the relationship between wisdom
and ruling is punishment. As an example of the myopic wisdom of
rulers, Hythloday recounts a conversation with the Archbishop of Canterbury and one of the king's counselors about the practice of hanging
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thieves. The counselor lauded the rigorous application of the principles
of justice: "They were executed everywhere, he said, sometimes as
many as twenty at a time hanging on one gallows, and he remarked
that he was all the more amazed that the country was cursed to have so
many of them prowling about everywhere, since so few escaped punishment."7
Hythloday disagrees with this assessment and offers an enlarged
view of the problem of thievery including the shortage of land (his
famous sheep-eat-men observation), the learned incompetence of the
middlemen who administer the feudal orders, the markets for beef and
wool, the desire for luxurious living, and the presence of gambling
houses that leave many in desperate ruin. The bodies that litter the
state's gallows could not be pulled down quickly enough to make room
for more under such circumstances.
Certainly unless you remedy these evils, it is pointless for you to
boast of the justice administered in the punishment of thieves, a justice which is specious rather than either just or expedient. In fact
when you bring people up with the worst sort of education and
allow their morals to be corrupted little by little from their earliest
years, and then punish them at last as grown men when they commit
the crimes which from childhood they have given every prospect of
committing, what else are you doing, I ask you, but making them
into thieves and then punishing them for it?8
The crime has nothing whatsoever to do with the punishment but
instead results from social organization.
More scholar George Logan has observed that the debate about punishment aptly establishes the primary themes of Utopia. 9 In commenting that the practice of hanging thieves is neither just nor expedient,
Hythloday introduces the central question of Utopia, and indeed virtually all political thought, by asking how best to reconcile the needs of
practicality and justice. Hanging thieves, since it fails to prevent thievery and is a betrayal of the principle of proportionality in punishment,
fits neither criterion. While it is tempting to assume that More is building the ideal with little attention to the practical, in actuality Utopia
offers a more nuanced message on this problematic, which becomes
clear when contrasting the penal practices of little value in England
with the penal practices of Utopia.

THE WHIP OF UTOPIA

23

To introduce a utopian vision by discussing punishment seems
counterintuitive to say the least, so we expect to encounter a rapid shift
from the critique implied in the first book to a more idyllic political
vision in the second. But the unsavory elements of More's discussion
persist even in the second book of Utopia, when we have presumably
moved from the corrupted European order to the Utopian one. Hythloday has commented that inequalities of wealth and property create
crime, along with an undue love of luxury. Utopia has eliminated
wealth, luxury, and property yet still has to conduct punishments. If
Hythloday's prognosis in the first book were to hold true, in such a perfectly engineered society there would be no need for punishment. Nevertheless, we find slavery in Utopia. Rather than killing criminals,
Utopians enslave them, and they perform many of the menial tasks
upon which their society is absolutely dependent. Prisoners wear differently colored clothing for quick recognition and must devote their
lives in public service to amend for the harms caused to the community
by their crimes.
There are three classes of slaves: those who were condemned to
death in other countries and sent to Utopia where they can instead
labor their days away; the poor of other countries who presumably
come to Utopia and request to be their slaves since such an existence is
better than the life offered to them in their own countries; and finally
the Utopians who have committed crimes. "Utopian slaves, however,
they treat more harshly since they consider them baser and deserving
of more severe punishment because they had an extraordinary education and the best moral training, yet still could not be restrained from
moral wrongdoing."lo
Hythloday points out with apparent delight the practicality of this
system of punishment: all benefit from their labor when none would
profit from their execution. The public slaves also serve as a countermonument. He compares the criminals in chains to the statues of local
heroes: they both serve as an incentive for citizens to become virtuous.
If slaves can prove that "they regret the sin more than the punishment"
the sentence can be ended, commuted by the rulers or by popular
vote. l l This comment reveals an understanding of the complexities of
state punishment. This penitence is no simple task to discern or to produce. For virtually everyone who is punished is quite sorry indeed that
they have been caught, but very few become truly remorseful of their
crime.
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One paradox of punishment is that the pain is supposed to encourage reform and recognition of personal duty. On the contrary, those
being punished are more likely to blame those administering the pain
for their misfortunes. Acceptance of personal responsibility for the
crime would require that the person being punished give more legitimacy to the law and its executioners than to their personal choices or
comfort. Hythloday's account of punishment in Utopia quickly discards these subtleties. If the slaves refuse to labor and are disruptive
"they are finally slaughtered like wild beasts." So much for the inherent
worth of man and the promise of just social order whereby individuals
combine together, sometimes giving up their individual gain for collective good.
.
The international order of Utopia is no less troubling. The Utopians
are a peace-loving people, so they hire mercenaries to fight their wars
so as not to stain their own population with wanton bloodletting. As
self-proclaimed peaceniks, we might assume they fight only in selfdefense, but they invade other countries who may have insulted their
friends, countries who treat their citizens badly (and who might be
happier as slaves in Utopia), or countries that might threaten their interests. Ultimately, Utopia sounds imperialistic. 5hlomo Avineri has commented upon these unappealing aspects of Utopia, concluding,
"Utopian thinking never really maintains that the given human nature
is perfect; on the contrary, it has to be purged and cleansed from its
intrinsic evil."12 In Avineri's view, Utopia is created as "perfect" by its
ruthless excision of anything that is less than perfect-wars are fought
on other turf and by soldiers from other countries, slaves become the
repository of the population's moral failings-their public display
asserts the relative morality of everyone else. The problem with
Avineri's reading is that it replicates the simplistic understanding of
crime and punishment that Hythloday explicitly rejects in the first book
of Utopia. More does not think you can eliminate thievery by killing
thieves; instead you must look into the inherent causes of criminality.
In Hythloday's view, Utopia does all it can to prevent criminality
through the eradication of property and wealth and by creating the best
possible system of education. Nonetheless, More remarks to Hythloday, "For everything will not be done well until all men are good, and
I do not expect to see that for quite a few years yet."13 The only available strategy is to balance the needs of practicality and justice and to
create the best possible arrangements for cultivating virtue and achiev-
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ing stability. The social organization dispenses with all the requirements of justice; those people that persist in falling outside the utopic
order can be punished in the way that is most expedient.
If this is the case, then punishment is far more central to Utopia than
it first appears, and in fact, displays the central problem of the book.
What do you do with the failings of humans in even the most perfect of
social orders? In less than perfect orders, the state can be blamed, at
least in part. But there are convicts even in,Utopia. On the one hand, we
could take the presence of punishment as a sign of freedom, rather than
failure, within the administered world of Utopia. After all, as opposed
to other forms of social control, such as conditioning, propaganda, or
peer pressure, using punishment to maintain order "maximizes individual freedom within the coercive framework of law."14 Individuals
have a choice whether to obey the law, and punishment is a form of
control that is deferred until a transgression has actually occurred.
On the other hand, Hythloday observes the rage that erupts when
this bestowed freedom is abused. The fury of the Utopians was
reserved for the betrayal of their own perfection by members of the
society. These deviants prove the inevitable incomplet~ness of political
order; no matter how beautifully constructed a society is there will
always be those who fall outside of the boundaries. Perfection, defined
as the ability to construct a society where justice is fully realized, is a
mirage; the real test of a society is how it manages its failures. This is
why Utopia begins with a discussion of criminality, and why the pressing question of political order is not simply the ideal, but how to relate
the ideal with the pragmatic. The final answer is clearly not offered
here in Utopia, and More suggests that it never can be-the matter is left
open for debate at every point in the book.
The message of Utopia is that a perfect reconciliation of justice and
expediency is not possible, therefore how the state decides to punish
reveals where it falls in juggling the two elements. I agree with others
who have suggested that Utopia ultimately argues that there is no way
to engineer a perfect convergence of justice and practicality.1 5 The thematic of punishment becomes central in the text because this is exactly
where states are forced to try this negotiation. Yet punishment also circles back to the first theme I introduced here, and that is the wisdom of
outsiders. In the cases of both England and Utopia, observers recount
their official practices of punishment, opening both regimes to examination. More wants us to adopt the outsider position and tum back to
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question English penal practices as representative of the character and
purpose of the regime. Does a government feast upon its unfortunate?
Does it profit from criminality and thus secretly cultivate it? Does it
take too much pleasure in disciplining the bodies of criminals or viewing their misery? Every political order has stated ideals and beliefs, but
practices of punishment reveal whether and how these ideals are
betrayed. Conversely, ideals, when followed absolutely, can be just as
problematic. Is outrage too vehement? Do we lynch in the name of our
own righteousness? More suggests that we need to discard the examples of both the English and the Utopians, and balance idealism and
practicality in punishment. For instance, a country would never throw
everyone who sped on a highway into jail for criminality; on the other
hand, it would create chaos to give up trying to regulate traffic. The
negotiation between practicality and principle is played out over and
over in choices about why, how, and whether to punish crimes.
As the reported discussion between Hythloday and the Archbishop
of Canterbury in the first book suggests, another central issue in determining practices of punishment is how responsibility is perceived.
What is so startling about seeing this debate articulated in 1516 is that it
is the same one that we have today. Does the amount of criminality
have any relation to the punishments administered, or does it have
more to do with social conditions outside the law? There is a series of
relationships implied here: in one view, the crime incurs the punishment; the causal relationship exists in the frame of reference of individual choice. Failure to punish harshly would send the message that the
crime is not deserving of punishment, severing the causal link. Crime
would then run rampant. This view assumes that the criminal always
has a good incentive to break the law, and that punitive pain must outweigh the calculated advantage.
The other viewpoint, here represented by Hythloday, sees the causal
relationship existing in a different frame of reference: social conditions
create the crime. If social conditions are such that either a true or perceived advantage is derived from crime, then the social order has simply failed. Society must be organized in such a way that there is no gain
from participating in criminal activity. Until this level of social engineering has been achieved, the need to punish must be perceived as a
failure on the part of the state in accomplishing its mission, not necessarily a failure on the part of the criminaL
This debate signals why the assumptions about individual responsi-
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bility that support practices and conceptions of punishment are so difficult. If we assume that people are malleable enough to be trained,
then why suddenly assume that their choices are individual? More
observes that the special fury of the state is reserved for those people
who bite the hand that trained and fed them: "After all I've done for
you, see what you have done!" The structures of punishment insist we
are individuals, but political order assumes we are educable citizens.
One aspect of determining the role of punishment in political order is
the negotiation between persistent human unpredictability and the
promise of social administration. Practices of punishment are one arena
where societies are forced to grapple with the fact that human beings
are conditioned yet free.
Punishment as a practice is particularly salient: it represents, as I
have said, much about how a regime deals with its failings. More also
makes it clear that the population participates in these given structures
through their acceptance or questioning of them. Today, we as readers
are outsiders to both regimes that More describes in Utopia, hence it is
much easier for us to be critical of them. Those subject to a political system are most likely to accept its practices. Utopia offers the view from
the outside as an impetus to reform. But More makes it plain that the
prisoners described in both regimes provide another cause for reflection-they are the internal dissidents to the established order as well as
the products of that regime's failure. In other words, those being punished and those viewing the punishment fall outside the regime's common preconceptions of proper order, thereby harboring the potential
for critique and change. Of course, those being punished have none of
the legitimacy or dispassion of the observers, and they have guilt, not
objectivity on their side.
In the Penal Colony

Dystopias can be read as companion volumes to utopias, and indeed
viewing Kafka's "In the Penal Colony" alongside More's Utopia provokes many of the same considerations of audience, idealism, political
order, and punishment. Franz Kafka's fictional work provides a crystalline vision of politics by taking the familiar elements of our administration of justice and placing them in an unfamiliar context or by magnifying common assumptions or trends. Kafka's work is often fantastic
in form, but his intent was worldly. His dreamlike narratives push

PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER

readers to recognize the world as it actually is, not as it is commonly
perceived. In a conversation with Gustav Janouch, Kafka described his
work as follows: "The dream reveals the reality, which conception lags
behind. That is the horror of life-the terror of art."16 It isn't that Kafka
creates dreamlike worlds; instead his work brings out the surreal
aspects of our own. Kafka's bizarre yet straightforward descriptions
penetrate his readers who then carry that sense of estrangement into
their own experiences. Those who have read The Trial will never sanguinely face a bureaucratic maze again; those who read his story "In the
Penal Colony" will respond to the phrase "sentenced to death" with a
shudder. Jane Bennett has written about Kafka's work as a contribution
to political thought, arguing that he writes genealogical stories that
"highlight the contingent elements of an ideal, or its falsifications, or the
arbitrary devaluations and exclusions that accompany it, or the incompatible elements within it."17 "In the Penal Colony" shakes our perception of the relationship between punishment, justice, and enlightenment to the very core. I can think of no better place than Kafka to start
unraveling common assumptions about punishment and politics.
The narrator of the story is an explorer who is visiting a penal
colony. He is apparently someone of stature, as all the administrators in
the colony assume that he shall report back on their activities and that
his opinions shall carry some weight. Most of the story takes place with
four characters around a machine in a deserted area of a penal colony.
The officer is showing the explorer a machine invented by the original
Commandant of the colony; the two main characters are accompanied
by the condemned and the soldier who is guarding the prisoner. The
officer is preparing the machine for the condemned, who failed to obey
his orders: over the course of twelve hours, the machine will write the
sentence "Honor Thy Superiors" over the body of the man repeatedly.
The machine is carefully designed to inscribe the sentence upon the
condemned, literally. The mechanism is carefully designed to kill its
victims, but very slowly and with great precision. The officer observes
that at the sixth hour, "Enlightenment comes to the most dull-witted. It
begins around the eyes. From there it radiates. A moment that might
tempt one to get under the Harrow oneself."ls Most courts simply proclaim the sentence or judgment; here the punishment inscribes the
judgment onto the body of the prisoner. The Officer points out that
after the Harrow's work is done, it can truly be said that "the judgment
has been fulfilled."
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The story begins with the observation, "It's a remarkable piece of
apparatus." In life, Kafka was employed by a Worker's Accident Insurance Company to calculate the risk of employments in mechanical and
industrial occupations. 19 One can imagine that the story might have
had inspiration from the claims of actual workers. At any rate, Kafka's
own occupational experience is on display as he takes pages to explain
the intricate workings of the machine: the engineering precision
required to inscribe the sentence upon the body of the prisoner without
killing him or her is indeed truly breathtaking. Wool and cotton pads
dab away at the skin of the prisoner after each inscription of the sentence upon his skin. This promotes cleaner scarring, making the sentence legible for those attending the proceeding. They have gone to
great lengths to concoct a system of punishment that is precise, deliberate, and exact. The punishment is the exact realization of the sentence;
the punishment consists of the moral to be learned. The Harrow is the
product of generations of technological and medical knowledge: it is
both the brutal product and grim instrument of human enlightenment.
Hegel's view of just punishment as reestablishing the proportional and
exactly calibrated to the crime is monstrously achieved here.
It is important that the story's narrator be an outsider, someone who
is neither subject to nor required to administer the system of justice in
the penal colony, in order to share in the reader's horror as the machine
and its purpose are revealed. As outsiders, both the explorer and reader
offer the possibility of clear evaluation and critique of deformed practices of justice and punishment. The political brilliance of the story is
the fact that Kafka denies the explorer and the reader any easy judgments. As Walter Benjamin observed, Kafka's goals of changing the
consciousness of his readers is accomplished by presenting the tragic
events of individuals-for instance, turning into a bug or being investigated for no clear reason-in a context where "everything continues as
usual."20 Can we, the readers, continue with our lives when confronted
with the brutality of these practices? If so, we become as complicit as
the figures in the story that administer death with the ease of habit and
the scaffolding of legitimacy.
The officer explains the workings of the machine with unflappable
zeal. The mechanical descriptions are punctuated with explanations of
overcoming manifold difficulties to achieve perfection in the machinery: "So that the actual progress of the sentence can be watched, the
Harrow is made of glass. Getting the needles fixed in the glass was a
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technical problem, but after many experiments we overcame the difficulty. No trouble was too great for us to take, you see" (147). The enthusiasm and precision of the officer's description matches the mechanism
of the machine: both seem bizarrely juxtaposed to the practice of torture.
Suddenly, the officer begins to beg the explorer for assistance: now
that the old Commandant is dead, the new Commandant refuses to
order the parts necessary for the maintenance of the machine. The
machine of perfect justice and enlightenment is thereby threatened, as
its mechanisms grow creaky. At first, the officer sounds like a bureaucrat frustrated in the accomplishment of his appointed task-he cannot
service the machine properly. "Now he has taken charge of the
machine money himself, and if I send for a new strap they ask for the
old strap as evidence, and the new strap takes ten days to appear and
then is of shoddy material and not much good. But how I am supposed
to work the machine without a strap, that's something nobody bothers
about" (151). Kafka's officer predates Arendt's Adolf Eichmann by
forty-nine years but demonstrates the same bureaucratic exertions
behind grisly murder.
However, the reader slowly starts to understand that the officer is a
true believer in the machine, not a mindless servant of it. He believes in
the machine as both a product of and impetus for human accomplishment. Through the machine he can help change the world, not merely
administer it. The old Commandant was not content to be exiled with
criminals in a penal colony; he worked tirelessly to devise a way to
reform and redeem those that had been given up by the mother country. The machine was designed to bring enlightenment to the penal
colony, mechanically lifting the most hopeless cases to the highest stage
of human consciousness. Arnold Weinstein has observed that the
machine in this story presents one solution to the fundamental problem
of language: "Language cannot be what it says."21 Designing the
machine that solves this problem reveals an intensive familiarity with
the traditions of law and the Enlightenment, not an ignorance of them,
as we might be tempted to assume.
The opacity of language is the same problem in the law and the
founding of political orders generally.22 The word or law cannot be the
world that it brings forth: it is the classical dilemma of political philosophers that idea and practice are distinct, they are always removed from
their object. Punishment is to bring the law, the imperative, into exis-
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tence-to move it beyond the realm of mere language. The machine
transforms the impotence of language into the force of understanding.
The officer comments, "Our sentence does not sound severe," and
indeed no law does until it is somehow realized. The punishment
machine perfectly realizes the law and therefore serves as the head,
heart, and soul of the colony, which, according to the officer, had been
perfectly organized by the old Commandant. This is a person who
cared about creating good in the world, and who believed in the perfectibility of human beings through knowledge, technology, and political institutions.
The officer explains that originally the entire colony would turn out
for the executions, people fighting for the privilege of watching it up
close (the honor was awarded to children, naturally). "How we all
absorbed the look of transfiguration on the face of the sufferer, how we
bathed our cheeks in the radiance of that justice, achieved at last and
fading so quickly!" (154). The past glory of the machine is a sad contrast
to the colony and its machine as the explorer finds it. No one attends
the executions, and the machine groans due to its neglect. Without popular support and maintenance even a mechanism of perfect justice falls
into disrepair. The officer wails at the explorer: "Do you realize the
shame of it?" (155). He views the explorer as the last hope to resurrect
the former glory of the mechanism and return justice to the colony.
When the explorer tells the officer that he will not support him in his
attempts to save the machine and carry out the vision of the old Commandant, the officer frees the condemned man and places himself
under the Harrow. He programs the machine to inscribe "Be Just!" on
himself. The last true believer in the system proves his devotion by
placing himself into its mechanisms. The machine starts to malfunction,
and despite efforts by the explorer, the Harrow goes haywire and kills
the officer. His rapid death denies him the torturous pleasure and the
radiance of justice that he has thus far experienced only vicariously.
The explorer regards the face on the officer's corpse: "It was as it had
been in life; no sign was visible of the promised redemption; what the
others had found in the machine the officer had not found; the lips were
firmly pressed together, the eyes were open, with the same expression
as in life, the look was calm and convinced, through the forehead went
the point of the great iron spike" (166).
The ending of the story considerably complicates Kafka's message,
which until now could be seen as a description of maniacal devotion to
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a deformed sense of justice. Closely followed by the soldier and the
now freed condemned man, the explorer goes back into the town to
find the new Commandant and report on the day's events, but instead
finds the old Commandant's grave. It is hidden underneath tables in a
teahouse; the other patrons move a table out of the way to reveal the
state of the old Commandant's legacy. Inscripted upon his grave is the
message, "Here rests the old Commandant. His adherents, who now
must be nameless, have dug this grave and set up this stone. There is a
prophecy that after a certain number of years the Commandant will
rise again and lead his adherents from this house to recover the colony.
Have faith and wait!" (167). Other patrons in the teahouse sneer at the
message on the grave, and the explorer begins to recoil from the people
around him. The belief in redemption sheltered by the officer and his
Commandant has now disappeared from the colony, hidden under a
table and brutally sacrificed in the Harrow. Those that remain are inarticulate, disbelieving.
The infuriating complexity and ultimate political significance of this
story come from Kafka's refusal to provide a straightforward reference
point. Initially the officer seems fanatical, and the condemned man, the
lamb about to be sacrificed. Then the officer sacrifices himself, while the
condemned man's face is animated by the cruelty of the machine. In
contrast to the justice sought by the man in the Harrow-the officer
who has programmed the machine to inscribe "Be Just" on his bodythe newly freed man watches his sacrifice and responds, "So this was
revenge. Although he himself had not suffered to the end, he was to be
revenged to the end. A broad silent grin now appeared on his face and
stayed there all the rest of the time" (163). The people in the tearoom
sneer at the optimism of the grave's inscription and the notion of resurrection. In contrast, the idealism of the officer and old Commandant
seems virtuous, even touchingly naive. They dared to believe in
enlightenment for all people, even the most abject, here in exile. The
dream of earthly redemption for the incorrigible might be better than
simply waiting for them to die out on the edge of the world.
Having frustrated the simple condemnation of the officer and old
Commandant, and denying the condemned man any redeeming qualities, Kafka then proceeds to refuse the explorer any moral credibility as
well. After he sees the grave and the response of those around him, the
distressed and confused explorer scurries in a panic toward the docks,
not stopping to talk with the new Commandant, and manages to jump
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on a ship as it pulls away from shore. The soldier and condemned man
grasp at him and try and follow him onto the boat; their actions beg the
explorer to provide the second chance that the penal colony has not.
Will he take on the mantle of redemption refused by the new Commandant and bring them with him? "They could have jumped into the
boat, but the explorer lifted a heavy knotted rope from the floor boards,
threatened them with it, and so kept them from attempting the leap"
(167). The reader cannot help being relieved to join the explorer and
leave the entire scene behind with this last sentence.
All of Kafka's writing provokes more questions than it answers. "In
the Penal Colony" has many interpretations, many of which seem plausible. The problem, as Sander Gilman observed about Kafka's work, is
that "it is infinitely rereadable and inherently uninterpretable because
it is so very interpretable."23 It reproduces what we bring to it: hence it
makes sense that this story's interpretations reflect the times and proclivities of its readers. In 1968, Wilhelm Emrich saw that "In the Penal
Colony" was about the passing of an older order and the birth of a new
one. 24 Many readers have found Jewish, anti-Jewish, Christian, and
anti-Christian messages in the text. More recently, for example, in 2001
Paul Peters claimed the story "may indeed ultimately and appropriately be read as a kind of master narrative of the 'primal scene' of colonialism itself."25 Falling in line with this company of critics, I think that
focusing on the act and interpretation of punishment in this storywhich seems to be an entirely novel approach-is particularly revealing. However, I make this argument while agreeing with some of the
earlier emphases: we should think about punishment here in relationship to the existence of penal colonies, religious or earthly redemption
or the lack thereof, the passing of a regime, and our position as outsiders who can judge.
Clearly, there are religious elements in the story, as many critics
have observed. The innocent officer dies, replacing his body with the
one of the condemned, seemingly destroying the machine through his
sacrifice. The spiritual father of the colony, one who "combines everything in himself ... soldier, judge, mechanic, chemist, and draughtsman," lies in wait, declaring a return if the earthbound are faithful.
Though many are engaged in arguing whether the story falls in line
with Christian or Judaic impulses, Kafka considerably complicates the
story as a religious one in a number of ways.26
Redemption everlasting isn't the product of the Harrow and its
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inscription: instead earthly illumination is. The recognition brought on
by the machine is fleeting, since it is inevitably followed by death
within six hours, but it seems significant that "enlightenment" with all
of its philosophical, abstract, and disembodied overtones is the product
of the torture device. Suffering is not rewarded in the next life but
instead is the direct route to knowledge in this one. The officer who
puts himself into the machine as a demonstration of his faith in it
doesn't gain the desired effect: enlightenment comes only from pain,
not belief. Kafka's story uses religious motifs, but sharp twists change
the effect of these elements in the story: the Harrow provides redemption in this world, and thereby it is an integral element of the political
system of the colony.
Recent observers have begun to note the colonial setting of the story
instead of the religious motifs.27 It is certainly plausible that Kafka was
concerned with writing a commentary on colonialism, as research suggests he was greatly influenced by the experiences of his uncles working in the French efforts to colonize Panama. 28 What other critics have
not suggested is that the setting in a penal colony is of particular importance, and more telling in the narrative than straightforward colonialism. Of course, penal colonies and colonialism were closely related
endeavors (as I also explore in chapter 5). However, the rationale
behind the penal colony was particularly incoherent. Penal colonies
were developed in part for their economic utility in settling the globe.
Yet they were also developed from a particular conundrum created by
the rapid change in ideals and even regimes of governance in Western
Europe. Penalties were more punitive than general predispositions
were liable to support. Before the relatively high-cost penitentiary and
prison options were developed, governments adopted exile as a more
humane alternative to corporal and capital punishment. Convicts
would be sent to designated penal colonies and then remain as settlers.
The policy makes sense as a measure of making punishment more
humane and also as a method to populate the globe with settlers from
their nation. But the practice does not make sense at all from the ideological standpoint driving colonization-the civilizing mission-either
through education, institutions, or religion, often attached to colonial
enterprises. How are those deemed unfit for European citizenship supposed to provide for the cultivation of other races? What sort of transformation is happening in these penal colonies to turn the convict into
colonial lord? The French government in particular was concerned
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with this puzzle, as evidenced by the debates that were spurred by
administrative reports from New Caledonia: was life too hard or too
easy for the convicts? Should they be treated as prisoners or settlers?
Stephen Toth has argued that the ideological incoherence of the practices of penal colonization led to the French cessation of the practice in
the late nineteenth century.29
The self-examination and vulnerability to criticism that result from
practices of punishment and colonization are similar: in the name of
what ideal do we engage in this practice? The transition from one
regime to the next brings the opportunity for new consciousness of
political order, a theme captured by Kafka's description of the passing
of the order from the old Commandant to the new Commandant. In a
sense, we are all outsiders with an ability to see events and practices
without a dulled consciousness at the beginning of a new regime. Colonization also creates the conditions that juxtapose outside perspective
onto the common assumptions and practices of all cultures involved.
Conquest in the name of civilization is a difficult proposition to maintain, as is administration of pain in the name of enlightenment-particularly before an audience. It is abundantly clear in Kafka's short story
"Jackals and Arabs" that he was aware of the difficult relationship
between the triad of European values and dignitaries from home, the
conduct of colonial settlers who presumably reflect those same values,
and the natives,3o
Kafka's machine in the colony speaks to all of these dynamics: the
potentially catalyzing spectacle of punishment, the arrival of "civilization" in the colonies, and the political opportunities and risks afforded
by the audience. The result shocks us into a new consciousness about
the claims of enlightenment and the political administrations under its
banner. The elements of the machine perfectly embody the qualities of
European civilization: its mechanisms adapt to different bodies to serve
justice equally well to all; it is transparent and impartial, and denies the
ability to seek revenge by those in power by taking the ability to punish
and putting it in nonhuman hands. And, as I have already noted, it
realizes the sentence with perfect efficiency and mimesis: the sentence,
no more no less, is the punishment. Our own mechanisms of justice
only aspire to such dispassionate administration and such clear effectY
In a fashion typical of Kafka, he neatly subverts all of our expectations and standard narratives about progress. The passing of the
regime from the old Commandant, one based on faith, into the realm of
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the new Commandant is quickly assumed to be progressive as the
machine has fallen into disfavor. But the faith of the old Commandant
was not religious, it was earthly: he had faith in engineering and
human understanding. The typical colonial narrative is also reversedrather than finding the settlers have "gone native," the explorer finds
that the most vehement advocates of the principles of the homeland are
in the periphery. The explorer ultimately refuses to condemn the
machine publicly and to adopt the task of redeeming those hidden
away in the penal colony. The characters in the story are so disorienting
to the reader that Kafka leaves the machine as the only fixed point: we
realize with horror that the Harrow is more civilized than the population it was created to enlighten. But such a position is untenable: how
can a torture device reflect the values of humanism in any scenario?
We don't like the machine, particularly since it amplifies our desire
for the engineering of perfect justice to such effect. But we are left with
the feeling that the penal colony won't necessarily be a better place
without it. The machine stands for the hope of earthly redemption
before death-at any price. Denied any easy answers to the predicaments of the penal colony, the explorer leaves. And so today, denied
any easy answers about what exactly is achieved in punishment and
whether it truly embodies our social values, we chose to tum away as
well. Why go out of the way to view what is hidden? Punishment was
once a public affair; citizens even visited penitentiaries to view the
scales of justice at work. Today executions, incarceration, censorship
are all topics of public debate, but the actual administration of punishment is something that we would prefer not to see.
What we need to carry away from Kafka's story is how impossible it
is to find solid ground in terms of punishment and its purpose, idealism,
and practice. However, the absence of secure footing in the negotiation
between relinquishing and pursuing ideals does not change the fact that
being an audience or witness nonetheless changes the dynamics of punishment and its relationship to justice. But this is one of the more
intractable problems of political regimes, that their accountability rests
upon the willingness of others to witness the execution of its ideals.
Those who have the choice to leave or ignore state punishment rarely
persist in this responsibility. Those who are forced to feel or administer
the law lack the perspective and moral authority of an audience.

CHAPTER 2

"Man's Life Is but a Prison"
Human Reason, Secular Political Order,
and the Punishments of God
Race of Cain, ascend to heaven,
And cast God down upon the earth.
-Charles Baudelaire, Flowers of Evil

Punishment is a reflection of political order in all of its complexity. It
requires an active relationship between justice and power, a negotiation of perception between government and population, and finally, a
reckoning of the relationship between political ideals and practical
administration. My description of political order is deliberately participatory. This presents the question of why a given population would
want to create a power to punish itself. Without a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon, my conjecture-that punishment is not simply about demonstrating the power of command over a population as
much as expressing an authority that originates from this populationcrumbles. The answer to this question can be found in the Bible, and in
Hobbes's Leviathan that reveals how the foundations of political order
moved from the heavens to the earth.
This chapter explores the connections between human reason, punishment, and political order by looking at Hobbes's Leviathan as a
response to Job's pleas for comprehension of human suffering in the
book of Job. Leviathan offers punishment and a political order that is
transparent to human reason; after all, a political order we cannot
understand does not allow us to exercise our judgment and control our
destiny. Viewing the two works in conjunction reveals how Hobbes
offers a corrective to Christianity's failure to provide clear causality.
One of Hobbes's greatest insights was that the anxiety resulting from
our desire to control our future, combined with our inability to do so,
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finds expression in political ordering. Systems of punishment are one
of the primary mechanisms of political order that address our need for
causality and the anxiety that accompanies it. The impulse to order
amidst chaos has led us to construct ever more refined systems of creating predictability. Punishment follows the system of logic by replacing the unexpectedness of criminality or violence with the predictability of pain following an ill deed. Punishment and political order reflect
the human mind interacting with and interpreting the phenomenal
world; perceiving this contingent relationship helps us to understand
the very root of secular political systems.

The Demand for Punishment
Contemporary readers encountering Hobbes for the first time find it
almost impossible to imagine Leviathan as an attractive political vision.
Why would anyone embrace an all-powerful ruler? The short answer
to this question lies in the Hobbesian vision of the state of nature that
reflects the turmoil of his time: his philosophy was born from the same
fear he claimed as his twin. As Corey Robin's recent examination of
Hobbes explicates, fear is the foundational political psychology of liberalism-a tendency that is particularly relevant in times of turmoil
and change. Fears of the unknown and unknowable can be transformed through political order to a more calculable, and ultimately
productive, fear of worldly authority. Punishment is assumed to be a
primary instrument of this regime since it allows the sovereign to realize the threat of pain, and hence manipulate and transform individual
fear into collective harmony. The central understanding of the relationship between punishment and politics is that punishment displays the
power of command and establishes and maintains hierarchical authority. The Leviathan punishes in order to transform our fear of one
another into fear of the potentially avoidable fury of the sovereign.
Nietzsche considerably complicates this picture in On the Genealogy
of Morals by asserting that punishment is a power of the community
recently stolen by the state in its quest for dominance. The origins of
punishment lie in the community's desire to extract payment from
those who abuse their membership or take it for granted-for example,
the thief who steals from his neighbor's pot will be reminded of the
protection afforded by the village once he is ejected into the woods.
Nietzsche's observation that "in punishment there is so much that is
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festive!" has disturbed many readers in arguing that punishment
serves as the basis for, not merely the right of, the community.1 The origins of the social contract lie not in the reasoned calculations of individuals, but rather in festivals of suffering that affirm membership in
the collective.
But perhaps the two versions of punishment are not so far apart after
all. In Hobbes, the community creates a demi-God and awards him the
power to punish-what was originally an expression and experience of
the community becomes condensed into the figure of the "Artificiall
Man." But in the end, the function of punishment is the same: to
demonstrate the power of either the community or its representative
and to enforce compliance with a given political order. Punishment
generates and manipulates fear. However, this view of punishment is
unidirectional: it affirms a view of political authority based upon hierarchical relationships. What this vision lacks is an understanding of
why we might seek punishment, and why we would welcome the
administration of pain. This is not a case for popular masochism of
gigantic proportions, the counterpart to Nietzsche's intonations of collective sadism. Instead Hobbes offers an understanding of how not just
fear but also hope and the proclivities of human rationality lead us to
the construction of an all-powerful entity to deliver punishment. Our
craving for comprehensible order, not discipline, is what inspired the
creation of an earthly deity to punish and hence redeem us.
Fear may govern the direction of Leviathan, but Hobbes also examines the psychological drive of humans in another sense. He asserts that
causality is the primary tool used by humans to assert control over their
lives and environments, rather than being subject to them in the way of
other creatures. If something happens, we want to know why. Determining the cause of events allows us to prevent tragedy, or attempt to
re-create or to perpetuate fortune. This human proclivity forms the
starting point of Hobbes's political vision in Leviathan. He eloquently
states that "it is peculiar to the nature of men to be inquisitive into the
causes of the events they see-some more, some less, but all men so
much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and
evil fortune."2 This inclination toward causality propels the establishment and perpetuation of political order to help guarantee the expected
order of events. The promise of political order is that everything will
progress in a relatively predictable manner-justice and virtue shall be
rewarded, indolence punished. Even more mundanely, political order
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offers the hope that everyday life will be more calculable despite the
intrusion of unfortunate events: you can put funds in a bank that will
be guaranteed even if the bank is robbed; if a house catches fire you can
call the fire department and someone will respond.
But while this proclivity toward causality has been at the root of all
political orders, it is a necessarily tragic propensity. Causal logic offers
the tantalizing possibility that we can know why things occur and,
even more important, that we might be able to control what happens to
us. However, experience proves that a complete mastery of events is
impossible. For example, routine maintenance does not always preclude automobile failure, and reward does not inevitably follow
accomplishment. Our perpetually unsuccessful attempts to control our
lives and fortunes are shadowed by a nagging unease. The frequently
suppressed knowledge that absolute control cannot be maintained creates the psychology of anxiety common in human beings. We set the
stage to create calm and clear progression yet know that our narrative
is bound to be disrupted in ways we cannot anticipate. The inevitable
failure spurs us on to try to create ever more tight contingency plans,
which unfailingly fall short as well.
The search for causality is the source of anxiety, but it also can provide comfort when our plans go awry and we suffer. We can look back
and see different choices or paths that might be taken, or we can comfort ourselves with the knowledge that there will be some reward for
the pain we feel currently. Punishment isn't just about Nietzsche's relation between creditor and debtor, but also about the relationship
between God and man. We might suffer today, but that pain will lead
to redemption. Leviathan and the book of Job help us to understand
why we would be inclined to view suffering as punishment, or even
welcome punishment as a path to redemption. Hobbes's Leviathan
delivers punishment that enforces order based upon human reason.
But it simultaneously reveals the Achilles' heel of any secular regime:
the requirement that punishment provide earthly redemption.
The Fall from Grace: How Judgment Begat Punishment

In the Christian tradition, the ability to judge gives birth to the punishments of God. Before they are able to know the difference between
right and wrong, Adam and Eve have not been punished, they dwell in
Paradise and have been given life everlasting. God tells Adam, the day
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he eats the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil he shall
die. Adam and Eve eat the fruit and do not die. The fruit itself does not
kill them; instead mortality becomes their punishment for disobeying
God. The punishment for the crime brings on their eventual death.
After Adam and Eve gain the faculty of judgment through their disobedience God observes, "Behold, the man has become like one of us,
knowing good and evil; and now lest he put forth his hand and take
also the tree of life, and eat, and live forever" (Genesis 4:22). God doesn't conclude his thought, that then humans will have become Gods,
knowing and immortal. Instead, he banishes humans from Paradise,
cursing them to suffer estrangement and pain, and to return to dust at
the end of their lives.
The story is important primarily because it offers an explanation for
the suffering that humans endure. We humans brought the state of original sin upon ourselves, hence our state of life is one long punishment
from God. Consider the link ;)etween the faculty of judgment and the
punishment that is wrought as a result. The punishment of God would
not have made sense without the faculty gained by the crime. Dying
from eating the fruit would have been a causal relation that any animal
would have been able to learn from. This fruit is poisonous. But to
understand that disobedience itself is wicked, not merely the consequence of disobedience, relies upon the faculty of judgment. A child can
disobey her father and touch a hot stove, and will learn why not to touch
a hot stove out of instinct and experience. To teach a child not to disobey
even when there are no direct consequences for his or her actions is a
much more difficult enterprise. Why is lying wrong if no one finds out?
Understanding this requires a faculty of judgment, the ability to know
the difference between good and evil as abstract principles.
In punishing Adam and Eve, God not only dooms them to lives of
pain, but also takes the first step in developing their ill-gotten faculty of
jUdgment. The story is intended to provide a causal answer to the suffering of humanity. Humans suffer because Adam and Eve sinned, and
through punishment humans will learn to remember and act correctly
when judgment is required.
However, there is another way to understand this story. Faced with
suffering, our desire for order requires us to understand the human
condition as punishment based upon a clear order-God's will. If we
suffer, there must be a reason that we do so; it cannot be senseless and
random. To understand our suffering as punishment comes from the fac-
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ulty of judgment. The faculty of judgment leads us to assume that there
must be a cause and effect between our actions and lives.
There is a remarkable convergence of the two interpretations here. In
the first, sin creates punishment. Yet we can also see that the content of
the sin is not inconsequential-judgment creates the proclivity to see
suffering as punishment. We insist that the random chaos of life and
death is the result of a divine order of reward and penalty. Human reason creates this order out of faith; though life and death appear random, they are ordered by a force we cannot see or understand. The
insistence that such chaos is ordered, despite the dearth of empirical
evidence that proves this order, demonstrates the fervent human desire
for causality and control.
The Book of Job
Divine punishment and original sin help our minds make sense of suffering. Inherent in our desire to understand punishment is the potential
for future control, not just explanation of past events. This was true for
the Greeks for whom punishing was a form of honor-a reciprocal relationship. We punish in the hope that we will achieve a better world,
make better judgments next time. Therefore, the conception of original
sin defies our conception of punishment. If we were born evil, if we will
be punished no matter what, then what is the use of trying to be good?
Why would God issue the Ten Commandments if we were to be punished whether or not we followed them?
Further reading of the Old Testament reveals a more complex view
of the nature of divine punishment, most pointedly and powerfully displayed in The Book of Job) Here the human hope that through obedience
we can avoid divine punishment is reconciled with the reality of random suffering. Man's capacity for judgment is more clearly defined.
Interestingly, there is a shift from the observations of God and the serpent in Genesis who hinted that the capacity of Adam and Eve to know
good and evil makes them like God, implying that divine and human
moral reasoning are equivalent. In The Book of Job, human rationality is
defined as distinctly different from the rationale that guides the
bestowal of divine rewards and penalties.
The Book of Job opens with a description of the grace bestowed upon
Job's life by God. He has three beautiful daughters and seven strong
sons, and was "the richest man in the East." Job was a "man of perfect
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integrity, who feared God and avoided evil" (5). Job follows God's
rules and reaps the rewards of God's favor. Nonetheless, every year
after a week of celebration Job would have his children be purified, "for
he thought, 'Perhaps my children have sinned, and cursed God in their
hearts'" (5). Here the fundamental uncertainty of man's ability to avoid
divine punishment is revealed. Job opens his house to every stranger
and humbly thanks God every day, yet the fear that somehow, somewhere, something could go terribly wrong haunts him in the midst of
his plenty. The hope that the devout can avoid punishment is shadowed by the fear that punishment will come nonetheless, no matter
how strident their efforts. After all, it was clear that sometimes innocents suffered, while those who were less than devout were rewarded
by fate. The Book of Job acknowledges that divine order is still unexpected: even divine punishment can be random.
An Accusing Angel appears before God and responds when God
boasts of the integrity and piety of Job, "Doesn't Job have a good reason
for being so good? Haven't you put a hedge around him-himself and
his whole family and everything he has? You bless whatever he does,
and the land is teeming with his cattle. But just reach out and strike
everything he has, and I bet he'll curse you to your face" (6). God gives
leave to the Angel to test Job's faith. The Angel takes all his possessions
and kills his family. Job still will not curse God, so the Angel sends him
boils that eat away at his flesh and cause excruciating pain. After one
week, Job cries, "God damn the day I was born and the night that
forced me from the womb" (13). He begs for death and proclaims the
injustice of God's order.
If God is all-powerful, why do the innocent suffer, and why does evil
go unpunished? How can we explain the misfortune of the devout
when those who flout God's laws enjoy life? The suffering of Job calls
attention to the inconsistencies of God's punishments and demands an
accounting. The rest of the book is Job's dialogue with his three friends
and then God himself about the nature of divine punishment. Job
insists that he is innocent, that God punishes him without reason and is
therefore unjust. His friends beg him to be humble and proclaim his
sins and beg for forgiveness. Eliphaz asks rhetorically, "Can an innocent man be punished?" assuming that the answer is no. Yet The Book of
Job leaves the question open, for the story itself suggests the opposite
answer. Eliphaz insists that man could never avoid being wicked. Job
retorts, "Can't I tell right from wrong? If I sinned, wouldn't I know it?"
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(22). Job's friends tum to faith and the answer of original sin to explain
his suffering, Job relies upon his judgment to affirm his devoutness. He
points out the misery of human existence: "Man's life is a prison; he is
sentenced to pain and grief" (23). Is life itself nothing but a punishment
by a vindictive God? Is divine punishment inescapable?
Job refuses to succumb to the pleading of his friends. He insists upon
his innocence, proclaiming the injustice of God.

I swear by God, who has wronged me
And filled my cup with despair,
That while there is life in this body
And as long as I can breathe,
I will never let you convict me;
I will never give up my claim.
I will hold tight to my innocence;
My mind will never submit. (64)
Job knows he is innocent. Because God punishes the innocent, he is
unjust.4
God comes to earth and speaks to Job and his friends from a whirlwind and immediately complicates the situation by asking, "Do you
dare to deny my judgment? Am I wrong because you are right?" (84).
The simple binary of guilt and innocence is swept away. The human
capacity to see punishment and reward as proof of either guilt or innocence is entirely too clumsy an attempt at justice. God's reason works in
ways that are truly unfathomable to the human mind. While the suffering of the meek and reward of the venal may appear as injustice to us,
this is a failure of our comprehension, not of divine justice. The voice in
the whirlwind taunts Job and says he could punish all the proud and
humiliate all the wicked, but this would not be divine rule; he calls it
"savage justice."
Job is converted; he acknowledges the limits of his reason. "I will be
quiet, comforted that I am dust," he concludes. Therefore the contradictory becomes reconciled. Job was innocent, but God is just. There is
a fundamental inability of human rationality to understand the order
created by God's punishments. We can strive to follow his rules and
use our judgment in ways that he would find praiseworthy, but this
does not mean we shall not suffer at his hand someday. The crushing
reality of punishment has outstripped our attempts to rationally order
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cause and effect. Job was right to fear that suffering would invade his
life, even when he had done everything possible to curry God's favor.
After Job's realization of the impenetrable logic of divine punishment, The Book of Job ends with one last Psalm. God rewards Job and
punishes his friends. Job has "spoken the truth about me," while the
friends with all their piety failed to do the same. Job understands the
limits of his reason, that God punishes the innocent, and that the order
of the world is beyond his grasp. The friends are punished because they
assume they know the mind of God; they assumed that the source of
Job's suffering rested in his actions. In other words, it is a sin to expect
God's actions to conform to human reason. Divine order is beyond our
conceptual grasp.

Job's Trial
One of the more curious elements in The Book ofJob is a pretend trial that
is constructed by Job and his friends. His friends urge him to plead his
case before God, confess his sins and beg for mercy. This leads Job to
contemplate such a trial and make a number of observations. First, if
God is the judge and prosecutor and Job is the defendant, the grounds
of their collision are entirely uneven. "I know that this is true: no man
can argue with God or answer even one of a thousand accusations.
However wise or powerful-who could oppose him and live?" (27).
There is no way to state a case before a creature so much more powerful than oneself. The lack of even proximate equality makes an interchange impossible. To hold a trial between unequals is preposterous.
Second, Job asks, "If he seized me, who could stop him or cry out,
'What are you doing?'" (27). There must be someone even more powerful who could make sure that the trial proceeded fairly. Why should
he appear in court if there is no guarantee of his safety? How could he
freely accuse him without the protection of a greater individual? Job
ponders: "If only there were an arbiter who could lay his hand on us
both, who could make you put down your club and hold back your terrible arm. Then without fear, I would say, You have not treated me
justly" (29). The judge in a case must be neutral, and more powerful
than the participants; otherwise a fair hearing cannot be achieved.
Finally, Job expresses his desire that the punishment he has endured
be redemptive. Even if it has proven to be unjust, he would be willing
to endure it if it meant that God would embrace him for doing so.
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If only you would hide me in the pit
Till your anger has passed away,
Then come to me and release me.
All my days in prison
I would sit and wait for that time.
You would call me-I would answer;
You would come to me and rejoice,
Delighting in my smallest step
Like a father watching his child. (37)

This is a crucial revelation. Job welcomes God's authority, even the
administration of punishment, as long as it leads to redemption. He is
willing to endure hardship for the sake of God's authority, as long as he
is congratulated for doing so. If he felt that the punishment has
redeemed him in God's eyes, the bond between punisher and punished
would only be strengthened. This shows the inexorable desire of
human rationality to ascribe cause and effect. God has denied Job the
understanding of a causal link between crime and punishment in this
case. Indeed, there was no causal relationship to understand. Even if
there was no crime that brought on punishment, if the punishment
yields redemption a causal relation is established. Job can accept his
punishment-even if he can't understand why he is being punishedas long as the punishment leads to redemption.
Job's attempt to reason about the conditions of just punishment and
to ascribe meaning to his travails is answered by God in the form of a
great sea creature-Leviathan. He describes a most terrible, irascible
monster that no human could even dare to imagine placating. Only
God has the power to subdue him. Job accepts this illustration of divine
might and human impotence. The question of justice seems to have
been solved by the assertion of supreme power. God is all-powerful;
therefore you cannot question his justice.

Leviathan Returns
Thomas Hobbes adopted the name of this sea creature, Leviathan, for
his artificial and all-powerful earthly God. A number of scholars have
observed that Hobbes carried the lesson of the sea monster away from
the book of Job-might makes right. If the sea monster can be used to
frighten Job into accepting God's impenetrable divine judgment, why
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could it not work to reinforce mortal authorities as well? While the family resemblance is certainly there, the connections between Job and
Hobbes are more complex than that. Hobbes not only adopts God's
method of affirming his right to judge, he responds to Job's pleas during his trial earlier in the text as well.
Clearly Hobbes was closely engaged in a reading of the Bible. Recent
scholarship has exhaustively debated whether Hobbes was truly
devout. There are those who say that he was devout5 and those that
argue he was not. 6 Remarkably, none of these commentators looks very
closely at the relationship between Hobbes's Leviathan and the source
of its central concept, the book of Job. Deborah Baumgold does broach
the subject, asserting, "Figuratively, the political theory is about
leviathan and behemoth, but it speaks to Job."7 Yet Baumgold asserts
this in the most general fashion, believing that Hobbes was interested
not only in the powerful of the world, but also in providing for the
powerless. W. H. Greenleaf has established through careful historical
research that Hobbes was reading contemporary commentaries on the
book of Job by J. Cary1.8 Greenleaf argues that there are parallels in the
political implications of Job's story and Hobbes's Leviathan, but his
main goal in this note is to place the ideas of Hobbes within the context
of debates about theological nominalism. 9 I am not trying to argue that
the linkage between Hobbes and the book of Job reveals something in
particular about Hobbes's relationship to Christianity. Instead, the connections between the two works help to illuminate Hobbes's project in
a new light, as well as establish how conceptions of punishment reveal
a shifting role in the relationship between human rationality and politicalorder.
One interpretation of the book of Job's resolution is that the monster
makes divine and human reason expendable: justice is based only on
power. In an influential article from 1983, R. J. Halliday, Timothy
Kenyon, and Andrew Reeve claimed, "For Hobbes, the lesson of Job
contained an important political message: the absolutism of the mortal
God is an imitation of the irresistible power of the immortal God. And
obviously, Hobbes was quite content to rest on this doctrine."l0 I disagree with this assertion. First of all, Hobbes does more than adopt the
monster from the book of Job; there is a clear intertextuality between
Job's trial and Hobbes's Leviathan that suggests Hobbes carried away
much more than this basic political message. Second, while Hobbes
may have embraced the relationship between power and justice
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demonstrated in the book of Job, he also makes an important distinction between his Leviathan and the self-declaredly opaque God that
resisted Job's logic. The absolutism of the immortal God of Job includes
a statement that his actions are inscrutable to humans. Hobbes
empathizes with Job's predicament and creates a Leviathan that can be
understood by human-in fact, he only exists through the perception
and reason of human beings.
Michael Oakeshott has argued that while Hobbes's work may
appear labyrinthine, it is connected together by one thread-the nature
of human reason.
It is the character of reasoning that determines the range and the limits of philosophical enquiry; it is this character that gives coherence,
system, to Hobbes's philosophy. Philosophy, for him, is the world as
it appears in the mirror of reason; civil philosophy is the image of
civil order reflected in that mirror. In general, the world seen in this
mirror is a world of causes and effects; cause and effect are its categories. And for Hobbes reason has two alternative ends; to determine the conditional causes of given effects, or to determine the conditional effects of given causes. l l

Placing Hobbes's interest in cause and effect as the primary categories of human reason at the center of analysis, we can see why
Hobbes found a kindred spirit in the figure of Job. Job's meticulous
worship of God in the face of his prosperity sought to affirm devotion
and reward. His fear of the unknown or the unexpected, causing him to
purify his children year after year just in case they had thought something that might displease God, reveals what Hobbes called the fundamental human anxiety-the desire to know and the fear of the unknowable.
In chapter 12, "Of Religion," Hobbes argues that the origins of religion can be found in the psyche of man. The primary disposition of
human beings is to seek the causes of events that they see, then to establish cause and effect between chains of events. The problem is that
causality is usually obscure. "And when he cannot assure himselfe of
the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for
the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as
his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men,
such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself."12 The need
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to find causality overcomes the lack of empirical evidence. When there
is no clear cause of an event, we will assume one anyway. Hobbes
believes this is the impetus behind the development of religion as an
unseen force that can explain why events occur as they do.
Yet the search for causality combined with the impossibility of perceiving the cause of many occurrences leads to acute anxiety. Particularly those who meticulously try to anticipate the future and provide
for themselves become haunteli by the capriciousness of fate. "So that
man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his
heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other
calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep" (76).
While it is certainly debatable whether such anxiety is indeed overcome by sleep, the image is startlingly clear. The more one tries to control one's destiny, the more anxious one becomes in recognizing that
many aspects of the world are out of control. Here Job's furtive prayers
and purification rites, just in case his children had sinned somehow,
spring to mind. When Job's punishment is wrought, he cries out, "My
worst fears have happened; My nightmares have come to life."13
Hobbes describes how religion works to provide a clear causality for
events that cannot be otherwise explained. The propensity to assert
such a train of events even when events defy explanation is remarkable.
Hobbes notes, "And therefore, men by their own meditation, arrive to
the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Etemall God,
choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their
understanding; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeall, and
then confesse their definition to be unintelligible" (77). The mind that
creates phantoms and other bodies to ease the anxiety of uncertainty
will not relinquish these solutions even when they fail to provide any
explanatory satisfaction. Here Hobbes is unquestionably referring to
Job, where God's majesty is accepted as beyond human understanding.
This is a crucial paradox to explore: the mind's need for causality is so
great that it would rather blame its own limitations than give up the
device that provides a sense of causality. But while ultimately Job
appears to put his mind at rest with a knowledge of limited understanding and be "comforted that he is dust," the entire story of Job
reveals a more indeterminate struggle between the need for rational
explanation and the opacity of divine punishment. Job continues to
want punishment to be perceptible to his reason, to have a clear cause
and effect. Perhaps the impulse of reason proves triumphant over the
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need to assert causality. This seems to be where Hobbes offers the
answer to Job's dilemma. Hobbes will invent a creature that punishes,
but it will be carefully subject to the logic of human rationality, while at
the same time embodying the superhuman power of the divine.
Hobbes's ruler may bring terrible punishments to bear upon its subjects, but these punishments will meet the criteria outlined by Job. They
will be subject to the categories of cause and effect, there will be a powerful judge to arbitrate, and the subjects shall be equal before the law. In
short, punishment will be rational, hence redemptive when administered, and possible to predict, comprehend, and hence potentially
avoid. The book of Job offered an explanation for the breakdown of
causality between piety and divine grace.
But Job's cries ultimately did not go unheeded. Leviathan can be read
as an attempt to answer Job's pleas, to create a political order that is
based upon awesome power yet not opaque to human reason. Even if
divine order cannot be made accountable to human reason and control,
the worldly order can become so. Hobbes marks a shift in the relationship between human reason and the creation of systems of punishment. If human reason invented original sin to make sense of suffering,
this is the next step along the way. Reason will not only be able to
explain punishment but will also be able to predict and thereby
respond to it. Punishment can be truly redemptive if it meets these conditions. A system of punishment that follows the logic of human reason
promises a more transparent ordering of the world and the powers
within it.

Hobbes's Theory of Punishment
Punishment plays a most central yet generally unexamined aspect in
the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. But to understand his system of punishment, it is necessary to situate it in the context of his epistemology, which has been thoroughly explored by scholars. Hobbes
states that all thoughts and imagination originate from the senses. He
begins his book with the chapter "On Sense" highlighting this element
as the basis of his political order. Sense provides the origin of our perception of the world, "(For there is no conception in a mans mind,
which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the
organs of sense.)" (13). The senses do not provide us access to what is
per se; but are only "a Representation or Appearance" (13). Hobbes
does not thereby conclude that we should suspend judgment, since we
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cannot know whether our perceptions of reality are true or not, as is the
case with skepticism. Richard Tuck has traced links between Hobbes's
interest in perception and knowledge and the work of Descartes,
Mersenne, and Gassendi in developing a postskeptical approach. l4
These seventeenth-century thinkers seem to have drawn inspiration
from Epicurus, "who was recorded as having said something to the
effect that 'every phantasia is true."'l5 Recent research also suggests
that Hobbes's exposure to optical instruments while living in exile in
Paris played a more formative role in the development of his political
philosophy than previously understood. 16 Regardless, Hobbes saw
human knowledge as based upon external stimulation of the senses,
despite the fact that our perception was not necessarily representational. He points out that our dreams are .affected by the external circumstances of our sleeping (for example, "lying cold breedeth dreams
of fear"). Through the senses, external reality influences perception. He
is not breaking off into a radically self-constructed system of knowledge. But nonetheless, perception, not empiricism, forms the basis of
knowledge. Hence, any social and political order must be based upon
our perceptions. The weakness of Christian order is that it relies too
much on elements, such as divine justice, that are explicitly beyond
human perceptual faculties.
The body receives the senses, and the mind sets about ordering
them. Senses provide the material for rationality to exercise itself by
developing a "trayne of imaginations." These are the categories of
cause and effect; our senses inform us, for example, that when it rains a
particular road floods, and the next time it rains we can imagine that
the same road has flooded. In that way, sense meets the human inclination to establish cause and effect. The result is science, which Hobbes
defines as follows.
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one
fact upon another; by which, out of that we can presently do, we
know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another
time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what
causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our
power, we see how to make it produce the like effects. (35-36)
Science allows us to learn from the past and try to exert control over the
future, to anticipate and plan.
Hobbes developed his metaphors carefully, and therefore I do not
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take lightly the fact that he described punishment as the "nerves of the
Artificiall Man, the Common-wealth." The relationship between nerves
and action is mechanical. If you hit your thumb with a hammer, the
hand will recoil and blood will rush into the appendage automatically.
The sensation of pain will be registered in the mind, which will then
direct the body to be more careful next time. Punishment and reward
are the nerves of the commonwealth, "by which fastned to the seate of
the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his
duty" (9). If someone steals from another, the brain (sovereign) of the
commonwealth responds and causes pain to the criminal. The sensation will teach him, and all who watch, the cause and effect of disturbing the order. Similarly, those who protect the commonwealth will be
rewarded, teaching through sensation the cause and effect of pleasure.
Once again, the matter is one of perception. As Hobbes observes, the
purpose of punishment is not revenge but correction. Therefore the
sovereign needs to punish in ways that correct rather than cultivate
resentment. If crimes are committed out of fear, need, or ignorance
"there is place many times for Lenity" (241). On the other hand, crimes
committed by the privileged need to be punished fervently. "For indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them" (241). If the
body of the commonwealth perceives that punishment is driven by
something other than the performance of justice, the nerves of the body
will no longer achieve its goal of training its appendages. If through
punishment the commonwealth betrays favoritism or prejudice, the
body will respond to those sensations instead.
The causal relationship Hobbes is searching for here is not a direct
correspondence between punishment and crime. If this were the case,
theft would be punished in the same way, regardless of who committed it and why. Rather, humans need to be able to perceive a direct correspondence between crime and punishment. Therefore, punishment
needs to occur as a clear message to the members of the commonwealth. It is with this goal in mind that Hobbes elaborates the rules and
methods of punishment in chapter 28, "Of Punishments and Rewards."
In contrast to the trials of Job, Hobbesian punishment must be perfectly
transparent lest it lose its utility.
Nor is it simply the sovereign's ability to punish that informs the
body. If Hobbes were adopting a simple linkage between power and
might, then the mere ability of the sovereign to punish, and punish ter-

"MAN'S LIFE

Is

BUT A PRISON"

53

ribly, would be considered sufficient to generate adherence to the law.
Yet Hobbes quite specifically delineates how the sovereign should punish. Because punishments and rewards send particular lessons and
teach the body through sensation it is important that the sovereign
punish and reward correctly in order to teach the body the correct
response.
Hobbes details the conditions of just punishment in chapter 28: "A
Punishment, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that
hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be
a Transgression of the Law: to the end that the will of men may thereby
the better be disposed to obedience" (214). There are several aspects of
this definition to be elaborated. First, the actions of private men are not
included in his definition. Only those with public authority can punish.
Those who are sworn enemies of the public authority are also not subject to punishment, either because they were never subject to the law or
have declared themselves no longer subject to the law. The pain that a
power may inflict upon those outside the law is pure hostility instead
of punishment. Hobbes also distinguishes divine punishment, misfortune such as plague or illness that befalls someone after a transgression
of divine law, from human variants. The result of these qualifications is
that punishment is a product of the social contract and hence also a
product of human perception and reason. This means that noncitizens
and an opponent facing a conquered enemy are not subject to the same
restrictions that Hobbes places upon the public authority.
Some argue that the sovereign authority's power makes the law; the
law is created and maintained by his authority to punish those who
transgress it. But the second notable aspect of Hobbes's description of
punishment is that he carefully limits the sovereign power's ability to
punish. Here the mere fact of punishment does not establish sovereignty, instead sovereignty bounds the ability to punish. In a fashion all
the more remarkable considering his leniency toward the necessities of
sovereign power at other locations in the text, Hobbes places a series of
restrictions upon punishment. Hobbes's standards of punishment are
surprisingly rigid-it must be rational, redemptive, and transparentall the elements that Job desires for his own trial.
Only through the perception of causality between crime and punishment, and then punishment and redemption, does punishment become
useful in training members of the commonwealth. For that reason, "all
evill which is inflicted without intention or possibility of disposing the
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Delinqquent, or (by his example) other men, to obeey the Lawes, is not
Punishment; but an act of hostility" (215). Punishment is distinguished
from hostility only by its utility. Furthermore, he elaborates that punishment must follow public condemnation and announcement of
exactly which crime or crimes are being punished.
In achieving the perceptible relationship between the punishment
and just authority, Hobbes makes the following provisions. First, the
amount of punishment needs to be exact in order to achieve its utility.
The pain of punishment must outweigh the benefits derived from the
crime, otherwise it will not create adherence to the law. More interesting, Hobbes also states that if a punishment for a crime has been specified, increasing the penalty is not legitimate punishment but is instead
"an act of hostility." This provision belies the assumption that for
Hobbes might makes right. Instead, punishment must adhere to the
law in order to generate obedience to the law. Furthermore, a person
cannot be punished for breaking a law that does not exist.
The public authority alone has the right to punish. Hobbes distinguishes punishment from private acts of revenge, as well as acts of
nature or God, such as a curse or illness that fall upon someone after
they have done evil (214-15). This makes it seem as though one aspect
of the generation of sovereignty is the exclusive ability to punish. Yet
Hobbes points out that wanton punishment by the sovereign, which
may assert his power, nonetheless defeats the enterprise of punishment, which is to generate judgment and obedience. If punishment
breaks a person's spirit, or strikes fear and terror in the hearts of spectators, fear is the result, not the improvement of judgment. In order to
train the judgment of members of the commonwealth, the relationship
between law, authority, and the punishment must be maintained as
well.
This is yet another way that Hobbes answers Job's pleas for a
redemptive punishment. Hobbes places the conditions of punishment
under a utilitarian imperative: if it is not useful for bolstering the judgment of the commonwealth, it should not be done. For this reason, "All
Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the
Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for transgression of the Law,
and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. ... For there
can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by punishing the innocent"
(219). It is not the mere exercise of power that guarantees the obedience
of subjects, it is the exercise of power in ways that both conform to
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causal logic and are perceptible to human reason that help form the
"nerves" of the polity. Only through the consistent application of
causality in both crime and punishment, and a demonstrably clear relationship between legal authority and punishment, can the Hobbesian
order be maintained.

Conclusion
Hobbes's Leviathan and The Book of Job offer us one way to evaluate our
political order: does it meet the demands of causality, and is the justice
meted out perceptible as such? Looking at the contemporary penal system in the United States, it must be admitted that it meets neither of
these criteria. The links between crime and punishment, and between
punishment and redemption, have been severed. Those in prison often
feel that their incarceration was random, therefore unjust. Dozens of
people engage in similar criminal activities yet are not caught and sentenced. The perception of irregularity extends into white-collar crime
as well; for example, ask other people whether they think insider trading is consistently punished. Nor does having undergone punishment
lead to redemption. Megan's Law provides for the permanent stigmatization of some offenders; employment and suffrage exclusions create a
multitiered system of full and partial citizenship. All of these problems
have been noted by others as unjust for those unfortunate enough to be
subject to them. This reading suggests why these practices may be
detrimental to our entire political order.
The other lesson that emerges here is what Hobbes establishes about
the desire for control when confronted with a chaotic world that drives
us to establish, revise, and insist upon political order. This also seems to
be a lesson that is worth heeding in the contemporary political climate.
People certainly do look to their government to eradicate the unforeseeable and mitigate misfortune. It will inevitably fail in its attempts to
accomplish these tasks.
Perhaps the true dynamism of political systems is the paradox that
gave birth to them: the human desire to order the universe and find stability combined with the persistence of the unforeseeable. Embedded
in human reason is the anxiety that will drive us to find different, more
responsive orders. This is a search that will never end, unless we one
day decide to liberate ourselves from the prison of our anxiety and
hence overcome the need for political order. The most prescient exam-
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pIe of this sort of transcendence is found in Camus' "Myth of Sisyphus." Instead of trying to eliminate suffering by creating systems of
order based upon human reason, Camus suggests that we will finally
end our suffering by realizing that it has no meaning. Perhaps the
attempt to see meaning in our suffering is the source of suffering.
In Camus' essay, Sisyphus pushes the rock up the hill and wearily
treads back after it rolls down again, doomed to meaningless labor for
eternity. Camus perversely suggests that he holds out the key to our
happiness. When Sisyphus turns back to descend the hill toward his
rock, how does he face the external futility of his efforts? "If this myth
is tragic, that is because his hero is conscious. Where would his torture
be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him?"17 Sisyphus's punishment of rolling the rock for eternity is inconceivable since
he knows the absolute futility of his actions. Camus suggests he
becomes free through being denied redemption in his punishment, by
knowing that his efforts will lead him nowhere but back to the beginning. He is set free by knowing that he has created his destiny, yet it is
nonetheless out of his control.
At that subtle moment when man glances backward over his life,
Sisyphus returning toward his rock, in that slight pivoting he contemplates that series of unrelated actions which becomes his fate,
created by him, combined under his memory's eye and soon sealed
by his death. Thus, convinced of the wholly human origin of all that
is human, a blind man eager to see who knows that the night holds
no end, he is still on the go, the rock is still rolling. I8
The clear break in the illusion of control and the desire to establish
causality forces Sisyphus to attain a new understanding of human limitations. Once emancipated from the illusion that he is master over his
own life and that events follow a clear chain of causality, Sisyphus
becomes liberated even in the midst of punishment everlasting. Job also
gave up on his ability to understand and was comforted. However,
ultimately the book of Job reneges upon this message by rewarding Job
handsomely, reestablishing the causal link between obedience to God
and divine law and reward. Camus goes one step further and suggests
it is the hoax of causality and perception that is our true punishment.
The suffering caused by this single proclivity may indeed outweigh all
other kinds of misfortune.

"MAN'S LIFE

Is

BUT A PRISON"
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So why exactly is man's life a prison? Because of the seemingly
inescapable drive to create order that will disintegrate, just as Sisyphus's boulder rolls down the hill again? Because we see punishment
everywhere around us where there is only random suffering? Because
we create orders to punish us in ways that are comprehensible, perhaps
with the intention of occluding the pain and suffering that ultimately
defy perceptible order? All three of these dynamics pervade our experiences and help explain the prisons and rules we carry within and create for ourselves and one another. Punishment emerges as the key to
understanding why and how we create and re-create political order.

CHAPTER

3

Earthly Divinity
Punishment and the Requirements of Sovereignty
That kind of man-made irreality-indeed, that strange construction of a
human mind which finally becomes slave to its own fictions-we are normally more ready to find in the religious sphere than in the allegedly sober
and realistic realms of law, politics, and constitution ...
-Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies

I began this book by rejecting the simple equation of the power to punish and the power of command, and in drawing a connection between
punishment and sovereignty I risk the appearance of endorsing this
very position. What I offer is a more complicated, and more complete,
view of the relationship between sovereignty and punishment. Due to
the influence of theorists such as Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, as well as recent historical events, sovereignty has come to be
understood as an unstoppable force often trampling the law in its violent assertions. However, examining the history of the concept of sovereignty and its evolution, one finds surprising fragility. Sovereignty is
based upon representation and perception, and is therefore vulnerable
in regard to its audience. To be sure, it hides this vulnerability well
since sovereignty could not successfully provide and enforce political
order if the source of its power were easily discernible. Punishment
may display the power behind politics today, but a different perspective reveals much of the scurrying that is happening behind stage to
orchestrate this spectacle. While the common understanding is that
sovereignty and punishment are mutually constitutive, I argue that
strategies of representation are the forgotten element in this equation.
Adding this third term into consideration fundamentally shifts our
understanding of the relationship between punishment and sovereignty. Though sovereignty may be the central tool of modem political
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orders, it is nonetheless susceptible to the perceptions of those whose
lives it seeks to order.
There has been a flurry of newly released theoretical works that
address the problem of sovereignty.' A common conjecture is that in
our political era, there has been a significant shift in the form and practice of sovereignty. Some have argued that the practice of nation-state
sovereignty has become eroded through international administration
and institutions, global capitalism, and militarism. Others hold that
sovereignty has become even stronger, in the sense that the individual
rights that formerly held it in check are now waning in their power of
resistance. Against the tenor of much of this scholarship, this chapter
explores the more consistent aspects of sovereignty. For even as history
unfolds in a dynamic fashion, there are defining aspects of political
order that remain present. As sovereignty is one of the key elements of
political order (if not the most), understanding how it is constituted,
expressed, and maintained is an integral element of this book's
endeavor. This is not to say that the expression and practice of sovereignty have been unaltered, only that basic elements nonetheless
remain constant.
The fascinating aspect of sovereignty is how firm a grasp on social
order is exerted by something so intangible. Modern political orders
adopted the notion of sovereignty, inspired by the divine power that
had, if incompletely, provided some order in the world. Otherworldly
powers are not as evidently fallible as worldly ones, and less contestable. Political sovereignty is a worldly power, but how can an
admittedly man-made construction garner the same power as a divine
entity? To order the world, a sovereign power must be of it yet simultaneously transcend it. It is tempting to overlook the ethereal aspects of
sovereignty lurking behind the sometimes monstrous exertions in its
name. But in many ways, the power garnered by modern sovereignty
stems from its transcendent nature.
Sovereignty can be described as a self-contained dialectic: it is
understood as transcendent yet needs to be actualized. It achieves the
reconciliation of these opposing forces through representation that
must establish it as a force or presence distinct from all others. While
political sovereignty was directly linked with God, there was no question of authority. By locating political authority on earth and making it
corporeal, modern sovereignty becomes potentially fallible. The modern sovereign must have a human face but must also be more than
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human to serve as the boundary of political order, the guarantor of the
lives of others. It must be simultaneously human but perfect; worldly
yet superhuman in order to protect subjects from one another.
We have seen how human reason demanded the development of the
Leviathan, a creature to redeem suffering and provide comprehensible
order. The shape of this figure perfectly fulfills the needs of sovereignty
as superhuman, yet earthly. Because Hobbes explicitly unmasks his
demigod as an "Artificiall Man" we often think that the form, but not
the substance, of mysticism persists in early modem politics. Yet the
demands of sovereignty require that traces of divine privilege remain
to order the polity.
Through punishment, sovereignty comes to be represented. The
question is, how does a sovereign exercise power but still maintain the
trace of divinity or that which is more than mortal? Doesn't the manifestation of power in the practice of punishment pose a risk to the otherworldly status of the sovereign? Agamben and Foucault have
focused on the ordering capacities of sovereignty, emphasizing its
extreme strength in the face of those subject to it. Because punishment
is where sovereignty becomes most evident, it is also where it risks
the source of its own power. In embodying and manifesting this
"divine power" so concretely, punishment can make the demi-God, in
Nietzsche's words, become human, all too human.
To understand how punishment both constitutes and threatens
modem sovereignty, I begin with an examination of the origins and
development of the term sovereignty and revive the representational
and perceptual elements. Taking the issue of representation as key, I
look at sovereignty'S relationship to law and institutions of govemmentality in practices of punishment as proposed by Schmitt, Agamben, and Foucault. Using their discussions as a point of departure, we
can look at practices of punishment not only as a material expression of
the power of sovereignty but also as a strategy of maintaining distance
between the sovereign and the punishment done in its name. The sovereign must punish to assert power, but these same practices of punishment must reveal the transcendental aspects of sovereignty. This is a
difficult balance to achieve, and it makes punishment the most crucial
undertaking of a sovereign power. A concluding discussion of Camus'
"Reflections on the Guillotine" demonstrates how the expressions of
the force of sovereignty also reveal the vulnerabilities of modem politicalorder.
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Sovereignty
In the Oxford English Dictionary, one finds that the word sovereign was
used during the late fourteenth century to mean divine authority over
the earth and its inhabitants, the power of a man over his wife or of
fathers over their children, as well as the power of a king over his subjects. Interestingly, it was also used to designate someone who was
superior to others within the same class, someone who is truly exceptional, simultaneously belonging to yet standing apart from a particular category. The simultaneity of these different uses suggests it is erroneous to designate the divine form of sovereignty as medieval and the
worldly one as modem, since sovereignty was understood as having
both transcendental and worldly origins.
Nonetheless, we can see that the worldly origins of sovereignty
came to be more important with the establishment of secular regimes,
and that this form of sovereignty continues to have a central role to play
in the establishment, legitimation, and perpetuation of political
regimes. Hardt and Negri's work Empire includes a short passage on
the nature of modem sovereignty. While they detail the concept in
order to prove that it is eroding, their observations are still an excellent
place to begin.
Sovereignty is thus defined both by transcendence and by representation, two concepts that the humanist tradition has posed as contradictory. On the one hand, the transcendence of the sovereign is
founded not on an external theological support but only on the
immanent logic of human relations. On the other hand, the representation that functions to legitimate this sovereign power also
alienates it completely from the multitude of subjects. 2
This description beautifully evokes the paradoxical nature of sovereignty, though I do not think that it necessarily is limited to modem
sovereignty as they suggest. Sovereignty is something that exists above
and beyond what is immediately apparent. We may not see divine
majesty, but we see different occurrences as proof of his grace or displeasure. In other words, we look to the world to confirm that which
exists outside of it. It is a curious fact that we are willing to adopt such
a stance even toward ideals that do not threaten us with the ultimate
punishment or reward of hell or heaven.
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Recognizing the awkward corp orality of a king who is supposed to
stand for something much greater than a mere mortal, English jurisprudence of the Tudor period developed an understanding that the king
had two bodies, one which was mortal, the other immortal and political. This was an ingenious solution to the problem of the need for permanent sovereignty accompanied by a worldly embodiment, the perfect illustration of what Hardt and Negri note is the simultaneously
immanent and transcendent presence of sovereignty. Kantorowicz
describes the innovative law in The King's Two Bodies.
For the King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body
politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident, to the
Imbecility of Infancy or of old Age, and the like Defects that happen
to the natural Bodies of other People. But his Body politic is a Body
that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the Management of the public weal, and this Body is utterly void of Infancy,
and old Age, and other natural Defects and Imbecilities, which the
Body natural is subject to, and for this Cause, what the King does in
his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability in his natural Body)
Rarely has there been such an excellent demonstration of the necessity
of rescuing transcendental order from the vulgarities of raw materiality. Kantorowicz observes that the utility of the device is that the imagined political body of the king always supersedes the failures or incapacities of the natural body. Transcendent fiction mitigates flawed fact.
Representation is the primary means by which the transcendent
becomes manifest. Here the presupposed empiricism of law helps to
establish the fiction of the king's two bodies as fact. Every system of sovereignty utilizes a system of representation and perception. Paradoxically, signifying the transcendent in recognizable ways relies upon systems of perception, visuality, and knowledge that are immanent. This is
the aspect of their own definition that Hardt and Negri fail to explore.
For they say that the representation itself tends to create distance
between the sovereign and those beneath it. Yet the sovereign is created
through perception. Representing sovereignty is not enough to establish
it; instead the perception of sovereignty as it is represented is the key.
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The truly miraculous nature of sovereignty is its self-referentiality,
and the power it gains through this process. The sovereign defines
itself as the supreme power and then creates a system of political order
to sustain itself as such. Foucault observed, "In every case, what characterizes the end of sovereignty, this common and general good, is in
sum nothing other than submission to sovereignty. This means that the
exercise of sovereignty is circular: the end of sovereignty is the exercise
of sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, hence the good for
sovereignty is that people should obey it."4 In short, one becomes sovereign because one claims it and can represent oneself as such in a relatively convincing fashion. The end of sovereignty is the preservation of
sovereignty at all costs: sovereignty is both the means and end of politicalorder.
Despite the multiple usages of the term, sovereignty still enjoys a
unique position when thinking about power. In all of these cases, it is
power that declares itself such and is accepted as supreme. In fact, one
may be sovereign without having done anything except appear as sovereign. Sovereignty is a status and a norm rather than an action. For
instance, a military commander holds the powers of life and death over
her soldiers, yet this does not make her their sovereign, even though
they are trained to obey without question. Conversely, a lame-duck
executive may not be able to rule as he did before an election but is sovereign in the given territory until the term officially expires. These two
examples suggest that it is not merely the ability or inability to command that makes one sovereign. Instead it is the belief in these exclusive
powers by those subject to and embodying sovereignty that creates it.
In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, John Austin observes that
sovereignty must have three qualities-be accepted, perceptible, and
beyond restriction: "The habitual obedience to the government which
is rendered by the bulk of the community, partly arises, therefore in
almost every society, from the cause which I now have described:
namely, a perception of the bulk of the community of the utility of
political government, or a preference by the bulk of the community of
any government to anarchy."5 For practical reasons, people desire government. But this government only acquires the form of sovereignty
when it defines itself as such. Austin points out that sovereignty is
human, must be determinate, and must be recognized as sovereign,
and that the society itself must be defined as political and independent.
"If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like
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superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society,
that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society
(including the superior) is a society political and independent."6
What defines a political order is the existence of the sovereign. What
makes one sovereign is to not be subject to any other human superior,
as well as be recognizable as the sovereign. This much seems clear: the
power of the sovereign establishes political and legal order. But there is
one more element here-the habitual obedience of the sovereign.
Austin argued that the society must have already established the practice of obeying; otherwise the advantages of, for example, the social
contract, would not be evident. As Charles Merriam observed, "Custom is not law, it is true, until it is endorsed by the sovereign; but on the
other hand, the sovereign is not sovereign until recognized by custom.
Habitual obedience, the custom of obeying, constitutes the fundamental and essential basis of the political society and of the supreme
power."7 What would generate the custom of obedience other than
punishment? Punishment emerges as the grounds of the unity of law
and power in the concept of sovereignty.
Punishment generates the custom of accepting authority and demonstrating its advantages even in the absence of express consent. Furthermore, the practice of punishment provides the habits of obedience not
just in those being punished but in all those who accept the authority's
right to punish. It is the custom of obedience that creates the perception
of authority, serving as the grounds for the more formal codification of
a social order into a political one. From the habits of the whip come the
legitimation of the law and the subsequent transformation of the earthly
sovereign into something much grander than its origins.
It may seem all too simple to generate the habits of obedience and
thus cultivate sovereignty through punishment. But it is important to
remember that the representation of sovereignty must contain elements
of the transcendental. How can punishment be used to represent the
sovereign without coming to embody it and thereby compromise its
unique status? The particular challenges of establishing and exercising
sovereignty were noted by Foucault: "This means that, whereas the
doctrine of the prince and the juridical theory of sovereignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power of the prince
and any other form of power, because its task is to explain and justify
this essential discontinuity between them, in the art of government the
task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards
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direction."8 The power of the prince and the state in general must
appear to be distinct from all other forms of power, as well as those
people who act in its name. In this way, the understanding of sovereignty as transcendental helps to accomplish the necessary segregation
of state power from all other forms of social control. The need to use
other forms of power, yet remain distinct from these implements,
demonstrates why representation becomes the central element in the
balance of sovereignty. Representation must distinguish sovereignty
from its embodiment, whether it is a contract, population, person, or
law. For this reason, the representation of sovereignty as transcendental is just as important as the representation of the sovereign as allpowerful.
Punishment may generate obedience, but it relies upon laws, executioners, prisons, and other instruments to do so. In examining practices
of punishment we see the difficult balance between the maintenance of
sovereignty's ethereal status, combined with the need to have a
worldly embodiment of sovereign might. The law and institutions of
punishment have been two primary methods by which sovereignty has
maintained paradoxical presence. In these next two sections, I will be
drawing on the work of Foucault, Agamben, and Schmitt, who also
looked at the constitution and exercise of sovereignty in relationship to
law and institutions.

Sovereign Exceptionalism in Law and Punishment
The concern with creating a political power that was strong enough to
enforce social and political order is what drove the earliest modern conceptions of sovereignty. Jean Bodin, confronted with the rebellion of
the Huguenots in sixteenth-century France, insisted that sovereignty
had to be both indivisible and absolute. However, the need to have a
worldly embodiment of sovereignty caused a problem in modern philosophy from the beginning. Bodin, writing about the absolute, indivisible power of the sovereign, was confronted by the empirical proof that
the sovereign was indeed limited. As one commentator noted, "the gap
between the abstract fiction of his lawful sovereign and what he conceived to be the reality of the actual constitutional position of the King
of France remains astonishingly and revealingly wide."9 As the consolidation of France under a central authority remained tenuous, in his
1576 work on sovereignty Bodin insisted that consent was immaterial.
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"We thus see that the main point of sovereign majesty and absolute
power consists of giving the law to subjects in general without their
consent."l0 The authority of the sovereign was inherent in the concept
itself and by definition contingent upon neither consent nor law. Bodin,
considered the father of modem sovereignty, developed his understanding of the term according to what was required by his era. He is
not an apologist for absolutism but rather argues in favor of absolutism, which did not at the time effectively exist.
Even more revealing, Bodin argued that the appearance of sovereignty was misleading. In its essence it was infallible, no matter how
flawed or limited it appeared. In example after example, Bodin admits
that in particular times and circumstances, it may appear that power is
divided or that the king exists in a subservient position to the law.
Nonetheless, he insists by his own definition of sovereignty that these scenarios are simply impossible. Bodin is a prime example of a philosopher willing the world to exist in a fashion that it clearly did not. Hence,
looking at the theory of sovereignty in historical context, there is a great
distinction between the empirical workings of sovereignty and the normative understanding of it. Serving as the intermediary step between
the fragility of political regimes and the fiction of absolute power was
the juridical-legal system.
The law helped to provide the empirical confirmation of the fiction
of the king's two bodies in medieval English law. Here, Bodin moves
one further step, using the law itself as the device with which to bridge
the gap between fact and norm. This analysis reverses the one posited
by Michel Foucault in his lectures at the College de France published
under the title "Society Must Be Defended." Here, Foucault argues that
there was a switch from late medieval forms of sovereignty that were
aligned with the king's body and largely exercised upon the bodies of
his subjects. In an argument reflected in Discipline and Punish, Foucault
points out that the juridical forms of sovereignty that come after this
period are more focused on land and maximizing productive capabilities. He implies that the juridical apparatus is only a cover for the everincreasing administration of bodies, however. "One might say that
once disciplinary constraints had to both function as mechanisms of
domination and be concealed to the extent that they were the mode in
which power was actually exercised, the theory of sovereignty had to
find expression in the juridical apparatus and had to be reactivated or
complemented by judicial codes."ll Here he implies that judicial codes
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made a new kind of sovereignty possible, one that utilized disciplinary
mechanisms while at the same time invoking rights. Legality is viewed
as an ideological cover for a dominating and extracting political power.
On the contrary, one finds when examining Bodin that legality
serves as the empirical referent for the fiction of absolute power. In
reality, worldly sovereignty is limited and fallible; it needs the political
fictions of theorists as well as the law to establish the power of the sovereign as infallible. The exclusive alliance made between sovereignty
and law sets sovereignty apart from other forms of domination, but not
just because it can then cloak itself in the guise of legality. The law
defines sovereignty as such and, since Bodin, has provided its primary
empirical referent: it makes the transcendental aspects of modem sovereignty worldly in its power.
Restated in other terms, sovereignty is a problem of how to relate
what Foucault calls two different ways of analyzing power, lithe juridical schema" whereby power is constituted and circumscribed by the
law, or the "domination-repression schema" whereby power is
achieved or resisted in terms of struggle and submissionY While Foucault argues that the oppressive-dominating effects of power lurk
beneath the juridical apparatus, Schmitt argues that the two aspects are
intertwined in the concept of sovereignty. After all, sovereignty is a
juridical term that is nonetheless meaningless without the ability to act
and to wield authority. That such actions are not then subject to the
same judicial oversight, no matter how egregiously they offend written
law, is what Schmitt refers to as the sovereign exception. Schmitt's
analysis states that sovereign power, not law, is ultimately what matters.
Schmitt believes all political concepts are adopted from religious,
theological ones. Modem sovereignty is no exception.
All significant concepts of the modem theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical
development-in which they were transferred from theology to the
theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God
became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also because of their systemic
structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological
consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is
analogous to the miracle in theology.' 3
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Schmitt argues that the transport of sovereignty from heaven to earth is
not only driven by historical development but also reflects a switch in
metaphysics. Immanence, not transcendence, becomes the defining
aspect of modem sovereignty. This basic view guides Schmitt's view of
the relationship between sovereignty and law, with sovereignty standing for worldly power and law as an idealistic construction.
Bodin's work suggests that the empiricism of the law is used to
transform the fiction of sovereignty into a historical force. Schmitt's
argument offers a twist on this logic by stating that law is fiction, while
sovereignty is real. The fact that the sovereign can suspend the law
proves that law is contingent upon sovereignty, not the reverse. Even
though typically the rule of law provides the basis for everyday governance, the exception proves that the sovereign is ultimately superior.
Take, for example, a state of emergency when typical legal or legislative
procedures are suspended. Only the sovereign may determine whether
such a state of emergency has arisen. Even more tellingly, when the law
is suspended, the sovereign still rules.
The transformation into a political order based upon immanence is
also accomplished by the establishment of juridical principles that will
lead to a routinization of political order. The goal of modem constitutionalism is to encompass all contingencies and thereby prevent any
occurrences that could potentially fall outside of the law. For this reason, the law itself specifies under what conditions and exactly how it
can be suspended. In this way, even the lapse of the law appears as its
own confirmation. However, as Schmitt points out, the state of emergency that requires the suspension of law reveals the true workings of
sovereignty. "What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited
authority, which means the suspension of the entire working order."14
The law itself, in conformity and assuming a norm, cannot determine
whether such a norm exists. Instead, sovereignty, the power that stands
outside yet is reinforced by the law, "definitively decides whether this
normal situation actually exists."15 Because order persists, even when
the law is suspended, in practice sovereignty dearly provides the basis
for political order. Sovereignty, no matter how well it is defined, rationalized, divided, or confirmed, does not have any substantial meaning
outside of its exercise. Schmitt argues that the exercise rather than the
definition of sovereignty reveals its mechanics.
Undoubtedly, Schmitt is correct in offering this assessment of the
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mechanics of sovereignty. There are times when the sovereign suspends the law, and the ability to punish itself can be seen as exhibiting
an exceptional relationship to the law. The fact that the state can incarcerate while all others cannot demonstrates the paradoxical relationship Schmitt describes: the sovereign is not subject to the laws in the
same way as all other entities and can therefore guarantee the rule of
law.
The work of Giorgio Agamben takes Schmitt's insights and applies
them to recent political events and also trends in the twentieth century.
Agamben observes that these "exceptional" demonstrations of power
gradually become the rule. He also points out that one expression of the
power of the sovereign is that it can decide which populations are governed by the rule of law and which are not. Schmitt's exceptionalism
can also be applied to populations, in addition to standard legal proceduralism. Agamben's argument seems particularly relevant today
given the diffusion of special extralegal categories such as enemy combatant, and the definition of physical spaces in which political power
can be exercised without any tempering by international human rights
or domestic legal regulations. Thinking of sovereignty as a force that is
only imperfectly tempered by the rule of law, Agamben's view of sovereignty as an unstoppable power creeping over the entire globe feels
scary and prescient.
Agamben does point to real dynamics in contemporary politics.
However, he also overstates the power of sovereignty. After all, at
times the exercise of even sovereign exceptionalism has brought censorship and removal from office, international outrage, or popular
rebellion. If sovereignty were able to define its own terms as completely as Schmitt and Agamben would have us believe, the Soviet
Union would still be intact and all democratic elections would be
purely theatrical or usually suspended if they posed the risk of producing a regime change.
The fact is that sovereignty can be taken away, and it can be risked
through its exercise. If the ability to exercise power were enough to
generate sovereignty, political history would be a tediously constant
narrative. There are instability and uncertainty, however. Part of this is
due to the requirements of sovereignty to both order a polity yet
remain aloof from it as well. Bodin's originating work offers us a new
way of thinking about the rule of law and sovereignty today. The ability to suspend the law, to exercise clemency, or to determine which
II
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populations are more vulnerable may also be a way of signaling the
transcendental elements of the sovereign. It alone can stand apart from
legal order, and it becomes a power entirely unique through this privilege. The effects of this unique relationship are all too real, and often
tragic or deadly.
Yet sovereignty is still vulnerable. Punishment poses a very particular challenge for the exercise of sovereign power: to demonstrate and
uphold the rule of law, the sovereign must provide sanctions. Yet punishment cannot become personal or viewed as merely a way of maintaining power, otherwise it seems a product of worldly calculations
and limitations, not a semidivine presence. It must be allied with the
transcendental order if sovereignty is not to become weakened. The
concluding chapter of this book will examine this hypothesis in more
detail with an examination of current U.S. penal practices at home and
abroad. The central issue, made crystal clear in the practice of state
punishment, is how sovereignty can order yet transcend the world. In
many ways, you can look at the development of bureaucratic elements
of political rule as a strategy to minimize the risk in exercising sovereignty, as I explain in the next section.

The Disciplinary Articulation of Sovereignty
The ability to suspend the law through exceptionalism, providing
clemency, or even defining which populations can be sacrificed is one
way that sovereign power establishes itself as transcendent vis-a.-vis
the law. Another method for establishing this simultaneously transcendent and immanent presence is by separating the executive powers of
sovereignty from their administration. This is the dynamic of sovereignty that captures the attention of Michel Foucault. Foucault's work
investigates the teleological development of the power of sovereignty
toward a disciplinary regime and, finally, what he terms governmentality. He offers a trio of terms-sovereignty, government, disciplineand explores the evolving nature of their interrelationship. Initially,
sovereignty, which he understands largely as a judicial construct, utilizes a system of punishment and violence to embody the power of the
king. As sovereignty is embodied in the king, when a crime occurs, the
king himself is considered the injured party. Like the laws themselves,
the punishment must reflect both the immanent and transcendent bodies of the king. Here is Foucault's description: "Now, this portion
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belonging to the prince is not in itself simple; on the one hand, it
requires redress for the injury that has been done his kingdom (as an
element of disorder and as an example given to others, this considerable injury is out of all proportion to that which has been committed
upon a private individual); but it also requires that the king take
revenge for an affront to his very person."16 In the practice of punishment, particularly in the era of spectacular corporal punishment, the
full complexity of the king's sovereignty is acted out and reconstituted
upon the body of the condemned.
However, Foucault points out that this practice was ultimately
unstable. The bloody spectacular display of sovereign power actually
created more violence and destabilized, rather than consolidated, the
power of the sovereign. Perhaps the too literal embodiment of the transcendental in such gruesome fashion made it more difficult to sustain
the fiction of sovereignty. Interestingly, this was one of Locke's primary objections to absolutist forms of government. When the king is
always party to the crime, as he is when he and sovereignty are singular, the punishment will always carry a tinge of revenge. As both party
to the crime and judge and executioner, rationality cannot be maintained, hence punishment only extends the state of war rather than
reestablishing the power of the social compact. Locke's observation is
borne out by Foucault's studies of the disorder of the mob at public
punishments.
Foucault's oeuvre suggests that sovereignty was redefined along
with the methods of punishment that represented it. With the development of popular sovereignty came the acute necessity for the development of discipline. Discipline and Punish explores the historical development of a new penal apparatus along with shifts in government
methods to enforce this discipline. Because he describes to such great
effect how sovereignty becomes dispersed and ultimately a matter of
self-discipline, the overall outlook of this particular work of Foucault's
is rather bleak. Once again, it seems as though there is nowhere one can
escape the sovereign power, and resistance is futile. But Rousseau's
Social Contract can be read as a companion volume to this work, as it
describes the internalization and social control in the terms of the freedom gained through popular sovereignty.
It is crucial to remember why the administration of the population
that Foucault describes to such horrific effect was considered a movement toward freedom. It is not that the false promise of personal free-
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dom was able to blind many generations to the increasing power of
sovereignty. Rather, self-governance was understood as a form of selfcontrol (the connections between democratic practice and punishment
shall be explored in full detail in the next chapter). What is important to
note here is that the changes Foucault describes reflect a vision of popular sovereignty, a fact that becomes occluded in his own discussion.
Sovereignty is the one aspect of Foucault's triangular configuration that
remains static, and he implies that it loses its importance except as an
ideological cover for the increase of disciplinary practices.
Foucault looks at a fundamental reorientation away from what he
describes as a sovereignty-based state, to a disciplinary society-one in
which power is more productive and conducive to political economy.
This shift ends in governmentality, an era of complete administration
upheld by institutions in and outside of the state. Foucault describes
governmentality as "the process, or rather, the result of the process,
through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into
the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
gradually becomes govemmentalized."1 7 Sovereignty then comes to
legitimate itself based upon the sanctity of the body and the protection
of the rights of citizens, rather than the sanctity of the ruler. This
requires a new form of social control that seeks to maximize the productive capacities of its citizens. The development of various institutions of education, penality, and health helps to create and administer
the population of the modem state. The sovereign power of the state
has become increasingly effective at utilizing institutions that appear to
be independent.
In this way, the transcendence of the sovereign state is maintained,
while the exercise of its power has only increased. Because the sovereign is so removed from the actions done in its name, its exercise generates virtually no resistance. Foucault's basic insight is that an invisible and decentralized power is able to exercise greater control than an
embodied one. The primary concern is how changes in the form of government have created regimes that have almost complete control over
the human body, a process that he terms biopolitics.
Foucault's work adds two new elements to this discussion of punishment and the requirements of sovereignty. First, the development of
a disciplinary apparatus certainly reduces the potential of generating
resistance through the exercise of sovereign powers. But the separation
between the act of punishing and the ability to wield sovereignty needs
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to be noted. The common understanding is that the exercise of sovereignty through punishment is its constitution, as in Agamben's and
Schmitt's works. Foucault's work suggests a rather startling evolution,
that the act of punishing does not generate sovereignty at all. If it did,
the prison guard would be sovereign. Instead, she does not perceive
herself as such, nor do others, even though she is exercising the classic
power of command. While modem sovereignty may use a greater variety of tools to manifest itself, Foucault's discussion reveals that sovereignty is still reliant upon perception rather than any particular action
or capacity. Sovereignty cannot be traced only by the actions done in its
name. We also need to pay close attention to its strategies of self-representation, which is particularly revealing in cases of punishment. Here
the orchestration of the perception of the sovereign becomes visible,
and crucial if the power is not to become overly worldly and limited.
Second, while Foucault's discussion of sovereignty and power suggests that both become stronger through dispersion, a constant relationship to the law remains intact. The disciplinarity that Foucault
describes suggests that all of us somehow become instruments of sovereignty. But sovereignty itself is still distinguished by a particular relationship to the law. Consider the difference between vigilantism and
the exercise of disciplinarity described by Foucault. If the point would
be to have the most pervasive implementation of the interests of the
sovereign, vigilantism would certainly help in accomplishing the task.
Mobs could enforce discipline and thereby increase the sovereign rule.
At times social reprisals would be a more effective deterrent against
future crime than state-sanctioned procedures. If it was only about
adherence to the law, vigilantism could be embraced as a partner in, if
not substitute for, state punishment. Instead, it is officially prohibited.
Admittedly, at times vigilantism is tolerated and even encouraged by
state officials/ 8 but the practice cannot be officially sanctioned because
to do so would relinquish the sovereign's unique relationship to the
law. It is the strategic representation and perception of this relationship
to the law that remains the source of sovereign power.
These two observations are linked. Sovereignty is able to represent
itself and be perceived as distinct from other expressions of force
through a unique relationship to the law. This requirement remains
even at the moment when it appears that sovereign power becomes
most manifest, in the act of disciplining bodies. The requirements of
sovereignty in the act of punishing are then taxing-it becomes partic-
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ularly vulnerable given the need to demonstrate an allegiance to the
law during the exercise of force.
Camus: Sovereignty Unveiled

This body of literature on sovereignty that emphasizes the power of
sovereign exceptionalism, the diffusion of its instruments, and the consolidation of its power demonstrates how successful this hybrid concept has been in constructing the basis of modem political power. Yet
there is instability in the relationship between punishment and sovereignty that needs to be exposed. Albert Camus' "Reflections on the
Guillotine," a complex and masterful rhetorical piece against capital
punishment, also reveals something essential about the exercise and
nature of modem state sovereignty. Capital punishment displays the
exclusive prerogatives of the state but simultaneously risks its unique
authority through its exercise. After all, if state punishment were simply a matter of exercising power, it would not have spawned the intricate legal codes and machinery for assistance. Camus' discussion more
than any other I have encountered reveals the methods by which sovereignty can be undone through its punishment practices.
Camus begins his essay with a story.
Shortly before the war of 1914, an assassin whose crime was particularly repulsive (he had slaughtered a family of farmers, including the
children) was condemned to death in Algiers. He was a farm worker
who had killed in a sort of bloodthirsty frenzy but had aggravated his
case by robbing his victims. The affair created a great stir. It was generally thought that decapitation was too mild a punishment for such
a monster. This was the opinion, I have been told, of my father, who
was especially aroused by the murder of the children. One of the few
things I know about him, in any case, is that he wanted to witness the
execution at the other end of town amid a great crowd of people.
What he saw that morning he never told anyone. My mother relates
merely that he came rushing home, his face distorted, refused to talk,
lay down for a moment on the bed, and suddenly began to vomit. He
had just discovered the reality hidden under the noble phrases with
which it was masked. Instead of thinking of the slaughtered children,
he could think of nothing but that quivering body that had just been
dropped onto a board to have its head cut off.19
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Camus starts with the story to replace the abstract pronouncements of
justice with descriptions of severed heads that still have the power of
vision and limbs that jump during burial. He points out that even
though punishment is justified through tradition, the impartial application of the law, and procedural administration, we still use language
to occlude the reality of administering pain. We say "justice has been
served" when someone has been sentenced to life in prison or death,
and "the prisoner" and "the condemned" become figures with no identity outside of his or her status. Camus wants to emphasize the materiality of punishment, pointing out that these are bodies in pain. The
gruesome reality will belie the noble phrases if we are forced to contend
with the fact that "the condemned" is not a position in a justice system
but rather a living being. Camus' strategy is to illuminate the practice of
capital punishment, contending it cannot stand close examination.
If punishment were only about the demonstration of sovereign
power, Camus' strategy would have little effect and in fact would backfire. If the ability to punish constructs the power of the sovereign, then
describing it in detail would only make that power seem more formidable. Instead, Camus' hunch is correct: the more closely we examine
practices of punishment, the more fallible modem sovereignty appears.
Camus' strategy works because the nature of sovereignty demands certain opacity.
The processes of state punishment are done in the name of the law or
state, but those who administer them do not occupy positions of power.
I have argued why this is a necessary aspect of sovereignty and that
punishment must make it operable without becoming limited. Punishment occurs in the name of the sovereign without becoming overly
manifest in the figure of guard, judge, or even executioner. In "Civil
Disobedience," Henry David Thoreau described the division particularly clearly. He observed that the jailers serve the state "as machines,
with their bodies" while those who make the laws and policy serve the
state with "their heads"-it is the division of the two, body and mind,
that eases culpability for those who do punish and those that command
ipo Asserting the individual identity of the person who administers
punishment disturbs this configuration by insisting upon his or her
human identity. Camus understands this dynamic and exploits it in his
essay against capital punishment, by relaying the diaries and feelings
of those who administer sovereign power.
Camus describes two different responses in those who administer
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the penal system. On the one hand, we have those who cannot bear
their involvement in such activities. "Just listen then to the warden of
an English prison who confesses to 'a keen sense of personal shame'
and to the chaplain who speaks of 'horror, shame, and humiliation'"
(195). The cruelty of capital punishment in particular, and all punishment in general, affects not only the faceless guilty ones, but also the
deliberately nameless people who administer it. Even more disturbing
are Camus' descriptions of those who like to deliver the punishment.
An executioner's assistant writes in his joumat "The new executioner
is batty about the guillotine. He sometimes spends days on end at home
sitting on a chair, ready with hat and coat on, waiting for a summons
from the Ministry." There are also overly eager citizens, ready to participate in the due punishment of the condemned: Camus reports that
"hundreds of persons offer to serve as executioners without pay" (196).
The fact that those who punish exhibit emotion, regret, or anticipation
destroys the illusion of punishment as a mechanical process. But sovereignty must deploy mankind as its tools: we are complicit, not separate.
Camus points out that capital punishment has become ever more
hidden from view to hide the fact of human agency. The same is true of
all punishment today in the United States. If a prison guard were to
acquire a face, we could look and find indifference in the face of suffering, an anguished soul, or sadism: any of these options would disturb
our sense of the administration of punishment tempered by law and
institutional mechanisms, therefore we choose again and again to
obscure any specifics. We like the idea of the machinery of justice but
recoil when presented with a concrete example, as in Kafka's "In the
Penal Colony."
While much of Camus' essay is a case against capital punishment,
for the purpose of this argument the most revealing passages come
when he links the practice of capital punishment with state sovereignty. He has detailed how capital punishment fails to deter, he has
demonstrated that capital punishment potentially destabilizes the representation of the state as a benevolent or at least neutral party, and
therefore it hides the practice away from the public eye. This is not a
spectacular representation of state sovereignty; instead, sovereignty
represents itself as hidden, invisible-as is appropriate to maintain the
aura of transcendence through impartial administration.
Since the practice of punishment places such a stress on this system,
one would assume that the practice of punishment would be lessened

PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER

or avoided. On the contrary, the state must take on the mantle of punishment. Camus points out how the practices of punishment become
integrally linked to the self-conception of the state and the nature of the
power it demands for itself. At one time, the state punished-with
death and other penalties-in the name of religious values or deities.
When the state serves the interests of the divine, its punishments can be
seen as a sort of intermediary step, not the ultimate end in itself. Camus
points out that for true believers, even today, capital punishment is "a
temporary penalty that leaves the final sentence in suspense, an
arrangement necessary only for terrestrial order, an administrative
measure which, far from signifying the end for the guilty man, may
instead favor his redemption" (224).
The last chapter displayed how modern sovereignty moved from
punishment in the name of unearthly order to the earthly divinity
described in this chapter. The state still punishes, and must do so to
provide this "terrestrial order," but it does so in its own name, in the
name of a worldly order. As Camus points out, this makes those who
administer punishments hypocritical: they do it in the name of a God
they don't believe in. But in fact, the very act of punishing asserts
human political order over a divine one. No matter whether the blade
is drawn in the name of God or the law of state, it establishes the sovereign on earth. And this sovereign becomes visible through its manifestations.
Camus' piercing critique of capital punishment amounts to this: that
the state punishes in the name of absolute right, and that the power to
punish is essentially godlike, but the force is exerted without faith.
Instead, punishment happens in the name of reason, knowledge, and
information-not mystical faith. "Europe's malady consists in believing nothing and claiming to know everything" (229). With the secularization of state order, the state had to punish in its own name. But the
ability and right to punish cannot be grounded in something as worldly
as knowledge and reason. They are too fallible. For instance, clear rationales can be provided for differing views, knowledge does change, and
information is less than perfect. How can we then use these secular
tools as the basis of administering pain? On the other hand, there is no
choice if political power is to have secular grounds.
Camus has unveiled the unstable foundations of modern sovereignty: it is secular, but assumes the powers of a god. For this reason,
whenever sovereignty is revealed as human, fallible, it becomes threat-
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ened. This is why it is particularly important to deny the impulse to see
sovereignty as the overwhelming mechanism described by Foucault,
Agamben, and Schmitt. This perception of sovereignty as otherworldly
only strengthens it. As Camus observes and demonstrates in this essay,
once punishment is viewed in all of its materiality, both the condemned
and the administrator become all too human, interfering with the current justifications for sovereign power. Inherent in the form of modern
sovereignty is a check on its exercise: if it becomes too earthly or
exposed as human, it ceases to have the same power. Therefore we
must look at punishment as an expression of sovereign power, and not
be awed by its strength, though it certainly does exhibit tremendous
force at times. We must be willing to look closely in order to expose its
weakness. After all, it is nothing without the hand that holds the key,
the judge that shuffles the papers, and the person who chooses whether
or not to file charges. Our perception is what creates the power of sovereignty; that same perception can and should contest its absolutist
claims.

CHAPTER

4

Severing the Sanguinary Empire
Punishment and Early American Democratic Idealism
Lay then the axe to the root, and teach governments humanity. It is their
sanguinary punishments which corrupt mankind.
-Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man

The opinion rendered by Justice Kennedy in Roper v. Simmons on March
1, 2005, that finds capital punishment for crimes committed while the
offender was a juvenile to be cruel and unusual contains an unusually
exact historical reversal. The ruling was bolstered by recent psychological research that establishes moral capacities are not fully developed in
late adolescence. The decision was largely anticipated on the strength
of this particular argument following the 2004 decision to stop execution of the mentally impaired. However, there is another line of argumentation advanced by Justice Kennedy. He notes that many states
within the United States have banned capital punishment for juvenile
offenses, but he also looks at the capital punishment practices of the
entire world. Citing the universal movement away from the practice,
Kennedy notes that "it is fair to say that the United States now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death
penalty.'" Dissenting, Justice Scalia was outraged by the suggestion
that the United States look to other countries as a guide for penal codes.
Yet historical research into the origins of American penal practices
reveals that from the very beginning they were formed in relationship
to other countries, most specifically, in contrast to Great Britain.
Today, the United States stands apart from many countries in its sanguinary penal practices. This is a fascinating position to consider, as the
founding of the country was in part inspired by the illegitimate penal
practices of Great Britain, and early political philosophers saw leniency
in punishment as the way to characterize the United States as a comparatively enlightened regime. For example, the charter statement of the
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Society for Political Enquiries asserted that they had "grafted on an
infant commonwealth, the manners of ancient and corrupted monarchies," by adopting many of the laws of the Crown. "In having effected
a separate government, we have as yet effected but a partial independence. The Revolution can only be said to be complete, when we shall
have freed ourselves, no less from the influence of foreign prejudices
than from the fetters of foreign power."2 The hearings in various states
over capital punishment reflected the idea that the new republic could
distinguish itself and define democracy through a starkly contrasting
approach to penality. While Britain's code still awarded death or transport for virtually all felonies, a few states in the new republic abolished
the death penalty, and most of them severely restricted its use.
The fact that 210 years later the United States, in Kennedy's words,
stood alone in the execution of juveniles shows how far we have come
from that first impulse to set an example for the supposedly "enlightened" regimes of Western Europe. This lost moment of democratic idealism deserves to be resurrected as we contemplate the future of punishment in the United States. Here is one historical instance in which
the character and philosophy of a country was defined in part through
practices and ideals of punishment, and self-consciously so.
Most recent work on punishment emphasizes how punishment
reflects and enforces particular social, political, and economic trends. I
generally agree with the position articulated by, for example, Rusche
and Kirschheimer that punishment often serves economic imperatives) Similarly, Foucault's analysis of the growth of administrative
power perceptible both in and outside the prison resonates. For those
who see the use of punishment primarily being driven by politicized,
economic, or institutionalist logic, the jurisprudence of the early American republic is a startling counterexample. This is not to say that this
idealism is always long lasting, or strong enough to fight institutional
logic that may run counter to the original intention. While the idealism
may have been rapidly occluded, for a short period practitioners and
philosophers tried to reconcile practices of punishment with genuine
democratic fervor. We can learn more about democracy and punishment by revisiting it.

The Sanguinary Empire
One of the most pressing duties of the convention assembled to write
the Pennsylvania State Constitution in 1776 was reforming the criminal
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code. An intensive debate about criminal law and punishment raged
throughout the ex-colonies for the next twenty years, but it boiled with
particular fervor in Philadelphia. The "sanguinary punishments"
forced upon the state were a large point of resentment between the
Quaker settlers and the Crown. In a study cOIrunissioned by the Pennsylvania Legislature, William Bradford argued that the death penalty
needed to be abolished, as it was a remnant of a corrupt aristocratic
regime. Allowing harsh punishment was sign that the new republic
had not yet achieved full independence. "Hence sanguinary punishments, contrived in despotic and barbarous ages, have been continued
when the progress of freedom, science, and morals renders them
unnecessary and mischievous: and laws, the offspring of a corrupted
monarchy, are fostered in the bosom of a youthful republic."4
The image is striking and appears repeatedly in documents from this
era, as in the charter of the Society for Political Enquiries written by
Thomas Paine. Law needs to be purified in order to have a truly clean
foundation upon which to build American democracy. The psychology
of the age was largely oedipal: there was a desire to break free from the
rule of the Father, yet a terror of growing to become like him through
independence. Jefferson worried about national debt and even the
establishment of a permanent constitution, precisely because he did not
want the mistakes or decisions of a previous generation to fetter the
existence of the next: "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation."5 What a tremendous symbol of independence: to plant a tree of
moral reform and optimism in human nature that would spring forth
from the ground literally watered with the blood of English and Irish
convicts. Dozens of commentators argued, and the legislators in Massachusetts, Virginia, and New Hampshire agreed, that the United States
should stand alone in the world, turning its face from corporal punishment of all kinds. Finding inspiration from Montesquieu and even
more from the Italian Cesare Beccaria, early American philosophers
and penal practitioners engaged in an extended debate about how best
to create a system of punishment that would serve as an instrument of
democratic morality.
When Tocqueville and Beaumont came to study the Eastern State
Penitentiary (or Cherry Hill as it was then called) in 1830, these ideas
had found their institutionalization in a building similar to Bentham's
panopticon. Foucault's Discipline and Punish famously examined the
birth of the prison and the ideals of the penitentiary as the development
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of the means of correct training-the individualism, behaviorism, and
self-regulation that were required by mass democracies found their
expression in schools, prisons, and the factory. While there can be no
doubt that this less inspiring practice of punishment did ultimately
emerge out of these institutions, research demonstrates that the initial
impulse was far more idealistic. Behaviorism was explicitly rejected in
favor of a more fundamental belief in human virtue.
Hence, this period of debate and penal practice between 1790 and
1810 displays a naiVete. But it also serves as a curious mirror, for many
of the practices that were explicitly linked to despotism in England are
now practiced in the United States. Perhaps in these foundational articulations of democratic ideology we can find a position from which to
critique current penal practices. Have we become the sanguinary
empire from which we broke? Did institutions take on a life of their
own, creating practices and effects that were not intended? Or are the
ideals of punishment always bound to be nobler than the practices, creating an inescapable chasm between ideals of justice and practices of
power?

Transportation
Australia's origins as a penal colony are well known; America's are not.
European powers had long used punishment as a way to advance colonial ambitions, starting with the use of galley slaves in the sixteenth
century. Rusche and Kirschheimer use the example of galley servitude
as a demonstration of their argument that economic considerations
rather than moral ones have historically determined the nature of punishment. They reprint a letter from a public prosecutor in Bordeaux to
the national administration written in 1676.
You have frequently done me the honor of writing to me in connection with the supply of prisoners for the galleys and of transmitting
to me the express orders of His Majesty relating to the use of such
prisoners in the execution of his glorious projects. You will be gratified to learn that this Court has twenty prisoners who will be
chained together this morning and sent off.6
Galley slaves were needed to power the fleets of the different crowns of
Europe: 350 rowers were needed for the larger ships of the era, and 180
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for the smaller ones. 7 Because of the dangerous and ghastly nature of
the work, it was impossible to power the fleets with free men, so prisoners were found (some might even say, made) to do so. It is particularly vivid to realize that trade, war, and expansion were literally powered by thousands of enslaved prisoners at precisely the time that
Grotius was penning "The Free Sea" providing the theoretical and legal
justification for the expansion of free trade.
Technological innovation made galley slaves largely obsolete by the
eighteenth century, but prisoners could be useful for the projects of
empire in other ways. Settlers in Virginia asked the government to send
them convicts to help with labor in 1611 but found their labor unreliable and their administration so difficult that they soon reconsidered
this source of labor. In 1670 in Virginia and 1676 in Maryland, the
colonists passed laws prohibiting the transport of convicts into their
territory.8 That such a measure was needed testifies to the commonality
of the practice.
Eighteenth-century English penal laws were draconian. The death
penalty was prescribed for virtually every felony, but jails were overcrowded nonetheless. Fewer people were convicted of crimes since the
result would be death. While it might seem obvious that a reform of the
penal code was required, instead in 1717 Parliament passed the Transportation Act. The act is remarkably frank about the failure of the
English penal code and suggests a more productive alternative.
Whereas it is found by Experience, That the Punishments inflicted
by the Laws now in Force against the Offences of Robbery, Larceny,
and other felonious Taking and Stealing of Money and Goods, have
not proved effectual to deter wicked and evil-disposed Persons from
being guilty of the said Crimes. . . . And whereas in many of his
Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in America, there is great Want
of servants, who by their Labour and Industry might be the Means of
improving and making the said Colonies and plantations more useful to the nation. 9
This act of Parliament made it possible to commute the death penalty
for felonies and substitute transportation to the colonies for either
seven or fourteen years as the alternative punishment. The question of
whether the transport sentence was to last seven or fourteen years
depended upon if the crime was classified as a "clergy crime."l0 The
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official rationale that colonists were anxious to receive these convicts
was belied by the existence of laws in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania specifically barring the importation of convicts. The Transportation Act of 1717 made all these oppositional laws null and void,
however, and the large-scale transport of convicts to America commenced.
Roger Ekrich's research provides a sketch of the practice. In the years
between 1749 and 1771,40 percent of those convicted of crimes at Old
Bailey were transported into the American colonies. 11 Other research
takes a longer period of focus and finds that between 1729 and 1770,70
percent of convicts from Old Bailey were transported to the colonies.
Clearly, the practice fundamentally changed criminal punishment in
England as well as immigration into the colonies. Most notoriously,
James Oglethorpe arranged for 16,000 debtors to be released from
prison to go and settle in the newly founded colony of Georgia. In the
eighteenth century, one-quarter of all immigrants from England and
Ireland into the American colonies were convicts. 12
The practice was wildly profitable, almost as much as the slave
trade. Jonathan Forward was the London merchant who had a virtual
monopoly on transport from 1718 until 1738.13 The criminal justice system handed convicts over to Forward, who then loaded them into boats
and shipped them to the American colonies. Upon arrival in North
America, he sold the convicts to plantation owners, or any other masters, who would be able to use their labor for either seven or fourteen
years depending upon their crime. Plantation owners liked to buy convicts, because they cost much less than a slave. The average cost of a
slave was 50 pounds for an adult, while it was a mere 12 to 15 pounds
for a convict. Because of procreation and permanent enslavement, the
long-term economy of slaves may have been better. But because they
were a short-term investment, convicts did not have to be treated as
well. Fifty percent of convict laborers died within seven years, suggesting that they were worked to death. 14
The reason convict labor was relatively inexpensive was that the
transporters did not have to pay for their cargo as did slave traders, and
they capitalized grandly upon the voyage back home as well. The government handed convicts over to the merchants for free, happy to be
rid of the expense of execution or detainment. Balak and Lave closely
examined the political economy of convict transportation and found
that the profitability was also due to the "return cargo" such as sugar,
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tobacco, and cotton that they brought back to London. This was a crucial factor in perpetuating the practice: transportation to the colonies of
Canada failed when the War of Independence made transport impossible into the United States. IS Because there weren't as many products
available in Canada to make the return trip profitable, the transportation of convict labor across the Atlantic ceased to be a venture that
attracted London businessmen.
Hence, the transport of convicts was a lucrative business that intersected well with the development of colonial products. The English
criminal system soon found that transportation was an ideal solution to
the overcrowding of jails. Between 1720 and 1765 Parliament passed
sixteen different laws making transportation the required punishment
for different crimes. This historical case study suggests that the practice
of punishment at the time was developed according to economic principles, as Rusche and Kirschheimer argue throughout their classic book
Punishment and Social Structure. From the galley slave system to transportation, one can see how England used the penal code as a way to
promote imperial ambitions.
The transportation system allowed merchants to profit from the
crime wave that accompanied industrialization in England, helped
people the colonies, provided labor for tasks that even indentured servants were loath to take on, and provided an inexpensive way for
England to rid itself of the "criminal classes" without having to kill
them off one by one. Presented with a choice of execution or exile, convicts found little to resent in transportation. The only people who were
less than enthusiastic about the entire system were the colonial administrators who complained about the disorder caused by transportation.
They aptly perceived that they were bearing most of the unfortunate
outcomes of this ingenious system of justice. Since they could no longer
bar transport outright following the 1717 Transportation Act, instead
they sought ways to regulate and curb it. They tried both taxation and
red tape to strangle the practice. Some states required intensive registration procedures for transporters to be eligible to sell convicts. Others
placed taxation per head on each convict sold, attempting to tip the economics that made the practice so profitable. 16
However, the Crown was so supportive of the policy that soon transporters recognized that they could ignore the colonial administrators
with impunity. The Crown wouldn't enforce these taxes or regulations,
so transporters saw no need to pay them. This is but one place where
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the sovereignty of the Crown was asserted over the colonies. However,
this clash over transportation produced an interesting response in the
colonies, and later the newly independent United States. The colonies,
having played an integral role in bolstering a corrupt system of justice
for many decades, were all the more eager to establish their moral
superiority by establishing a code of punishment that served democratic ideals, rather than aristocratic corruption.
Intransigent in many things, England continued to try to ship convicts to the United States even after independence. In 1787, the Continental Congress passed a resolution urging all states to ban the transport of convicts from Britain as soon as possible. In Britain, the sudden
closing of their primary release valve for the criminal justice system
caused crisis and soul-searching. In 1779, Britain passed a resolution
calling for transportation to resume elsewhere. When transport to
Canada proved to be unfeasible for economic reasons, Lord
Beauchamp was appointed to prepare reports examining the possibility of transport to other regions. In a report to Parliament in 1785 entitled "Recommendations for the Disposal of Convicts," Beauchamp
noted the overcrowding of jails, which were bursting with prisoners
who had been sentenced to transportation many years earlier but had
not been able to be transported due to the American Revolution.
Beauchamp suggests that transportation has the disadvantage of not
providing the example to discourage future crime, since "his Sufferings
are unseen.... His Chasm is soon filled up, and, being as soon forgotten, it strikes no Terror into the Minds of those for whose Correction it
was intended to operate, though the Public may gain very importantly
by his Removal." Nonetheless, the Lord recommends a coast of Africa
(present day Namibia), which has a favorable climate and" A vein of
Copper Ore which contains one third of pure metal," and furthermore
would be an excellent stopping place for those returning to England
from India. To establish the colony, the Lord suggests they land convicts in November as "they will have the whole Summer to raise Habitations, and make other preparations for their future Subsistence and
Security." Happily, the administration of these convicts can be accomplished by loyalists from America who "are desirous of settling in any
healthy Part of the Globe where they can rely upon the protection of the
British Government.""7 Ideally, the colony would flourish and become
the destination for all transportation and emigrants from England. Is
They hoped to provide ample economic opportunities for British sub-
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jects to remain under the protection of the Crown, rather than being
tempted to go to the United States.
New South Wales, Australia, became the location of choice instead,
due to the fact that Namibia was considered "sandy and barren, and
from other causes unfit for settlement," but the logic behind the argument for Namibia is revealing nonetheless. 19 One can see the colonial
administration at work, trying to gain "The greatest national Advantages" from the system of criminal justice.
There were dissenters in the empire itself, the most well known to us
today being Jeremy Bentham. In 1802 he wrote a long pamphlet arguing that Parliament should abandon the system of transportation to
New South Wales in favor of expanding the penitentiary system of his
device, the panopticon. In this pamphlet, Bentham proposes five criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of punishment: deterrence,
reformation, incapacitation, compensation (satisfaction to the injured
party), and economy. Interestingly enough, Bentham argues that the
transportation system to American was effective, as the prevalence of
law-abiding citizens and the purchase of convicts by one particular
master who was to train the convict in the manners and habits of society fulfilled the need to have punishment serve as a transformative
process. Yet transport to New South Wales accomplished no similar
transformation, as the colony was overrun by convicts with no positive
influence to offer one another. In his eyes, even more damaging is the
fact that transport is not perfectly proportional to the crime committed,
breaking one of his cardinal rules. Furthermore, sentences were frequently commuted, and those with means could buy their own way out
of the servitude that was required of them. Therefore mere banishment
became the punishment for the wealthy, while banishment combined
with bondage became the fate of the poor, even though they had
received the same sentence. Frequently convicts escaped and returned
to Britain. Bentham argues that even though the system may be profitable, the price is too high to pay: "The price, in the way of injusticethe whole price is thus paid for the expected benefit; and it is but in an
imperfect degree that the benefit is reaped. The proportions of penal
justice are confounded; the poison of perfidy is infused into the system
of government; and still the obnoxious vermin remain unextirpated."20
Bentham offers his penitentiary system as the favorable alternative,
one that will serve the interests of justice rather than the purse. He proposes to see convicts as a "sort of grown children" that need the same
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basic guidance as other children to attain the means of self-legislation.
The penitentiary is perfectly poised to accomplish this task, "in its
extraordinary and improved state, that principle of management carried to such a degree of perfection, as till then had never been reached
even by imagination, much less by practice."21 Bentham argues that the
penitentiary system is superior to transport on every criterion except
for economy. He clearly hopes that the advantages in terms of justice
will persuade Parliament that the extra expense is justified. In the fifteen years following the breakdown of the transport system to the
United States, Britain was involved in a period of self-scrutiny and had
delegations report on the penal practices of the United States as a
model to consider for adoption. Interestingly, Bentham felt compelled
to send this particular pamphlet to a sympathetic fellow traveler in the
United States, Caleb Lownes. 22 Lownes was the administrator of the
Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia. On the face of it, he may seem to be
similarly inspired by Bentham's vision, but closer inspection reveals
that the initial penal philosophies and practices in Philadelphia were
derived from a different source and have a distinct character.

Beccaria
Bernard Bailyn has noted that Cesare Beccaria's work was mentioned
in pamphlet after pamphlet about criminal law in the new republic.
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and Benjamin Franklin
were all well acquainted with the work On Crimes and Punishments. It
was published in Italy in 1764, and the English translation of the work
was remarkably swift, appearing in 1767. Presses in the colonies
reprinted it as early as 1773, and multiple editions appeared in South
Carolina, New York, Boston, and Pennsylvania. 23 First editions of the
Italian work appear in the American Philosophical Library in Philadelphia, as well as multiple copies of these eighteenth-century American
editions. Beccaria is hailed as "wise," "immortal," and even saintly in
different treatises immediately following the Revolutionary War.
Though Beccaria is often seen merely as a short detour on the way to
Bentham, their ideas are actually quite distinct.24 While the utilitarianism of Bentham may have finally triumphed in the practices of the penitentiary described by Tocqueville, Beaumont, and Foucault, Beccaria
served as the initial inspiration behind the development of a new penal
idealism. In Beccaria we find a unique vision of the utility of law in cre-
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ating democratic virtue and citizens, an insight into the psychology of
democratic nations that compares to Tocqueville's, and a vision of how
democratic virtue, not merely behavior, can be created through public
policy. Ultimately, Beccaria's work suggests why punishment is so
dangerous in a democratic society, but it also offers suggestions for
how it can be used to create equality.
One theme in Beccaria's work that found favor among the new legislators in the United States was the idea that bad laws are the source of
criminality. This is different from claiming that laws are bad because
they do not prevent criminality. On the contrary, poor laws produce
criminality. They asserted that the criminals Britain had sent over to the
American colonies were an effect of corrupt laws. People are not the
source of criminality; rather, poor government is. The corollary to this
proposition is that good laws can be a fount of virtue. Beccaria claimed
that any law that goes against human sentiment would ultimately meet
resistance. The surest way of generating resistance is to force adherence
to a law that people find naturally abhorrent. On the other hand, making punishment perfectly just will create a sovereign that will never
need to be overthrown. In this sense, punishment becomes the calibration between government and the people-the more closely the government matches what is in the human heart, the more likely that this
government will never be deposed. Correct punishment becomes a
way to ensure perpetuity of law, or even the end of all revolutions. This
idea would have obvious appeal in a country seeking to establish a stable regime. But stability could not come at any price-for example,
compelling obedience to a regime-at least, not at this historical juncture. Correct law was the way to achieve stability without sacrificing
progress.
Beccaria extends this basic observation throughout his discussion of
crime and punishment. What he seems to fear above all is the observation of laws, without a concurrent belief in their justice. He takes the
highly unusual step of imagining what people who are being subjected
to the law must think when they see that the law is applied irregularly
or believe that the law is unjust. Both Beccaria and the political thinkers
of the early American republic had seen quite clearly how English law
was used as an instrument to increase the fortunes of the ruling classes.
For colonists who had tried to resist transport, they had experienced
the penal system as a clear affront to their ability to self-legislate.
Because they had experienced firsthand how punishment can be a tool
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that reflects and increases social inequalities, they recognized the need
to guard vigilantly against this use of the criminal codes.
When a person, group, or entire population is forced to submit to
laws that they recognize as unjust, the essence of the social contract is
destroyed. Obedience to law without believing in the law only creates
resentment, not the social cohesion that is intended. Beccaria acknowledges that punishment in a stratified society only leads to further disassociation from the state and justice. He imagines the calculations of
someone facing the death penalty: "these laws are nothing but pretexts
for power and for the calculated and cruel formalities of justice; they
are nothing but a convenient language for killing us all the more surely,
like the preselected victims of a sacrifice to the insatiable god of despotism. "25 Forcing blind obedience is the way to foment revolt, to undermine the political order entirely. Just as the son waits for the first
opportunity to overthrow the tyrannical father, so punishments that
create compliance but appear to be unjust are the most volatile element
in the relationship between state and citizen. Beccaria's own relationship with his father has been documented as a particularly troubled
one; who better to ruminate on the resentment caused by feigned obedience?26
This is the aspect of Beccaria's thought that most clearly separates
him from Bentham. Bentham argued punishment should serve social
cohesion and be gauged to be maximally useful in preventing future
crimes. But Beccaria sees the origin of social cohesion as resting in the
contract; therefore punishment must serve to enforce the contract, not
simply social cohesion. Obtaining correct behavior through punishment without true acceptance of the society and government opens the
road to revolt. Beccaria's tract contains a short precis on education. His
ideas about education display exactly how distant he is from the
"Means of Correct Training" at work in both prisons and schools
described by Foucault in Discipline and Punish. Education should
"replace copies with originals" in the minds of students and eschew
"ordering them what to do, which gains only a feigned and fleeting
obedience."27 Learning happens when students think for themselves;
they should not be encouraged to repeat the knowledge of others. Beccaria correctly foresaw that behaviorism would undermine the spirit of
contractual government.
Punishment is useful in preventing future crime, but the principle of
utility cannot be the guide in developing it. Instead, Beccaria asserts
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that the proper way to determine a punishment is by the effect it has
upon those administering and witnessing it. "'The limit which the lawgiver should set to the harshness of punishments seems to depend on
when the feeling of compassion at the punishment, meant more for the
spectators than for the convict, begins to dominate every other in their
souls."28 What is the punishment that brings out compassion? 'This
seems to depend more upon the response of the person being punished
than the actual punishment. Take, for example, sending a child to his
or her room. If the child sorrowfully and dutifully goes to the room,
stifling cries, and sits inside quietly moaning, compassion is felt much
more easily than if the child resists, screams, and slams the bedroom
door after yelling at you. 'The punishment is the same, but in one
instance it seems harsh, in the other, perhaps too lenient.
Another factor that determines the level of compassion in spectators
is whether the punishment itself corresponds to what they feel is correct. If we gather in public to watch a hand be slapped for an aggravated assault, we would have no compassion for the convict; instead
we would only marvel or feel outrage at his luck in escaping something
more severe. On the other hand, when punishments are harsher than
seem appropriate, two events are likely to occur. First, we think the law
is unjust and distance ourselves from it-it is the law of the regime, not
the law of the social contract of which I am a part. But spectators will
also be more likely to refuse identification with the person being punished. To convince oneself of safety even in the midst of an unjust law,
we reason that the condemned must be of an entirely different sort of
person than myself. 'There would be no empathy and hence no compassion. Beccaria argues against the public punishment of smugglers.
"Smuggling is a real crime against the sovereign and the nation, but the
punishment of it should not involve dishonour since it does not seem
disgraceful in the eyes of the public. If humiliating punishments are
given to crimes not held to be dishonourable, then the feeling of disgrace aroused by those that really are so diminishes." Instead of seeing
the law as a reflection of innate human sensibility, it seems to be an
instrument of humiliation, and "the moral sentiments are destroyed."29
'The basic insight is interesting, as Beccaria observes that punishment
can create a chasm in societies by developing a class that becomes
untouchable, an entire category of people that we come to see as less
than human as a result of their punishment. It is when punishments
create different classes of citizens that they fail to reflect the unity of the
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social body through contract but instead perpetuate the division. Once
punishment serves to divide, all hope of justice is gone as the contract
and law must be based upon unity. This idea of unity was to guide
many practices of the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, as I will discuss shortly.
Beccaria laments the uneven application of the laws to different
social classes as well as the use of punishment in creating a permanent
social schism. Once again, he puts himself into the head of a criminal
being tried.
What are these laws which I have to obey, which leave such a gulf
between me and the rich man? He denies me the penny I beg of him,
brushing me off with the demand that I should work, something he
knows nothing about. Who made these laws? Rich and powerful
men, who have never condescended to visit the filthy hovels of the
poor, who have never broken mouldy bread among the innocent
cries of starving children and a wife's tears. Let us break these ties,
which are pernicious to most people and only useful to a few and
idle tyrants; let us attack injustice at its source.... King of a small
band of men, I shall put to rights the inequities of fortune, and I shall
see these tyrants blanch and cower at one whom they considered,
with insulting ostentation, lower than their horses and dogs.3°
It may sound like ressentiment, but it is a jarring passage to find in the

midst of an otherwise straightforward plea for the proper structuring
of law in the purpose of punishing. In these passages, he strikes at the
core of the problem of democracy and punishment: when we punish,
we make someone less than ourselves. The paradox of punishment in a
democracy is that punishment is ideally used to encourage and
demand that someone act as one of the self-legislating individuals that
form the basis of an equal society. Yet the very act of punishing makes
someone inherently less than those others in the position of enforcing
the contract. Today, most people accept the idea that once someone
breaks the law, they fall outside of normal citizenship. Once a sentence
is served, a fine paid, the offender is supposedly to be welcomed back
into society. Yet Beccaria's work helps remind us why that is so difficult. The process of punishing makes someone less than equal, and the
stigma remains. We cannot place someone in a prison and outside of
society according to a time regulation and expect their reentry into soci-
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ety to be seamless. Punishment can only work to promote democracy if
it is circumscribed to very precise effect.
Beccaria saw the problem and tried to calculate a form of punishment that would maintain democratic citizenship. He concludes it is
crucial for compassion to be maintained on the side of the onlooker,
whether a passive observer of punishment or someone involved in the
actual administration of it. He also insists that understanding must be
established in the mind of the person being punished. If punishment is
to maintain a democratic society, it must not break the bounds of natural compassion among fellow citizens, nor can it create the perception
of privilege among different classes.
Beccaria's vision of punishment would not work in a society where
there were different classes, for any criminal would then be able to
blame his inequality for his penance. If there are already classes in society, practices of punishment will reveal the inequity starkly. Beccaria's
work suggests why punishment and criminal codes must be reformed
if democracy is to flourish. What had been the instrument of inequality
must be wrested away, lest it corrupt the heart of the new republic. We
might look at this idea today and say that such ideals are noble, but that
the practice of punishment will inevitably create some sort of hierarchy
between judge and defendant, guard and prisoner. Yet the practices of
the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia in the years immediately following the American Revolution were closely aligned with Beccaria's
ideas. They did try to create compassion between keeper and prisoner,
and the goal of the system was to maintain every person's identity as a
full citizen, even while they were in prison.
Democratic Punishment: The Practices at Walnut Street Jail, 1790-99

The Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia was the first experiment in
democratic punishment, and this is where the idea of the penitentiary
was initially developedY Settlers built the Walnut Street Jail in 1773. In
1777, the British army seized Philadelphia and used the jail to house
prisoners of war. The notoriously cruel Captain Cunningham was
charged with the administration of the jail and the rebel prisoners
within it. When he was finally charged with numerous crimes in London in 1791, Cunningham confessed that he had "presided over the
miseries of over two thousand prisoners in the New York and Philadelphia Provosts; how he had stopped the rations of his victims and sold
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them for his own gain." A report on the jail holding colonial prisoners
stated of Cunningham: "His chief amusement, when not in a sanguinary mood, was to defeat the benevolent intention of the people of
the city who sent in food to the patriotic prisoners, by upsetting the
utensils and scattering the food over the filthy floor. He would chuckle
to witness the degrading scramble of the poor wretches as they gathered it up, dirt and all, to mitigate the pangs of starvation."32 On average ten people a day died in the jail, and their bodies were unceremoniously dragged across the street and dumped in ditches in a field in
the middle of Philadelphia.33 Transforming the clear symbol of British
malevolence was a victory for the administrators of the jail following
independence.
In 1776, the new Constitution of Pennsylvania replaced the Code of
the Duke of York, which had been foisted onto the colony in 1718,
bringing the bloody criminal code of native England to Penn's territory.
William Penn had successfully resisted this criminal code and had
established a much more lenient and progressive penal code in 1682
under the name of liThe Great Law." With the Transportation Act of
1717, however, the Crown was no longer going to allow colonies to
have a criminal code separate from, and often in resistance to, its own.
William Bradford noted that the criminal codes of much of the eighteenth century in Pennsylvania were an exotic plant, and not the
native growth of Pennsylvania. It has endured, but, I believe, has never
been a favorite. As soon as the principles of Beccaria were disseminated, they found a soil that was prepared to receive them."34
Thus, one of the first significant shifts from British law was the Pennsylvania penal code.
II

To deter more effectually from the commission of crimes, by continued visible punishment of long duration, and to make sanguinary
punishment less necessary; houses ought to be provided for punishing at hard labor, those who shall be convicted of crimes not capital;
wherein the criminals shall be employed for the benefit of the public,
or for reparation of injuries done to private persons. And all persons
at proper times shall be admitted to see the prisoners at their
labour.35
It is important to recall that this was considered a great improvement in the penal codes, though the resulting practices were unsavory.
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In fact, the Wheel Barrow Laws, as they came to be known, are remarkably similar to the description of punishment that appears in Sir
Thomas More's Utopia. In Utopia, all people convicted of crimes
became slaves to the state, doing public works and generally providing
the difficult labor absolutely necessary for the maintenance of any society. The slaves are well treated, and the public display of their labor
serves as a constant reminder that one must contribute to the collective
endeavprs of the commonwealth or become a slave to them absolutely.
In Philadelphia, prisoners working in public were shackled to a ball
and chain and were subjected to taunts and abuses. The convicts fought
back. "After they had swept around them as far as the ball and chain
would permit, the manacled prisoners would pick up the balls and
carry them to a fresh spot. The more malicious would often throw
down the balls in such a manner as to injure passers-by."36 There were
several well-publicized escapes as well. On May 8,1787, the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons was founded,
and it still exists today under the name of the Philadelphia Prison Society. One of the founders, Benjamin Rush, presented a paper against the
practice of public punishments at Franklin's salon, The Society for
Political Enquiry. Rush's primary rationale against public punishment
was that it created a permanent stigma attached to the criminal. Thus,
the practice of punishment ultimately does more to break the harmony
of society than the initial crime. "Crimes produce a stain, which may be
washed out by reformation, and which frequently wears away by time;
But public punishments leave scars, which disfigure the whole character; and hence persons, who have suffered them, are even afterwards
viewed with horror or aversion."37 After several months of lobbying on
the part of Rush and the rest of the Philadelphia Society, the Wheel Barrow Laws were repealed on Aprils, 1790. Private labor was established
as an alternative to the public spectacle of hard labor. The Walnut Street
Jail was to be the primary location for this private labor.
The administration of the Walnut Street Jail was turned over to the
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, and
Caleb Lownes, member of that society, became the primary administrator and designer of the jail, though there were other volunteer
observers who met twice monthly to observe the workings at the jail
and discuss reformation. There are two different detailed accounts of
the workings of the Walnut Street Jail in the following years. Lownes
himself wrote one in 1793, which was attached to William Bradford's
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proposal to end capital punishment in Pennsylvania. Robert Turnbull
in 1796, a South Carolina native who was studying law in Philadelphia
when he toured the jail, wrote the second. He later became a political
reformer in the South. Both Turnbull and Lownes cite the ideas of Beccaria with particular favor.
Turnbull is an enthusiast for the system, describing the jail as the
"wonder of the world." At this time, the jail held 250 convicts, who
were segregated by sex. Everyone worked in the common yard of the
jail and then retired to their individual cells to sleep. They ate meals in
common. On Sundays ministers visited the jail, and there was some literacy instruction as well. The characteristics that distinguish the entire
enterprise are the relationship between the keepers and the prisoners,
the method of punishment, and the attitude toward criminality.
Lownes chastised those who "forget that the prisoner is a rational
being of like feelings and passion with themselves." While Bentham
was to later describe convicts and prisoners in the penitentiary system
as children needing instruction, this view was not held at the Walnut
Street Jail. Crimes were not understood as a result of individual moral
or rational failings. Instead, Turnbull observes, "you attribute their situation to misfortune, to bad education, and other adventitious circumstances in life-not to any innate thirst for vice or villainy."3 8 Every
pain was taken to create a bond between rather than segregate the
keepers of the jail and the prisoners. The companionship between the
two was seen as an essential element in their reformation, as emulation
rather than training or discipline was seen as the core of the prisoners'
transformation. Prisoners need to have a reason to emulate the guards,
and therefore their manners must be irreproachable. Corporal discipline would destroy the desire of the prisoner to identify with the
keeper and was therefore completely forbidden. In a reversal of contemporary beliefs, Turnbull acknowledges the necessity of corporal
discipline for a child who does not have a fully developed rational
capability, while he spurns it for the convict. "With children or boys, no
other principle than that of fear will govern, and perhaps no punishment avail more than whipping; but where reflection once holds a post
in the mind, I have been always firmly persuaded, that mankind would
more likely be reformed by almost any other mode."39
When Turnbull visited the jail, there were 250 prisoners who were
administered by four guards and one female warden, none of who had
weapons of any sort. Solitary confinement was administered to those
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who refused to work or upset the order and harmony of the jail in any
way. While Eastern State Penitentiary was to take solitary confinement
as the fundamental experience of penance, here it was a form of discipline, not of complete reform. Interestingly, the goal of solitary confinement was to make the prisoner realize the power of his rationale,
his mental capabilities. Solitary confinement might be understood as
taking the presumed virtues of democratic individualism to its logical
conclusion. Individuals, not society, are rational and moral. Therefore,
removing the individual from all social intercourse will allow this individualism to blossom once more in its full promise. Benjamin Rush
believed that the soul could recalibrate itself once removed from the
overstimulus of modem sociability. On the other hand, there is an
awareness of the psychological underpinnings of the experience
revealed by the description provided by Turnbull.
We become by it gradually acquainted with a true knowledge of
ourselves; with the purity of dictates prescribed to us by our consciences; and of course easier convinced of the necessity of conforming to them. It is in this state of seclusion from the world that the
mind can be brought to contemplate itself-to judge of its powersand thence to acquire the resolution and energy necessary to protect
its avenues from the intrusion of vicious thoughts. 40
Solitary confinement is where one can come to see that the mind can be
one's most terrible enemy. It forces inmates to achieve mental discipline in a way similar to meditation if they are to survive intact.
Keepers were more than guards or bureaucrats. They were allowed
to commute sentences when they thought that they saw true reformation in a prisoner. As opposed to the impartial administrators of Lockean liberalism, guards were encouraged to socialize and converse with
the prisoners in order to gauge the convicts' progress. Turnbull
recounts a discussion between a woman inmate and an inspector for
the prison. She asks the inspector if her sentence might be commuted,
and they discuss the matter for some time. When he concludes that as
she has not served half of her sentence, it would be impossible, she
reportedly "resumed her spinning with cheerfulness ... perfectly satisfied with his reasoning." Given the context, it is tempting to conclude
that the cheerfulness was artifice. However, Turnbull also recounts that
convicts happily greeted one of the keepers who had been ill for a week
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and away from the jail. Even the appearance, if not heartfelt sincerity,
of such a sentiment is inconceivable today.
Lest we think that Turnbull was an overzealous enthusiast and
Lownes a bureaucrat serving his own interest, we find other testimony
to the spirit behind the jail. In 1798, an anonymous "Lady" wrote the
following ode, "The Pennsylvania Prison," that was published in the

Philadelphia Monthly Magazine.
It is a sort of little commonwealth (if I may be allowed the expression) which I shall entitle the commonwealth of nature--an excellent
school to teach the utility of that government, which attends most to
its operations, to the uniformity, beauty, and simplicity of her divine
precepts,-health and contentment must exist, where wisdom and
humanity reign, and the breast of the most hardened convict, will
naturally admit contrition, and embrace reformation, while experiencing the bodily comfort, the mental satisfaction, and pecuniary
benefit, that lead to, and is the foundation of them,-virtue will display her charms, to beings who never before beheld her, and they
will instinctively be led to adore and follow what has afforded so
much tranquil, solid pleasure-in pursuing industry and good
order, they will see is the only roads that leads to happiness, while
idleness, and its concomitant vice, they will feel, leads only to misery.-The Philadelphia prison, is one of the most striking emblems,
of progress in refinementY

The prison was seen as a microcosm of government, rather than a
deviation from it. The prisoner was encouraged to see himself or herself as part of society, rather than apart from it. Inherent in the administration of the jail then was the goal of preventing a hierarchy developing between prisoner and administrator.
Yet this experiment was to last for only nine years. Thomas Dumm
has brilliantly detailed the quick evolution toward the more behaviorist impulse in American penal theory in his book Democracy and Punishment. The change from the desire to reform to the goal of creating
obedience is best captured by Tocqueville and Beaumont's observations about the distinction between the Pennsylvania Model of Penitentiary and the Auburn Model. The Pennsylvania system made labor
within solitary confinement its primary method of reform. In every cell
in Eastern State penitentiary, there is a gap in the ceiling called "the eye
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of God." Every day the sun passed slowly over the cell, and the prisoner was to engage in an extended self-study, under the all-knowing
eye of God. In Auburn, prisoners worked collectively, though in complete silence. The combination of collective work and silence displayed
the virtues of sociality and obedience. Prisoners saw the benefits of collective endeavor, without speaking and contaminating each other's
thoughts. The obedience required to be silent in a room full of other
prisoners was much different than the ability to remain sane after seeing no one for an extended period of time. Tocqueville and Beaumont
summarized the differences between the two systems as following: the
Pennsylvania system produces more virtuous citizens, while the
Auburn model produces more obedient ones.
Maybe the Walnut Street system was simply unsustainable because
an institutional logic became more prominent as the founding ideas
faded. Who is to remember the blueprint when the actual construction
of a place deviates from it? The cost of the Pennsylvania system was
also quite high. In fact the British government placed financial concerns
over all others when choosing transportation to South Wales rather
than Bentham's penitentiary. One other factor seems worth consideration. The existence of penal labor may have made the system too susceptible to appropriation by private interests, an issue that will be more
fully explored in chapter 6, "Hitched to the Post: Prison Labor, Choice,
and Citizenship." More likely, behaviorism and utilitarianism were
much less difficult goals to achieve than moral reformation. The fervor
of democratic sentiment faded, and the realities of creating democratic
order grew more apparent.
In the end, the penitentiaries decided that the souls of prisoners
could remain their own, as long as they were willing to obey their masters. Yet this is exactly what Beccaria and the founding fathers saw as
the birth of tyranny as well as the betrayal of the social contract. As
soon as the democratic society can be divided between those who
believe in the rectitude of the code of law and those who are subject to
it, law and society appears as a sham, an instrument. It is ironic that we
have misread Beccaria for so long as a utilitarian, because he provides
some of the most powerful arguments against the utilitarian version of
punishment. Punishment will only be useful when it remains true to
the ideal of the social contract-equally applied, transparent, and for
the interest of self-regulation. Oddly, after reading Beccaria, we can see
virtuous punishment as one of the pillars of a truly democratic society.
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Beccaria realized that punishment could corrupt our perception and
experience of the law, meaning that it is crucial to get the system right.
This does seem very idealistic, and some might claim that no person
ever being punished would view their fate as deserved or legitimate
without being lost in a blizzard of confusion or self-hatred. But every
one of us has been punished in one way or another and recognized that
we deserved it. When a person is pulled over for running a red light,
she may hate to pay the fine but recognizes the need for traffic regulations and the penalties that accompany them. It is when the driver finds
out that her friend was caught running a red light and did not receive
the same penalty that indignation might arise. When the rule, law, or
system appears as unjust, the punishment has a purely performative or
tyrannical meaning. Similarly, when a punishment is clearly illogical or
disproportionate, those who enforce it lose their authority and become
tyrants instead, people who have power based upon coercion rather
than as a result of perceived, legitimate means.
Every government needs a system of laws and a way to administer
punishment. The challenge of democracy is to prevent the government
and the penal system from creating a hierarchy among what should be
equal citizens. Beccaria laid out the framework and rationale clearly.
The moment serves as a sober reminder; perhaps the true test of
whether a state can truly be considered democratic is if those sitting in
the jails believe it is so. The most illuminating moments of Beccaria's text
are the juxtaposition of principles of right and justice with the cynical,
angry thoughts of those subject to the law. The penetrating anger of the
offender makes the principles of justice seem a sham, or at least hopelessly abstract in comparison. How many prisoners in the United States
today believe the laws are a manifestation of the social contract of which
they are a part? How many citizens, when hearing of atrocities in prisons, feel proud or even comfortable in acknowledging that they have
legislated these punishments as an equal member of the social contract?
It isn't that criminality threatens our democracy; instead our punishments reveal how completely democratic idealism has disappeared.

CHAPTER

5

Punishment in Liberal Regimes
"To prove fiction, indeed," said I, "there is need of fiction; but it is characteristic of truth to need no proof but truth."
-Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government

In a virtually manic departure from the foundations of early American
democracy explored in the last chapter, today the United States incarcerates a much higher proportion of its population than any other
advanced democracy. In 2003 Bruce Western measured a penal population of 2.1 million inmates, indicating a scale of incarceration that
"exceeds the historic average by a factor of nearly five" in the history of
the United States. 1 Analysts have measured and examined crime rates,
public insecurity, shifts in (or manipulations of, depending on one's
perspective) perceptions of crime, sentencing practices, institutional
trajectories, and economic and racial elements to explain the punitiveness that characterizes the United States today. 2 No doubt all of these
factors need to be considered. But what I offer here is another element
that does not usually appear in discussions about contemporary penal
practices in the United States: classical liberal political philosophy. In
this chapter, I demonstrate the unique reliance upon punishment in liberal contract theory, relating it back to the role that punishment plays in
the presentation and legitimation of political order. One of the most
striking aspects of the current incarceration boom is how it appears to
completely defy logic or utility. At great human and capital costs, we
cycle an increasing percentage of the American citizenry through jails
and prisons, producing little reform and a questionable impact on the
crime rate. Clearly, we are pursuing this policy for reasons that are not
immediately apparent. Understanding the unique reliance of liberal
social contract theory on punishment to establish its terms and principles helps to explain the function of penal practices in the political
order of the United States in different terms.
On the face of it, the incarceration boom in the United States seems to
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contradict the classical liberal tenets that venerate individual rights as
much as limits upon state power. Should we see punishment and penal
policy as the exception to this rule? On the contrary, when we examine
the philosophies of John Locke, we find that punishment plays an integral role in defining and developing-and importantly, presentingboth individual rights and limited state power. While I do not offer liberal thought as a primary reason for contemporary incarceral policies,
understanding the centrality of punishment in classical liberalism helps
us to understand in part how a punitiveness that seemingly contradicts
all other governmental trends is not generally viewed as problematic.
Let me conclude this introduction by clarifying what I am not arguing. It is relatively clear to argue that modem forms of penality have
been instrumental in molding the kinds of behaviors desired by capitalistic, liberal regimes. The calibration between systems of punishment
and the ideal political subject was explored to great effect by Foucault
in Discipline and Punish and Thomas Durnrn in Democracy and Punishment. I am not out to contest these arguments but rather to point out the
relatively exceptional reliance upon punishment in the formation of
John Locke's liberal political philosophies. He relied upon punishment
to signify and represent the most basic definitions and conditions of liberal social contract theory, such as responsibility, personhood, and limited executive power.
It is simple to say that punishment is necessary to enforce the terms
of the liberal social contract. Yet this would not distinguish social contract theory from any other form of government. I argue that where liberalism comes to rely uniquely upon punishment is in establishing its
comparative strengths: a veneration for individual rights and circumscribed state power. How can the exercise of state power be visibly and
convincingly registered as limited? How are such abstract notions as
"individualism" and "responsibility" to gain meaning? In both cases,
theorists tum to punishment as a way to put together the necessary elements of the liberal regime. Social contract theory claims that it is
derived directly from natural rights, but a close examination of Locke
demonstrates that he used punishment as the midwife in the birth of
the social contract. Punishment is not an exception to the rules of liberalism, but an integral element in the classical liberal paradigm.
Punishment and the Contract

Proponents of the social contract point to the great strengths of using
the metaphor of contract to structure government such as the necessary
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reciprocity between citizen and state, the consent that makes it possible
to reconcile order to freedom, the explicit rights for individuals and
limitations upon the government, and the ability to agree upon what
conditions will render the contract null and void. Critics point to the
contract as a scrim, a facade of consent that serves as a cover for coercion, and argue that the mechanism of the contract renders a society
composed of agents and objects, exchange, rationality and calculation,
as opposed to community, emotion, and love. Contract as a metaphor
for organization also occludes power dynamics. Both critics and proponents take the intangibility of the contract as a given and see that its
neat character stands in contrast to the messiness of social dynamics.
Depending on one's point of view, this distinction can mean that contract is normative in modeling interactions and seeking to regulate
them. Conversely, it can be argued that contract serves as a blinder to
actual people, ambiguities, and coercion. In both views, contract is
something that stands outside of the world, and hence orders it-to
good or ill.
Contract may be the most powerful tool of political order to emerge
since deism precisely because of its abstract existence. Empirical methods of political organization and regulation are relatively vulnerable.
Institutions can be corrupt and recognized as such. Rulers can die, go
mad, or produce idiotic offspring, and laws can be critiqued as written
or applied. Even actual contracts contain loopholes and weaknesses
that make them less than ironclad. Since no one has ever seen a social
contract, much less signed one, it is difficult to point out exactly how it
fails to manifest itself. Critics say as an abstraction it is a poor representation of the much messier world. Proponents point out that its remove
from the everyday struggles and prejudices of life make it able to mediate fairly. How exactly does such an abstraction come to order society
and state? Even God had his miracles, revelations, and spokespersons.
While faith was considered all the stronger because it eschewed the
need for evidence, belief in contract relies upon a similar type of devotion without the support of institutionalized faith. Contract, improbably, becomes the abstraction upon which a positivistic political order is
based.
It is an indication of the power of the contract metaphor that we live
in a properly contractual society today. A contract gave birth to the
government that protects against abuse of contracts between individuals. A marker of our freedom as individuals is our ability to make contracts, yet the contracts themselves are what help define us as individ-
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uals. We became citizens through entering into the social contract, and
contract creates our protections as citizens. There is a truly remarkable
convergence in our conceptions of agency, freedom, government, and
economy around the idea of contract. But this makes it virtually impossible to understand what the contract is, how it functions, where it
came from, and what its effects are.
Most literature surrounding social contract theory and practices of
punishment tries to justify or challenge the state's right to punish,
which can and often does take away the inalienable rights upon which
the social contract is based. This is a genuine problem: how can a state
founded upon the sanctity of individual rights be allowed to take them
away? Some have argued that crime tips the natural balance between
the rights of individuals in the favor of the offender; the state must punish in order to restore the equilibrium) Others have argued that membership in the social contract is predicated upon the understanding that
the state will enforce laws, thereby one has already consented to one's
own punishment in the case of an infraction. The consent implied in
membership reconciles this curtailing of rights with individual freedom. 4 Others embrace utilitarianism, proposing that the state must
punish in order to protect the rights of others in the future and that
punishment should be viewed for what it produces, as opposed to how
or why it achieves this goal. Others have argued that as soon as one
breaks the law, that person falls out of the social contract into a state of
war and thereby loses all claims to individual rights.5
These positions take the social contract form of government as a
given and recognize the problem that punishment poses for it theoretically.6 I think that the more interesting question is why punishment
plays such a central role in the foundations of social contract theory.
Since punishment places a strain upon the conception of individual
rights and social contract, why does it play such a large role in their
articulation?
I had long thought that the practices of liberal regimes and the theories of liberalism were incompatible-perhaps, even worse, that the
ideals themselves might be complicit in the bloody practices done in
their name, agreeing with others such as Pateman, Pitts, and Mehta.?
This is why I find it particularly interesting to consider the appearance
of punishment in John Locke and Jeremy Bentham-two classic variants of the liberal argument in which punishment plays a central role. I
couldn't point to violence as a way to belie the claims of philosophical
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liberalism, because I found a stream of blood running right through the
core of the liberal canon.
The Second Treatise of Government
On its most basic level, Locke's version of the social contract is an
agreement between individuals or persons consenting to be bound by
the rule of law. Fascinatingly, all elements of this configuration-personhood, law, rights, and contract-are defined in reference to punishment. Following Locke's own logic that individuals are the point of
departure for social and legal organization, we should begin by examining personhood. While personhood is not extensively defined in The
Second Treatise of Government, he does dwell upon the subject in An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke asserts that personhood
is a matter of consciousness. After all, I could define myself by saying I
am a Philadelphian. Would I then cease to be me if I moved? I could say
I am the person that occupies this body. But bodies change. Isn't the
woman the same person--even though changed-as the girl who came
before? What makes a person, according to Locke, is the consciousness
that can connect experiences throughout time and space: "This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by
consciousness,-whereby it becomes concerned and accountable; owns
and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for
the same reason as it does the present."8 Notice that the term accountable rests at the center of this definition. Consciousness is what provides
accountability: if I could not remember what I did yesterday or if I was
reborn every day (a strangely common theme in films these days),
human consciousness as is typically understood could not exist. We
would have no sense of where we were, where we had been, that our
actions and choices have effects, or that we are distinct from our environment.
Consciousness defines a person; it also makes every person accountable. "In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of
reward and punishment."9 To elaborate upon this claim, he turns to
punishment that, in this case, is not a system of laws and application
but rather an external recognition of personhood and accountability, or
the mitigation thereof. Punishment is one way our personhood is recognized by others, and the way society as a whole establishes who
counts as a person and who does not. As accountability is the marker of
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personality, the determination whether someone can be held accountable for his actions signals his personhood or lack thereof.
Locke's definition of personhood serves an instrumental role in his
political system. If people cannot be held accountable, then they could
not possibly consent in any sort of meaningful or binding fashion. It is
interesting that he turns to punishment as a way of demonstrating that
such recognition of accountability is already present in legal practices.
Whether a small village or a state, it is true that some persons are recognized as having greater accountability for their actions, and this is
made most clear through practices of punishment. As Locke points out,
to punish someone for a crime of which she has no understanding or
recollection is nothing but creating misery. The term punishment, as
opposed to cruelty, implies comprehension that there is logic behind the
pain. For a person to recognize pain as punishment they must have
consciousness. But this is not entirely subjective because society also
recognizes different gradations and elements of consciousness. Hence
punishments are mitigated accordingly.
What Locke presents in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is
a definition of personhood that supports his later elaboration of consent and contractual political order. Yet he turns to extant practices of
punishment as a demonstration of his definition. It seems to me this
provides a corrective to Foucault's work that looks at modem penal
practices as a reflection of Enlightenment notions of responsibility and
individualism. Locke's notion of personhood is elaborated, even substantiated, in reference to legal practices, not the reverse: the practice
gives rise to the theory.
Another crucial element of the contracting Lockean individual is
established through his discussion of personhood and punishment.
Locke contemplates why society punishes the actions of drunkards, but
not madmen. The common answer is that drunkenness is a state that is
voluntarily entered, while madness descends without volition. Locke
agrees that part of accountability would include being conscious of the
choice to lose consciousness. However, knowing the difference
between the two scenarios-deliberate and involuntary unconsciousness-is difficult. "And all that lies upon human justice is, to distinguish carefully between what is real, and what is counterfeit in the
case."l0 Therefore, the social contract is dependent upon this definition
of a person as accountable, yet this principle creates all-new difficulties
for the administration of justice. Locke turns to punishment to establish
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an empirical point for his definition of personhood, but practices of
punishment render that same person increasingly intangible. The problem that punishment poses for the voluntary, willing individual is
especially apparent in the following passage in Locke's Essay.
It is past doubt the same man would at different times make differ-

ent persons; which we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest
declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad
man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad
man did, -thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat
explained by our way of speaking in English when we sayan one is
'not himself,' or is 'beside himself.'ll
Our consciousness may make us a person, but our actions seem to
splinter us into two individuals at times. The demands of justice are
such that only the fully realized individual may be punished, however.
H. L. A. Hart's Punishment and Responsibility is a brilliant rendering
of the difficulties of establishing individual accountability when
administering punishment. Hart discusses the different mitigating conditions that excuse a criminal infraction as well as determine culpability. Think of all the legal categories that describe differing levels of
responsibility for a death: First, Second and Third Degree Murder,
Criminal Negligence, Attempted Murder, Manslaughter, Negligent
Manslaughter, and Murder in Self-Defense, to name just a few. Hart
argues that practices of punishment reveal the difficulty of trying to
determine the level of responsibility of a person at the same time that
these practices rely upon this idea of responsibility.
Hart proposes that punishment is not actually indicative of individual responsibility-official legal recognition of such intangible aspects
of the human psyche such as volition, duress, insanity, compulsion, or
self-defense is impossible. The difficulty between determining what is
"real" and what is "counterfeit" is too great. Imagine that a man guns
down a teenager who had been following him on a dark street for half
an hour, convinced that the young man was about to kill him. "I
thought he was going to kill me, I thought he had a gun, even though it
turned out to be a cell phone." How can we decide if this statement
describes self-defense, temporary insanity, murder, or manslaughter?
Instead of actually ascribing clear responsibility, Hart points out that
punishment serves to change the relationship of individuals to their
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world, in making it appear to be more calculable, if not actually become
so. Practices of punishment make our environments more predictable
by assuming accountability as a norm. We can recall that the first step
in Locke's conception of personhood was consciousness defined as the
ability to make connections between past and future. The next step he
takes is that consciousness then makes people envision themselves in
relationship to past, present, and future actions. But another manifestation of this ability to position oneself in a temporal continuum would
be the desire and ability to plan and to make choices about present
activities with future benefits in mind. Of course things may not always
go as planned, and as tempting as it is to see causality in all events (as I
explored in chapter 2), sometimes there simply is no link between past
and present. Accountability is not ironclad, but assuming accountability is one step toward creating a more calculable world. Hart argues, "If
with this in mind we turn back to criminal law and its excusing conditions, we can regard their function as a mechanism for similarly maximizing within the framework of coercive criminal law the efficacy of
the individual's informed and considered choice in determining the
future and also his power to predict that future. "12
The relationship between punishment and personhood is ultimately
circular. In defining personhood, Locke points to punishment as a reference point. But then practices of punishment bring this definition of
personhood into question, precisely by taking Locke's challenge to distinguish between accountable and unaccountable persons. In the end,
we cannot rely upon persons having accountability. Someone may have
lost his mind that morning, someone may lose consciousness while
driving and crash into your car, someone might under orders from a
superior flip a switch that releases gas or electric shocks intended to kill.
Every day, actions occur for which apparently no person is accountable.
But the result of this system is that laws and rights gain accountability,
providing a person who mayor may not have accountability with an
environment with some element of predictability.
Personhood is just one of the pillars of social contract theory;
descriptions of the state of nature and natural rights also serve as the
foundation for the liberal political order. Locke's account of the natural
laws and natural rights that provide the basis for the social contract also
rely heavily upon punishment. Locke adopted his ideas of the natural
right of punishment from the work of Hugo Grotius, who made the
connection between punishment and contract explicitly. In De Jure Belli
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ac Pacis he quoted Michael of Ephesus's On Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics, which observes that in punishment there is "a kind of giving and
receiving, which constitutes the essence of contracts."l) This sounds
remarkably like Nietzsche's account of political and social order in
book 2 of On the Genealogy of Morals. While Nietzsche wants to emphasize the interconnection based upon extraction at the heart of all social
orders, I would argue Locke is searching for empirical referents to help
sustain his imaginary state of nature.
Locke defines law according to punishment. "For, since it would be
utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men, without
annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will,
we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or
punishment annexed to that law."14 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding points out three kinds of law: divine, civil, and philosophical
law (which he calls opinion or reputation). God punishes or rewards in
the afterlife, and upon occasion through divine intervention on earth.
Civil law is enforced by magistrates, while social laws, such as etiquette, are enforced through derision and exclusion. Curiously absent
from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is natural law, which,
as he points out in The Second Treatise, implies an ability to punish: "For
the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in the
World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, has
a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders."15 The assertion of natural law was not enough, you
needed the evidence that such a thing as natural law did indeed exist.
This may be the reason that Locke articulates a natural right to punish:
to establish the existence of natural law. After all, even he admits that
this position is "a strange doctrine."
Let us consider all of the different useful aspects in his assertion that
"every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of
the Law of Nature."16 According to his own logic, this demonstrates the
existence of natural law , for it would be inconceivable to have law that
did not imply punishment. We have the same tautology between
accountability and personhood replicated in his idea of natural law and
natural right.
The presence of law provokes the necessity to punish. Or is it that the
ability to punish marks the presence of law? This is not an idle question. We are more likely to think of punishment following law in order
to enforce it. But this leaves unresolved the foundations of political
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order. Social contract theory delivers the image of men exercising their
reason and overcoming chaos to create a more calculable world for
themselves. However, all three elements of this scenario-rights, natural law, and personhood-are defined in reference to punishment.
Nietzsche's "anti-enlightenment" reading of the social contract is little
different from the sources of liberal political philosophers. It may seem
that the image of self-regulating rational beings is destroyed by reliance
upon punishment to establish the components of the social contract,
but for both Grotius and Locke, the ability to punish guaranteed the
presence of consent as opposed to coercion.
Grotius presented a more extended consideration of principles and
rights of punishment in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, but Locke seems to adopt
the shorter discussion from De Jure Praedae Commentarius almost verbatim. Looking at Grotius's account makes Locke's use of punishment
somewhat clearer. The story that most people associate with Locke is
present: Grotius accounts for the natural right to punish, quoting from
ancient philosophers and the Bible, arguing that the right to punish
derives from the right of self-preservation. When we enter a civil society, this right is passed to a political entity. Leaving aside the question
of why we would enter such a society for just a moment, consider
Grotius's proof for the natural right to punish.
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that the causes for
the infliction of punishment are natural, and derived from that precept which we have called the First Law. Even so, is not the power to
punish essentially a power that pertains to the state? Not at all! On
the contrary, just as every right of the magistrate comes to him from
the state, so has the same right come to the state from private individuals .... therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he
never possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held
by private persons before it was held by the state." 7
In other words, as all political power derives from individuals consenting to it, the political power to punish must originate in those same
individuals. The existence of the political power to punish therefore
proves the natural right to punish. This is similar to Locke's assertion
that any law needed punishment, and that the existence of natural law
proves the natural right to punish. Both arguments are tautological. In
grounding civil law in natural law, they turn to punishment as a
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method of proving the existence of natural law and right, and in asserting its particular relationship to civil society.
Grotius and Locke both invoke the ability of a government to punish
aliens as further proof of the natural right to punish. If punishment
were purely a political right, then those who had not consented to the
government would be unable to be punished. While Grotius seems primarily concerned with using this fact as evidence for natural right,
Locke's account betrays an even more pragmatic use of this argument.
To those who have the Supream Power of making Laws in England,
France, or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the World,
Men without Authority; And therefore if by the Law of Nature,
every Man hath not a Power to punish Offenses against it, as he
soberly judges the Case to require, I see not how the Magistrates of
any Community, can punish an Alien of another Country. IS
In other words, a refusal of the natural right to punish would diminish
the authority of colonizing powers-there are pragmatic reasons for
embracing the strange doctrine.
The natural right to punish also provides the impetus to join the
social contract. As both Grotius and Locke point out, when punishing
crimes that have occurred against oneself, we are more prone to anger
and lose our natural state of reason. Grotius is particularly interested in
pointing out the dangers of exercising our natural right to punish
offenders. He spends four pages citing poetry and observations about
the weakness of character that emerges in vengefulness. He concludes
by offering his most damning account from a poem by Juvenal: "A
mind, small, weak, and mean, will ever pleasure take in vengeance.
Mark this at once, that in revenge A Woman does rejoice above all others."19 Nature and reason provide us the ability to punish; the practice
of punishment, however, can endanger that same reason and nature.
One of the primary mechanisms that propel free persons out of their
state of nature is the recognition that uninhibited exercise of natural
rights creates more discord. Locke argues that in the state of nature,
reason reigns supreme. In committing a crime, "the Offender declares
himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common
equity."20 Others can respond to their infraction and take revenge, but
then they too will cease to live by the laws of reason. The same seed
spawns crime and vengeance.
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The exercise of our natural right to punish endangers our reason.
Further, an inability to exercise our natural right to punish endangers
our preservation. While Locke emphasizes the danger in exercising this
right, think of the frustration and fear that might provoke anxiety in the
face of one's natural right to punish. There is a crucial gap between the
natural right to punish those who infringe upon your body, rights, or
possessions and the ability to do so. Those of poor social stature, no
resources, or weak disposition would not have been able to procure justice.
Locke's ideas about punishment make two important additions to
Grotius's. Locke defines criminality as irrational, a point that contradicts Hobbes, who at least acknowledges that it can be in one's interest
to commit crimes. But in punishing, we do not thereby transfer the
offender back into the realm of reason. In his "Second Letter Concerning Toleration," Locke blasts critics of his first letter who argued that
religious dissenters should be punished in order to bring them to the
correct mode of reasoning. He insists that though crime is a state of
war, reason and following the law are not absolutely commensurate.
"Will punishment make men know what is reason and sound judgment? If it will not, it is impossible it should make them act according
to it. Reason and sound judgment are the elixir itself, the universal remedy; and you may as reasonably punish men to bring them to have the
philosopher's stone, as to bring them to act according to reason and
sound judgment."21 Locke points out the futility of using pain to try to
inspire reason-that it is far more likely to engender resistance to the
power that administers it. Lack of reason will incur punishment, but
punishment will not inspire reason.
There is one more aspect of Locke's theory of punishment that has
been explored by Nozick that bears mention here. 22 Both Grotius and
Locke assert that the natural right to punish demonstrates the natural
executive right-it is evidence of our individual power that precedes
natural law. While Locke makes the case only obliquely, Grotius is far
more forthcoming about the political ramifications of this proof.
"Moreover, whatever existed before the establishment of courts, will
also exist when the courts have been set aside under any circumstances
whatsoever, whether of place or of time. In my opinion, this very argument has served as the basis for the belief that it is right for private persons to slay a tyrant, or in other words, a destroyer of law and the
courtS."23 This is a crucial result of the natural right to punish. It means
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that anyone who opposes the law deserves punishment, including a
king. If the king uses the law for vengeance, and the interests of the
ruler replace the rule of law, then the people have the right to punish
the tyrant. Grotius argues that anyone who refuses to follow the law
places himself in a state of war with society; the same logic holds
whether it is a murderer or king. The natural right to punish is the
capability that proves the natural executive right. The right of revolution is guaranteed by the natural right to punish, which makes it perhaps the most indispensable element in social contract theory since
consent is immaterial if it may not be withdrawn. Within Lockean theory, punishment becomes a measure of the rule of law, and the final
protection of individual rights.

Punishment and the Perception of a Distinctly Liberal Power
Locke relies heavily upon already existing practices of punishment to
establish the normative principles of his social contract as empirical
precedent. Without punishment, he could not prove the a priori existence of personhood, natural law, or executive powers. He also relies
upon instances of punishment to help distinguish the bounds and
establish the unique character of his political authorities. It is well
known that Locke was uneasy with the creation of the all-powerful
authority in Hobbes. But he does not, as is often assumed by many in
the United States, enthusiastically encourage rebellion against authority. "May the commands then of a prince be opposed? May he be
resisted as often as anyone shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy
and confusion."24
Locke's attempt to balance the need for order with individual freedom is best surmised through his articulation of tyranny: here he spells
out the privileges and limitations upon liberal power. Like Hobbes's,
Locke's sovereign exists in a special relationship to the law. As in
Hobbes, the sovereign has the power to punish. But here the spirit in
which punishment is delivered becomes, for Locke, the key to perceiving whether the use of executive privilege is within or exceeds the
bounds of acceptable power. In the Second Treatise, how a sovereign
punishes is one principal way to judge whether he is a ruler, who
deserves obedience, or a tyrant, who can rightfully be deposed.
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In a liberal system, it is understood that the law stands above the
ruler; after all, Locke clearly states the difference between a legitimate
sovereign and a tyrant: "one makes the laws the bounds of his power,
and the good of the public, the end of his government; the other makes
all give way to his own will and appetite."2 5 The fact that Locke talks
about legitimation of sovereignty as its disembodiment reveals his
basic understanding of the necessary transcendental qualities of sovereignty. As in Leviathan, Lockean sovereignty is based upon transcendental principles, only in this case, it is not semidivine status; instead it
is the disembodiment provided by reason that serves as the basis of
authority.
This characteristic of Locke's ruler is established through his distinction between the natural right to punish held by all individuals, as
opposed to the civil right of punishment awarded to political rulers. In
the state of nature, all people have the right to revenge injuries wrought
upon them; as a party to the social contract, we relinquish this right. In
so doing, Locke points out, we eliminate the state of war from society.
Because political rulers are not the victims of crime, they can punish
disinterestedly, without cruelty and vengeance. Therefore, the state of
war ends with state punishment, rather than being fed as in a cycle of
private revenge.
Because this is one of the primary benefits of being in a civil society,
a ruler who punishes with revenge in his heart fails to deliver one of the
most basic requirements of the social contract. A sovereign who punishes according to emotion, not reason, is by Locke's own definition a
tyrant. Therefore, the liberal political order isn't merely dependent
upon the exclusive right of punishment and the ability to enforce laws
as all regimes are. Instead, the ruler must accomplish order and enforce
law, but do so in a very particular manner. This may be the most effective device used to limit state power ever invented: to insist upon reason and calculation even when administering pain to offenders. However, there can be no doubt that this is one of the most difficult
principles to maintain in practice, and many commentators have
observed that liberal regimes routinely indulge in the pleasures of
revenge. 26
Lest his audience be alarmed that any liberal regimes shall be continually upset by intransigent populations, Locke astutely points out
that once the habits of obedience to a ruler are established, they are
overturned only with great difficulty. For a ruler to be considered a
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tyrant, "a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending
the same way" must be evident.27 Locke argues that the substitution of
"Will" and" Appetite" for reason and the greater good must be "visible
to the People" in order to justify the dissolution of government. TItis is
why in practice, liberal regimes may repeatedly indulge in revenge and
cruelty, but leaders not be called to account for the betrayal of principles. The boundaries upon liberal power are entirely dependent upon
public perception, not clear regulation. If punishment, no matter how
senseless, is perceived as within the boundaries of law, it will be acceptable. Yet because the principle of impartial punishment is elaborated,
whenever punishment is perceived as systemically cruel and vindictive, the legitimacy of liberal regimes is called into question.
The fact that Locke uses an explanation of a particular form of punishment to elaborate his vision of sovereign power suggests two different things. First, the disembodiment of the sovereign in the practice of
punishment is his way of signaling that this power will be bound, and
completely so, by reason. Only the mind will be allowed to rule, and
reason is a far less cruel master than the heart. The second element of
this description of liberal punishment is more difficult to explain. That
Locke is seeking to demonstrate the limited power of the sovereign
through the power of punishment is a truly paradoxical task. After all,
punishment is a demonstration of power, but in Locke's writing, it is a
demonstration of bounded power. The belief that the act of state punishment can demonstrate the limits of state power is a remarkable claim
on Locke's part. The fact that the exercise of sovereignty can be taken as
an expression of its limits reveals that the "limits" of state power may
be far more a matter of perception than empirical measurement. After
all, what is considered a pattern of abuses on the part of the sovereign?
By what measure can we determine if a ruler is governing with appetite
or reason? These judgments are a matter of perception.

Perception, Punishment, and the Social Contract
Jeremy Bentham's work on the social contract proves to be instrumental in helping to understand how perception and punishment serve a
uniquely instrumental role in social contract theory. Bentham was
made notorious by Foucault's studies of the panopticon, yet it is not his
theories of penal practice that interest me here. I believe his ideas about
rights and legislation and, even more important, his "Fragment on
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Ontology" prove of the greatest interest in relationship to Locke's
social contract. Appalled by the overdependence of law and governmental authority upon the fictions of social contract, Bentham offered
utilitarianism as a corrective. "The indestructible prerogatives of
mankind have no need to be supported upon the sandy foundation of a
fiction."28 Instead, the relationships between state and individual and
between private individuals could be grounded in rational and empirical calculation based upon maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain. As Locke adopted the Grotian framework with a new
emphasis upon reason, Bentham assumed Locke's interest in reason
and abandoned the Grotian framework of natural rights and law altogether.
Though Bentham is often characterized as a coolly calculating utilitarian, he was driven by an adamant desire to reconstruct law and politics upon firm, clearly self-evident grounds. His impulse toward
reform was such a primary drive that others observed that "he was the
sort of person who could not even play badminton without wanting to
stop and design a better shuttlecock."29 One of Bentham's primary
objections to social contract theory and law in general was its foundation upon either a mythical past or an interpreted one. Bentham found
reprehensible the practice of viewing the pas.t as the only authoritative
source; instead his framework looks to create future good. In A Fragment on Government, Bentham fumes against the scaffolding of natural
right and original contract that are intended to support sovereignty and
obedience to law.
Conversing with Lawyers, I found them full of the Virtues of their
Original Contract, as a recipe of sovereign efficacy for reconciling
the accidental necessity of resistance with the general duty of submission. This drug of theirs they administered to me to calm my
scruples. But my unpracticed stomach revolted against their opiate.
I bid them to open to me that page of history in which the solemnization of this important contract was recorded. They shrunk from
this challenge; nor could they, when thus pressed, do otherwise than
our author has done, confess the whole to be a fiction)O
Ridding himself of fiction, Bentham proposes a different basis for right:
punishment. "J say punished: for without the notion of punishment (that
is of pain annexed to an act, and accruing on a certain account, and from
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a certain source) no notion can we have of either right or duty."3 1 To
understand why this is the case, a cursory examination of Bentham's
utilitarianism is needed. He saw maximization of pleasure and avoidance of pain as the clear empirical bases for human action. We may
assert rationality as our God, but reason alone cannot overcome these
primary impulses. Reason may tell me that I should not take a vacation
if I do not have the funds, but it is the threat of creditors that keeps me
home. Without any clear consequences for our actions, we would
always choose to avoid pain and seek pleasure.
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne."32 To achieve good behavior,
morality needs to be attached to pain and pleasure: we will suffer when
we are bad, be rewarded when we are good.
Reason helps us understand the causal relationship between pain
and nonperformance of duty. It is up to the state to ensure that punishment is sure to follow infractions, rewards to follow acquiescence. The
fundamental shift between Locke and Bentham is that Bentham
believes that punishment can influence reason. Not that it creates rationality through pain, only that the assurance of pain administered by
the state will change the calculations of every citizen. It may be painful
to work, but the pain involved in hanging or incarceration that would
result from robbing a bank is far greater than the discomforts of working. In this way, punishment allows the state to manipulate the terms of
reason. Any organization of society that attempts to have people do
what is right even though they will suffer for it is sure to fail. Reason
can be utilized in social order; it cannot serve as the sole basis of it.
This is why though we may be able to understand such a concept as
right and duty, this insight will not affect our actions unless we can see
a clear manifestation of these abstract concepts in our own lives. Hart
and Schofield have commented that Bentham's ontology provides the
key to his radical critique of law and politics)3 Examining his "Fragment on Ontology" reveals that his utilitarianism is actually grounded
in the belief that much of reality is founded in perception. He divides
the world into categories: those entities that are corporeal and those
that are inferential and fictional. Corporeal substances are ones that are
tangible such as an animal, mineral, or plant. He has a fascinating test
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for how one can tell whether the substance in question is corporeal:
"Suppose the non-existence of corporeal substances, of any hard corporeal substance that stands opposite to you, make this supposition, and
as soon as you have made it, act upon it, pain, the perception of pain,
will at once bear witness against you; and that by your punishment,
your condign punishment." 34 Take, for example, deciding that the cars
driving by in the highway do not exist. You step into the traffic, only to
have the existence of the cars affirmed when you find yourself in an
ambulance on the way to the hospital.
The situation with inferential substances is quite different. "Suppose
the non-existence of any inferential incorporeal substance, of any of
them, and the supposition made, act upon it accordingly,-be the supposition conformable or not conformable to the truth of the case, at any
rate no such immediate counter-evidence, no such immediate punishment will follow." 35 I could wake up and bleakly assert that love does
not exist. Whether or not there is love in my life, there is no immediate
counter to my sad assertion. Someone could do something that demonstrated love to me that day which might make me change my mind, but
love itself, free of all agents, could not demonstrate that my bleak
denunciation was wrong.
It is tempting to conclude that punishment serves as the basis for
empiricism, but this would be incorrect. Instead, punishment serves to
create the perception of reality, or not. Love may exist, but it needs an
agent to make it appear, while the cars need no such messenger. These
passages assert a kinship with Hobbes's theories of nonrepresentational perception and his theory of sovereignty. Therefore, while Bentham's critique of social contract theory as a fiction seems particularly
damning, it becomes clear that all abstract categories such as sovereignty, rights, and law would fall into the same category.
Necessity, impossibility, certainty, uncertainty, probability, improbability, actuality, potentiality;-whatsoever there is of reality correspondent to any of these names, is nothing more or less than a disposition, a persuasion of the mind, on the part of him by whom these
words are employed, in relation to the state of things, or the event or
events to which these qualities are ascribed.36
The problem of politics then, is how to make these abstract entities
appear to be real, to have people perceive them as real. Punishment is
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the way that abstractions such as morals, rights, duties, and sovereignty gain an empirical existence. The enforcement of laws and duties
through punishments is what makes us perceive them as real. Contract,
as another noncorporeal entity, cannot serve as the translation of rights
and duties. This would be, in Bentham's terms, using fiction to prove
another fiction. Bentham insists that rights and duties only become real
when they cause pain or reward.
The fact that Locke's formulation of law, rights, personhood, and
contract keeps returning to the practices and notions of punishment to
serve as an empirical referent suggests that perhaps the essential views
of Locke and Bentham are not as far apart as they initially appear. Take
away Locke's story of the contract, and all you have left is punishment
to serve as the foundation. However, to say that right and personhood
is based in punishment requires unflinching pragmatism.
Bentham's ontological theory also suggests why political institutions
play such a central role in the formation of consciousness and perception of the world. He argues that the state is the "strongest and surest"
mechanism in its operation-the entity that will most reliably administer punishments and rewards to meet our perceptions and actions
based upon those perceptions. Other entities, such as schools, friends,
and parents, can also provide punishments and rewards, but they do
not have the "sufficient force" to give these other suppositions "any
practical value."37 Therefore, the power of the state to punish in a way
that no other entity in our world can, by administering death or incarceration, is what gives the noncorporeal entities it enforces a stronger
existence than most inferred substances-friendship, love, community,
to name a few. While we may experience these entities, and they may
give us pleasure, they are not enforced with the same vigor as the law.
Hence, according to Bentham" it would be impossible to arrange a society based upon the sure cause-and-effect relationship between the
rewards or loss of friendship. The power of the state to punish, along
with the will to do so vigorously, literally structures our reality; it
makes political principles more central than all others.
This assertion immediately provokes the question of what happens
when the state fails or refuses to punish offenders. Does this mean that
we lose the most central points of orientation in our grasp of abstract
reality? Do other principles arise and become more central than the law
and sovereignty? Do we struggle to maintain a sense of right and duty,
ultimately failing in our ability to believe these fictions "that deal in
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sounds instead of sense"?38 If we are to take Bentham's assertion seriously, then punishment would be the primary duty of a state: in punishing it creates the reality of sovereignty, it makes the laws empirical,
and it orders the conceptual universe of its citizens. This is an unyieldingly difficult view of the possibilities of human organization and justice, which is why the metaphor of contract is more generally acceptable, even if they amount to the same thing.

Liberal State Power and U.S. Penal Practices
Therefore, we can see that social contract theory is dependent upon
practices of punishment in an entirely unique sense. Because liberalism
is based upon abstractions such as the social contract, natural rights,
and even personhood that have no empirical referent, it has from the
very start relied upon practices of punishment to make these terms
operable. If practices of punishment are needed for theoretical explanation, making the power of the liberal state evident is certainly more difficult. Yet this is a difficult matter, for if just making state power evident were enough, liberalism would be no different from other forms of
government. However, punishment in liberal regimes is intended to
make government evident, but as a limited, not absolute power. Punishment establishes the two core elements of a liberal regime: its
emphasis upon the rights of individuals and the bounds upon state
power.
Critical reflection on contemporary U.S. penal practices reveals that
they do shadow the arguments I have outlined in this chapter. First of
all, the government has largely relinquished the aim of producing or
changing reason through punishment; therefore there is currently no
justification for penal practices based upon reformation. The U.S. government recognizes the rights of prisoners without seeking to bolster
the capacities that presumably create those rights. The ambiguous tautology between practices of punishment, rights, and personhood present in the foundational texts of liberalism continues today. The state
punishes to emphasize personal responsibility but through punishment often denies that same sense of self and culpability. We do not
punish to bolster individual rights and personhood as much as to assert
that these things exist already.
Some people argue that corrections has become a gruesome industrial complex, an economic engine in its own right. While certainly
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some people materially benefit from incarceration, I believe these
industries grew because the opportunity was there, and now these
organizations and towns defend their territory, unnaturally prolonging
the impulse toward severity. However, private corrections firms and
rural local governments cannot be understood as the root cause of mass
incarceration today. Instead, we can see how current incarceration creates, as Hart observed in 1968, the expectation of accountability and
personhood, rather than the actual product. I will explore this theme in
relation to neoliberal economic policies in the following chapter.
Choice, labor, and citizenship are reinforced as basic freedoms in an era
of deindustrialization through the deployment of mandatory labor in
penal institutions.
While the terms of liberalism are clearly at play in contemporary
penal practices, the struggle over the limits and scope of state power is
also evident. David Garland has made a powerful argument that the
new severity in the United States and Britain is a reflection of changing
definitions of state power. Both regimes have aggressively rolled back
the entitlements of citizenship in the past thirty years. This decline in
welfare and other social entitlements reflects a larger shift in the relationship between the state and its citizens. Political freedom has been
redefined to highlight individual freedom, exercised through the market and the capacity for personal choice, instead of an emphasis upon
political freedom that is guaranteed by social and economic stability.
The decline of the welfare state and the growth in incarceration both
emphasize individual choice and the private freedoms of the market.
But they are complementary in another sense: the economic disparities
resulting from neoliberalism produce more fiscal insecurity and instability. Polarization of income levels creates fear of crime, while the loss
of the safety net combined with deindustrialization creates more economic anxiety. Both of these fears can be visibly, and dramatically, met
by the state as it steps up to vigorously control crime. People feel more
secure in an unequal world when the government adopts more rigorous policing methods. The state may be providing a different kind of
security than it used to, but has proven its continued indispensability.39
While I agree with Garland's argument, I continue to be mystified
why such vigorous policing and the incarceration of so many citizens
has been considered acceptable in a historical era marked by distrust of
government and a desire to have less regulation. Crime is certainly one
of the great exceptions to this overall social trend in both the United
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States and Great Britain. Though Garland persuasively shows us how
punishment and social control meet the new insecurities caused by a
reduction in state entitlements, how can a social movement so greatly
at odds with the prevailing philosophy of government flourish? What
can account for the exceptional status that is awarded to state power in
the area of punishment in liberal regimes?
Part of the answer to this question is provided by Locke. In his theory, liberal state punishment actually represents bounded and limited
state power: punishment is a method of representing the limitations of
the state rather than its coercive capacities. In many ways this is
entirely counter to any logic-after all, the state is exercising domination over bodies in a fashion that is considered completely unacceptable under any other circumstance. The fact that these activities are perceived as an expression of measured authority can help account for the
lack of alarm on the part of the general public.
Whether or not the governments of Britain and the United States are
pursuing rational and just penal practices, the populations of these two
countries perceive them to be acceptable. Thus it becomes more important to understand why particular groups support punitive punishment and why others do not see it as an issue that is central to larger
questions of justice and right in their own lives. Marie Gottschalk has
recently completed a study of interest group politics and institutional
trajectories that explains the unexpected sources of support for new
severity in the United States. Reaching back into the 1920S, Gottschalk
examines the deep institutional roots that help provide legitimacy for
punitiveness. More recently, she looks at identity interest groups and
also advocates of prisoners' rights from the 1970S that unwittingly contributed to the mass incarceration of the 1990S into the twenty-first century.40 Clearly the racialized nature of mass incarceration plays a central role in the lack of identification with those languishing in prisons in
the United States.
However, religious tensions and different ethnic identification did
not prevent average Americans from feeling absolute horror at the
abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Though Garland and Gottschalk
help to explain the lack of popular outcry over the incarceral explosion
of the last twenty years, we cannot assume that public apathy will continue in the future. When a train of abuses becomes "visible," and when
the standard of reason is applied, rather than assumed, with respect to
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methods of punishment, there may yet be a day of reckoning and
reform. Locke established the highest standards for the norms of liberal
governance; however, enforcement of these standards falls to the perseverance of the people. The real question is whether the habits of obedience will continue to trump the intangible ideals at play, and whether
these ideals can truly be wielded to redistribute power.

CHAPTER

6

Hitched to the Post
Prison Labor, Choice, and Citizenship
The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top
of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They
had thought with some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment
than futile and hopeless labor.
-Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus"

Systems of punishment and economics have been mutually constitutive throughout history. Colonization and penality proved to be convenient partners for hundreds of years. It is relatively easy to understand
convicts as a source of exploitable labor and hence discern a causal relationship between capitalist development and punishment in the modern era. Certainly, accumulation of wealth has driven methods of punishment repeatedly. The exceptional cases interest me, however-what
can we say about prison labor in an era of unemployment? What is the
logic behind prison labor if expropriation of wealth is not the primary
goal? Does prison labor cease to support capitalism, or has the relationship between the two become more complex? This chapter argues the
latter point, that today prison labor and, ideas about punishment reveal
shifts from late industrial to postindustrial economies. I also explore
the ideological function prison labor serves within contemporary U.S.
capitalism. By focusing on how punishment shifts along with the economic system, it becomes clear that punishment serves a crucial function in political economy in general; exploitation of labor is only one
manifestation of this relationship. In the context of the United States,
citizenship is one of the primary mechanisms by which punishment
comes to enforce political economy.
127
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Labor and Citizenship
The problem of how to make people embrace wage labor has been with
us since industrialization. In order to produce surplus value, work
must be separated from mere survival and valorized on its own terms.
John Locke made an early attempt to specify how labor serves as the
foundation of citizenship within the social contract in The Second Treatise of Government. Here he specified, "Labor put a distinction between
them and common"-the act of labor takes nature's bounty, which is
shared by all, and turns it into individual property. Because every man
"has a property in his own person"-his labor---every man who labors
is thereby eligible, and motivated, to participate in the social contract
that establishes a government. 1
In a recent article, Nancy Hirschmann explored Locke's "Essay on
the Poor Law" to see how his theories were developed in relation to the
laboring classes of his time. He advocated cutting public relief to paupers, since it was through work that people developed reason and the
capacity for liberal citizenship. Failure to work or poverty "was evidence of a failure to use their God-given rationality."2 Thus, at the time
Locke was developing his theory of the social contract he perceived
that linking citizenship to labor was one way to ensure the stability of
liberal forms of government. The mythical founding of the social contract on labor solves several problems. First, labor becomes a proof of a
person's willingness to exercise rationality as well as self-discipline,
both characteristics that are sorely needed in a liberal polity. Second,
according to Locke's schema, labor creates property, which provides
the impetus to consent to and uphold the social contract. This answers
the question why we would ever choose to trade natural freedoms for
political ones. Finally, whether intentional or not, the connection
between work and citizenship also served to support industrialization
in England.
In Locke's version of citizenship based upon labor, there is one
exception to his rule, slaves.
But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we
call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of
nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of
their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and
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with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being the state of
slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property)
Here, Locke provides the philosophical basis that later helped to justify the exclusion of slaves from citizenship in the United States. Labor
is the crucial step in making one fit to join the social contract-it establishes your individual stake in and claim upon the world that was previously held in common. Because as a slave you do not even own your
own labor and cannot create property, you become ineligible for citizenship. Interestingly, Locke also explains that indigenous populations
do not mix their labor with the soil in the same way as Europeans and
therefore do not create pr\vate property for themselves either. Locke's
social contract prefigured the racially exclusive form of American citizenship through his linkage of work, reason, and the mythological
foundation of the social contract.
In her book American Citizenship Judith Shklar makes a convincing
argument that Locke's valorization of labor was central to the founding
of the United States.4 She points out that the work ethic was a conscious
fashioning of American identity in contrast to the aristocracy of the Old
World and the chattel slavery of the New World. Aristocrats were
maligned for their parasitic existence, and slavery was detested as the
specter of unprofitable and underpaid work. Between these two poles,
a life of leisure and the horror of enslavement, Americans glorified the
reward, dignity, and character-building effects of labor.
While there are no formal work requirements in the Constitution,
the United States has linked the rights of citizens to wage labor in social
policy. As Alice Kessler-Harris has recently explained, "Unlike many
other industrialized countries, America chose to distribute what the
British social theorist T. H. Marshall called the rights of 'social citizenship' on the basis of work rather than as a function of residence or citizenship."5 The U.S. government has developed a host of benefits that
accompany wage work, including social security and unemployment
insurance. Health care is linked to wage employment rather than citizenship as well. According to Kessler-Harris, wage work has also
served to differentiate levels of citizenship, particularly starting in the
twentieth century with New Deal programs.
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Work, wage work, had long marked a distinction among kinds of citizens: intimately tied to identity, it anchored nineteenth-century
claims to political participation. But when the federal government
linked wage work to tangible, publicly provided rewards (i.e., social
security and unemployment) employment emerged as a boundary
line demarcating different kinds of citizenship.6
Kessler-Harris explores how women and other minorities have been
and continue to be systematically denied "social citizenship" based
upon their failure to participate in the formal wage market. Although
originally, as Shklar points out, the ideal was to work for oneself and
gain true independence, today wage labor is considered the opposite of
an unhealthy "dependence." Debates about welfare suggest that participation in the formal workforce is still considered a mark of character in the United States. 7
Though the principle linking labor and citizenship may be traced to
Locke, his original formulation is not feasible in the United States
today. Shklar's and Kessler-Harris's works suggest that the connection
between citizenship and work changes over time. Today, in practice,
we have linked labor and citizenship not through the notion of property but rather choice. When one chooses to work, labor is a sign of
maturity and a capacity to self-govern. In contrast, when one is forced
to labor, labor becomes a punishment and actually makes one less fit
for citizenship. Hence, examining forced labor practices in the United
States allows us to consider which populations are made unfit for citizenship as well as to investigate how the relationship between work
and citizenship is currently defined. Furthermore, it is crucial to
remember that forced labor is a form of labor and as such reveals contemporary economic trends.
During eras of expanding economies and full employment, the ideological connection between work, choice, and citizenship seems perfectly reasonable. But what about times of economic stress? If it
becomes clear that not everyone can choose to work, then a society
needs to recognize and accommodate this fact. During the Great
Depression, the U.s. federal government expanded social welfare programs in order to provide political stability by meeting the needs of its
citizens. These welfare programs assumed that citizens had rights independent of their status as workers and that the government owed a
basic level of support to citizens. The adoption of welfare reversed
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Locke's assumption that citizens, as workers, will provide a basic level
of support for government.
However, we live during an era when neoliberal theories have
enjoyed renewed prominence, as evidenced in multiple arenas: the
reduction of corporate regulation, reduction of tariffs, elimination or
severe restriction of social programs, downsized taxation, and privatization. These transformations have reinforced, if not accelerated, the
traditional American valorization of work and the understanding that
employment serves as the gateway to full citizenship. This ideological
connection of work, choice, and citizenship has become ever more
insistent at a time of structural unemployment. How do we reconcile
the opposing theory and reality?
This chapter argues that the tensions between neoliberal ideologies
of work and contemporary realities of unemployment are clearly ascertained through the lens of prison labor. I also argue that prison labor
itself has become a spectacular means by which this tension is
"resolved." However, as I shall explain, the ideologies of free choice
and work have become increasingly difficult to maintain, which has led
to ever more farcical performances of penal labor.
Social theorists have frequently observed that the penal system is
developed in conjunction with the needs and detritus of the economic
order. Jonathan Simon, Malcolm Feeley, and David Garland have
pointed out that the penal system in the United States has experienced
a shift in orientation. While one aspect of the penal system is to provide
a clear moral order for a society, Simon and Feeley argue that this
"New Penology" notably lacks a coherent narrative or purpose. "It has
not yet succeeded in producing a viable truth about crime."s The result
is increased anxiety about crime and a lack of confidence in the institutions that deal with it. Garland, on the other hand, argues that the welfare state created a form of penal welfarism. Both regimes "meshed
effectively with the new mechanisms of social regulation, with government through experts, and with ideological stress upon universal citizenship and social integration that characterized social politics in the
post-war period."91t was the decline of universal citizenship and postwar prosperity that undermined the welfare state and, alongside it,
penal welfarism. Garland observes a "sharp discontinuity" in penal
practices that reflects the tum toward neoliberalism in both in the
United States and Great Britain.
Garland offers his observations as a contrast to Simon and Feeley'S.
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The sudden shift in penal policies does make sense given the larger historical, economic context. However, both analyses can be correct. Penal
policies are not coherent narratives, but that is because they reflect current ideologies and economic developments. Contemporary prison
labor is an expression of deindustrialization in the United States and
the loss of employment in urban and rural areas. I am not arguing that
prison labor is caused by these shifts. Rather, this particular incarnation
of forced labor practices in the United States reflects and hides these
political, economic trends. It deliberately contests economic reality outside prison walls, and this is why it becomes incoherent and unable to
produce" a viable truth about crime," as Simon and Feeley observe.

Forced Labor in Historical Perspective
In order to understand what distinguishes forced labor practices today,
it is illuminating to consider how they differ from other episodes of
involuntary labor in U.s. history. Because of the radically disproportionate number of minority, male inmates, prison labor today is frequently viewed as a return to slavery. This impression is reinforced by
the fact that prison labor is made legal through a clause in the Thirteenth Amendment. Slavery and involuntary servitude are outlawed in
the United States, "except as punishment of crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted" (U.s. Const. Am. 13, Sec. 1). Certainly,
the legality of forced labor in penal institutions has rested upon this
"escape clause" in the Thirteenth Amendment. In 1871, the Supreme
Court of Virginia, in Ruffin v. The Commonwealth, determined that a convicted felon "is for the time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the state," hence "civically dead," lacking rights normally
awarded to citizens.1O Joan Dayan has also pointed out in her work that
the practice of chaining inmates together to work, tracking inmates
with bloodhounds, and monitoring working inmates with armed
guards vividly evokes the history of slavery in the United States. The
visual references to the era of slavery are particularly disturbing when
considering the racially disproportionate prison population. l l Furthermore, the practice of many states denying convicted felons the right to
vote in perpetuity does suggest the creation of a permanent caste of
noncitizens and a new era of Jim Crow in the twenty-first century. 12
Despite the ghastly family resemblance between slavery, disproportionate minority confinement, and forced labor practices today, there
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are crucial differences. The Ruffin ruling no longer stands, and prisoners' rights are recognized (if not always maintained). More important
for the purposes of this argument, slavery was an integral part of the
early national economy. Low-cost labor was essential for the agriculturally dismal territory of the South. Slavery made it possible to tum a
profit from a swamp. While it was without a doubt fueled by racial animus and aristocratic fantasies, slavery was an institution that served an
economic purpose. Prison labor today is abysmally unproductive, a
fact I shall explore later. Incarceration is not driven by the need to
extract low-wage labor from inmates.
Similarly, many people would consider the convict lease system in
the postbellum South an extension of slavery. However, in his study of
the convict lease system, Alex Lichtenstein argues that despite appearances, the convict lease system was not a functional equivalent to slavery. On the contrary, Lichtenstein found that convict labor was used in
new industrial sectors of the economy, enabling the South's rapid
industrialization following the Civil War. Rather than accept being burdened with the costs of a free labor force, nascent industrialists developed infrastructure with the use of extremely cheap labor. Convicts
built the roads and railroads, stoked the furnaces, and removed the coal
that marked the death of the plantation economy. Agricultural
exploitation remained in force through the sharecropping system, but
convict labor forged the new economy that proved to be even more
profitable in the long run. 13
Immediately after emancipation, industrialists were faced with a
recalcitrant labor force. Newly freed slaves were not eager to sign up
for lengthy workweeks, even for wages. 14 Industrialists complained
that even working freed slaves chose to work only two or three days a
week, preferring free time to more wages. The convict lease system
solved the dilemma perfectly: industrialists were given a new captive
labor force. Furthermore, Lichtenstein argues, the convict lease system
provided a method of discipline for poor black families in rural areas as
well. Not fulfilling sharecropping obligations led to threats of the chain
gangs. "Since it reinforced, rather than disrupted, the form of social
control necessary for extreme labor exploitation in the South's plantation districts, this was a form of 'modernization' acceptable to planter
and industrialist alike."15
What is important to note here is that the convict lease system provided labor discipline for those outside the purview of the chain gang
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as well. This fact was not lost upon workers in the industries that used
convict labor. One committee issued a report to the governor of Georgia urging him to restrict the use of the convict lease system. They
argued prison labor was
offensive to the just pride of that worthy and estimable portion of
our community [the white working men]. They feel that the natural
effect is to degrade their vocation, by turning out from the walls of
the Penitentiary the worst characters as rivals and associates in their
business. 16
While the concern for competition from convicts whose wages were
minimal is evident, workers also adopted elements of the rhetorical
and ideological stance that had helped to defeat slavery: Republican
free labor.
Eric Foner's book Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the
Republican Party explores how the ideology of free labor was used to
challenge slavery. Rather than contest slavery on purely moral grounds
like the abolitionists, Republicans made the argument that it was
important to banish slavery from the Union because it sullied the heart
and soul of the United States: free labor. In speaking of differences
between the Southern and Northern sides of the Mason-Dixon Line,
Thomas Ewing observed, "Labor is held honorable by all on one side of
the line because it is the vocation of freemen-degrading in the eyes of
some on the other side because it is the task of slaves."17 Alexis de Tocqueville shared this concern in Democracy in America, making the argument that slavery was debilitating for the slave but also for the master,
killing his capacity for innovation and desire to work. Clearly, forced
labor was viewed in relation to free labor: its presence in the United
States had consequences for all.
Reviewing this brief history of the convict lease system presents an
interesting point of comparison to the economic circumstances of
today's prison labor. Lichtenstein points out that the convict lease system was an integral element in the South's rapid industrialization in
providing inexpensive, unskilled labor. Today, by contrast, the United
States is suffering from deindustrialization. The only sector of the
unskilled labor market that is experiencing growth is the service sector.
For the most part, prison laborers are entirely unsuited to fill this niche.
Telemarketing jobs are one large exception, but the vast majority of ser-
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vice sector jobs could not practically or cost-effectively be fulfilled with
prison labor. Therefore, unlike the convict lease system, contemporary
prison labor serves no pressing need on the part of the market.
Furthermore, convict lease labor was extremely productive. Today,
UNICOR, the Federal Bureau of Prison's work program, loses money
every year. In response to labor activism in the 1930s, Congress passed
the Ashworth-Summers Acts that made it a felony to transport or sell
prison-made products across state lines. In 1979 the Federal Prison
Industries Enhancement Act (PIE) was passed allowing private companies to enter into joint ventures with prisons. In order to be exempt
from the Ashworth-Summers Act, prison workers must be paid the
federal minimum wage. (It is important to note that 80 percent of wages
paid to prisoners are passed on to prisons for their overhead expenses
or to the justice system to meet the costs associated with conviction.)
Joint ventures in prisons are now in place in thirty-six states, and 80,000
workers are engaged in commercial activity behind bars. Examples of
prison industries include hotel reservations, office furniture, blue jeans,
lingerie, and electrical wire. IS The largest employer is the Federal
Prison Industries UNICOR program, which employs 21,000 workers,
primarily making goods for the government under mandatory sourcing contracts. 19
UNICOR does not have to pay prisoners a minimum wage as it is
already in compliance with the Ashworth-Summers Act because it sells
to the government. Even with wages as low as 21 cents an hour, UNICOR products are expensive, costing on average 13 percent more than
the same goods provided by private firms.20 These products are
shoddy; one study found that wire supplied by UNICOR failed at twice
the rate of other suppliers. Finally, UNICOR delivered its products late
42 percent of the time. 21 Clearly, UNICOR would not be able to compete in an open market. It seems that having a captive buyer and nextto-free labor would be tremendously profitable. Why isn't prison labor
more lucrative?
The difficulties with doing business in prisons are numerous. Security costs are high, much higher than the wages of the workers. For
example, in 2001 in the Philadelphia Prison System 350 inmates (out of
the 22,124 prisoners who were taken in) were released for work assignments. In the same year, the prison conducted 2A94 security checks on
these 350 inmates!22 Machinery installed in prisons does not tend to be
the most efficient or up-to-date, and productivity is interrupted by
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lockdowns or security disturbances at the prison. There are difficulties
in conducting manufacturing in prisons ill-designed for the purpose.
For example, trucks delivering supplies could not fit between two security gates encircling the prison that were programmed to open only one
at a time. Inmates are released from the prison, creating high turnover
rates and a need for constant training, particularly since those
employed in prison industries are most likely low-risk, nonviolent
offenders. It is true that employee absenteeism is low, and companies
do not have to pay payroll taxes, unemployment benefits, sick leave, or
retirement, nor enforce worker safety or environmental requirements.
Ultimately, the balance sheet seems to come up even: employers would
be just as well-off looking for nonincarcerated workers.
This is not to say that there have not been attempts to make prison
labor more market savvy. Two institutions in Texas have taken the lead
in trying to reform the current prison labor system, the Enterprise
Prison Institute and the Criminal Justice Center at the National Center
for Policy Analysis. Morgan Reynolds and Knut Rostad have testified
before congressional hearings and produced studies arguing that
prison labor might be used with greater profit in the United States. Both
men testified at a hearing for HR 4100 entitled "Free Market Prison
Industries Reform Act of 1998," which proposed ending mandatory
sourcing regulations, lifting interstate restrictions on products made in
prisons, and privatizing Federal Prison Industries, making it possible
to sell products on the open matket.
Proposals to privatize and expand prison labor profited from the
labor shortage of the late 1990S. A brief entitled "Creating Factories
behind Bars" points to the "93% unemployment rate behind the gates
of American prisons" as a solution to "a workforce shortage that threatens American competitiveness."23 The benefit of prison labor extends
beyond private manufacturers to taxpayers and prisoners as well. They
argue that 80 percent of income earned by prisoners currently is
returned to the criminal justice system or helps pay compensation to
victims. Expanding prison labor would be one way to manage the costs
of the policy of mass incarceration. Finally, prisoners who work in prisons are 24 percent less likely to return to prison after release. While
Reynolds and Rostad imply that this is due to the training and discipline provided by work experience, this may also be attributed to the
fact that only the best behaved prisoners are allowed to work.
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Reynolds and Rostad cite gross public mismanagement for the
underutilization of the workforce behind bars in the United States.
However, since prison industry is usually state run rather than privately run, the output is often shoddy, overpriced merchandise that
other state agencies must buy from the prison industry monopoly.
The largest prison supplier was the Federal Bureau of Prisons with
$433 million in output for federal agencies, yet the system employed
only 16,000 inmates out of 61,000 inmates eligible to work (i.e., those
not in solitary confinement, considered dangerous, or being transferred) from its total of 85,000 inmates.24
Today, the number of inmates has risen dramatically, but UNICOR
still employs only a fraction of potential workers. The globalization of
manufacturing has played a key role in hearings about prison labor; as
Senator Mitch McConnell asked, "How about the apparel makers who
use offshore labor? A lot of apparel is produced overseas now. Do you
think we could find a way to entice them back, with some of them using
prison labor?"25 Despite some support, the proposed reforms have not
thus far been approved.
The failure to push prison labor into the free market does not seem
to be due to a reluctance to privatize government functions on the part
of the current administration. Nor can the strength of unions take credit
in this regard. I believe prison labor is unattractive to most investors
because they do not need the kind of labor that prisoners can supply.
McConnell may have fantasies about recapturing a manufacturing sector in the U.s. economy through the competitive deployment of prison
labor, but even at slave wages, American workers cannot compete in
the global marketplace anymore. And this may be the primary reason
that so many potential workers are behind bars in the first place.
Troy Duster argues that the "darkening" of u.s. prisons can be
directly linked to deindustrialization in American cities. In 1933 black
people were incarcerated at approximately three times the rate of white
Americans; in 1990, the rate was eight times that of white persons. 26
This shift in the pattern of incarceration can be compared to the loss of
jobs in manufacturing in large cities and the concurrent rise of service
sector employment. Because service sector jobs rely much more on
fronting the image of the company, minority youths are far less likely
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to be able to land these jobs that now dominate the entry level employment market. For instance, racial differences in language patterns are
particularly sharp in the United States. Duster cites an experiment conducted by William Labov, a linguist at the University of Pennsylvania.
Labov tape-recorded the voices of children at playgrounds in London
and in Philadelphia. Neither he nor his English colleagues were unable
to identify the race of the children recorded in London. In Philadelphia,
however, they could four times out of five. Because service sector jobs
hire on the basis of employee presentation and the image of the store,
Duster argues that significant differences in language have meant that
African American youths have been displaced out of the labor market
in the transition to a service sector economy.27
Continuing to look at Philadelphia as an example, the city has suffered from high structural unemployment, has abysmal public schools
that are primarily attended by African Americans and other minorities,
and has surprisingly low property values. Philadelphia also has an
incarceration rate that is 148 percent of the national average and a significantly younger (35 percent of inmates are 24 or under) and disproportionately African American (72 percent) inmate popUlation. Sixtyeight percent of inmates in the Philadelphia prison system are there for
dealing drugs or theft of some kind. 28
Two sociologists, Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett, have argued
that the extraordinary incarceration rate in the United States in the
1980s and 1990S has seriously distorted typical measurements of unemployment. Taking the tremendous incarcerated population into
account (2 million people according to the New York Times on May 19,
2003) raises the overall unemployment rate for men by 1 percentage
point. This would make the current unemployment rate closer to 7 percent. However, because of disproportionate minority confinement, taking incarcerated populations into account creates a s-percentage-point
rise in African-American male unemployment. Including frustrated job
seekers and prisoners into their calculations, Western and Beckett place
African American male unemployment at 38 percent, even during the
"recovery" of the 1990S! Western and Beckett argue that penal institutions need to be understood as a labor market institution with two general effects: first, to hide massive structural unemployment; second, to
create decreased job performance on the job market for those exiting
them. 29
A point of historical contrast makes this second effect all the more
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salient. In his book on the parole system, Poor Discipline, Jonathon
Simon points out that during the era of indeterminate sentencing in
1960, in order to be released on parole, prisoners in thirty states had to
show that they had been offered gainful employment.3° Such job offers
did not always materialize, nor was the system any guarantee that exoffenders seamlessly melded back into society. But such a provision is
unthinkable today, not only as a condition of release, but also in comparison to the employment restrictions that are placed upon ex-offenders upon their release. Both federal and state governments bar exoffenders from holding jobs that require federal or state licenses. These
occupations include working airport security, as aids in nursing
homes, or as a social worker. Those with drug convictions cannot
obtain student loans.
Prisons work more to remove large numbers of the unemployed
from public view and to further stigmatize them. Especially in perpetuating the population's unemployment status after release, prisons
play in a key role in the hardening of poverty in U.S. cities. Simon
argues that work provides the main method of achieving "normalization" in American society, and so unemployed persons on parole are
not likely to be reintegrated into communities. He argues that given the
structural unemployment in cities, to break the cycle of incarceration
we will have to develop" an understanding of the normal distinct from
the discipline of the labor market.")1 While I absolutely agree with him,
I believe that contemporary prison labor practices suggest exactly why
this is not likely to be the case. After all, if prisons are helping to mask
what are extraordinarily bad economic prospects for minority youths
in the country, then why have them labor in prison at all?
The Moral Economy of Work or Work as Punishment?

Two different traditions intersect in prison labor. One is the tradition of
work as rehabilitation; the other is work as punishment or discipline.
The residue of both traditions can be found in debates about prison
labor today. The tradition of work as penance and rehabilitation has
been with the institution of the prison since its inception. In Eastern
State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, Tocqueville and Beaumont
described prisoners who were kept in their cells in solitary confinement
for the entire length of their sentence, in order to prevent criminals
from further contaminating one another. The original penal institution,
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the WaInut Street Jail, discovered that individuals kept in solitary confinement without activities went insane. At Eastern State Penitentiary,
the Quakers improved upon the model of solitary confinement by
adding handicraft activities for each prisoner to accomplish in his cell.
It is highly remarkable, that these men, the greater part of whom
have been led to crime by indolence and idleness, should be constrained by the torments of solitude, to find in labor their only comfort. By detesting idleness, they accustom themselves to hate the primary cause of their misfortune; and labor, by comforting them,
makes them love the only means, which again free, will enable them
to gain honestly their livelihoodY

Work becomes the welcome respite from idleness, and prisoners view
work as a form of redemption, a proclivity that reformers hoped would
continue after release as well. The Auburn penitentiary model also
placed a great deal of emphasis upon the rehabilitative aspects of labor
in prisons. By having prisoners work collectively but in absolute silence,
they learned the self-discipline and obedience needed for collective production. Interestingly, as Thomas Dumm points out, the system of rehabilitation through work was developed in the United States during a
time of an acute labor shortage, so released prisoners were likely to be
able to ply their trade after release.33 According to Tocqueville's interviews, the work of prisoners was also used to defray the costs of confinement, an advantage that is also frequently mentioned today.
Today some prison reformers advocate increasing work release programs, allowing prisoners to gain work experience, earn some money,
and enjoy more humane conditions of confinement through a variation
of their everyday activities. As I already mentioned, one rationale for
expanding prison labor is decreased recidivism. Most prisoners today
would prefer to work. Days are monotonous, and even dreary tasks are
more welcome than solitary confinement. Supermax prisons that place
prisoners in cells for twenty-three hours a day are finding that solitary
confinement causes insanity just as it did two hundred years ago. Dealing with overcrowded prisons, wardens and guards welcome prison
work. It provides occupation for the prisoners and wears them out,
making them a more tractable population. Within the institution,
prison work provides the sole occupation for prisoners now that educational and recreational budgets have been slashed.34
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But I believe that prison labor serves a different function outside the
prison walls. David Goldberg has observed that the labor discipline
provided for minority men in prisons and the workfare assignments
created largely for minority women outside of prison enforce capitalist
moral economy. "In the moral economy, then, prisons are supposed
ideologically to represent law and order, work in the face of welfare,
discipline rather than delinquency, social control over anarchy."35 Foucault also observed the intricate way that the penitentiary is closely calibrated to the economy outside of it.
How is power to be strengthened in such a way that, far from impeding progress, far from weighing upon it with its rules and regulations, it actually facilitates such progress? What intensificator of
power will be able at the same time to be a multiplicator of production?36
Viewed in this light, prison labor takes on a special significance considering that it is becoming more popular just at the time that structural
unemployment in urban areas has emerged as a permanent reality.
Today prison labor affirms that our old assumptions are still valid:
those who do not labor are criminals. What more efficient way to insist
upon participation in the workforce, even at a time when such participation becomes more difficult?
Examining the debate over the State of Oregon's Measure 17, which
was passed in 1994 requiring all prisoners to work forty hours a week,
we can see the interlacing of different, often contradictory arguments
about the nature of work, choice, and citizenship. Because the debate
happened during a period of economic prosperity, a common argument was that requiring prisoners to work was a form of rehabilitation
and would reduce recidivism. Interestingly, there was also resentment
on the part of taxpayers that they were paying for prisoners to remain
idle while they themselves were required to work forty hours a week or
more)7 Prefiguring the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996, the popularity of Measure 17 in Oregon (it passed with 71
percent of the vote) suggests that voters will not endorse exemption
from work. The ideological linkage between work and moral character
that I began this essay by describing still remains very strong.
The problem with this logic is that the incarcerated population
comes from the population least likely to find work in the first place,
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and it is even more disadvantaged on the job market after serving time
in prison. The ideology of work and citizenship in the United States
dictates that all rational and disciplined people can and will choose to
work. Not being able to work is a reality that our understanding of citizenship, virtue, choice, and freedom simply cannot accommodate,
particularly in an era of increased market discipline. To acknowledge
that some people cannot work would require a fundamental shift away
from neoliberalism. Yet such a dramatic shift seems unlikely, even in
the face of growing structural unemployment. The incarceration boom
hides some unemployment, and prison labor maintains the fiction that
unemployment is a character, not an economic, issue. This is the logic
by which we pursue prison labor practices of another era, sometimes
with absurd results. It is this collision of ideology and a changing economic reality that has led to some of the incoherence that Simon has
noted in contemporary penal practices.

Prison Labor as Farce
In State of North Carolina v. Clifton Frazier (COAOO--122, 6 February

2001), the State Supreme Court ruled that Clifton Frazier could not be
convicted of larceny for stealing from the prison canteen where he was
assigned to work. Frazier was paid one dollar a day for his labor. Over
the course of three months, $665.75 worth of goods and money disappeared from the canteen. The initial conviction found Frazier guilty of
larceny, but the Supreme Court overturned this conviction, arguing
that he was not an employee, by definition. "Defendant did not make a
wage that would have been lawful outside of prison, he could not lawfully refuse a work assignment, and he had no bargaining power or any
of the other ingredients of a traditional employment relationship."
Some prisoners are paid the minimum wage but still by law are not
employees. The key distinctions here seem to be the ability to choose
whether or not to work, and the sense that work is a reciprocal relationship between worker and employer.
But establishing these two precepts as the basis of free labor may be
problematic, and become even more so. If one cannot find a job, is
employment still a choice in any regard? If there is a shortage of jobs,
do employees still enjoy a reciprocal relationship with their employers?
Economic anxieties are making these questions more pressing. The case
of Larry Hope v. Pelzer illuminates how the connection between work
and choice is maintained, even in absurd circumstances.
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In Alabama, prisoners who disrupt work on the chain gangs or who
refuse to work on the chain gang are disciplined by being chained to a
hitching post, outside, with their arms high above them. There are regulations of this practice: prisoners are to be offered bathroom breaks
and water, and prisoners are to be released once they state that they are
ready and willing to work in the chain gang. In 1994, the Department of
Justice conducted a study of the Alabama Department of Corrections'
use of the hitching post and found that these regulations were only sporadically followed. The DOJ advised Alabama to desist in its disciplinary use of the hitching post-particularly because, they argued, not all
prisoners were released when they said they would return to work. In
short, it was acceptable for the hitching post to be used to enforce participation in prison labor, other than that it was considered inappropriate. Remarkably, the Alabama Department of Corrections replied that
they would continue to use the hitching post "to preserve prison security and discipline" (Hope v. Pelzer).
A case decided by the Supreme Court in summer 2002 provides a
vivid picture of the use of the hitching post in Alabama. Larry Hope, a
prisoner, was affixed to the hitching post twice. The first time was due
to a disturbance between himself and two other inmates on the chain
gang working together. He was removed and attached to the metal
apparatus for two hours. The incident was well documented in the
prison records, including the times that he was offered bathroom
breaks and given water. When he agreed to resume his work, he was
released from the hitching post and returned to the chain gang. The second time Hope was punished with the hitching post followed an altercation with the guards of the chain gang. His shirt was removed, and he
was held in the hot June sun without water or bathroom breaks for
seven hours. Guards offered him water, then poured it on the ground
in front of him, taunting him about his thirst. Hope brought a civil case
against the guards who were ruled to be immune from prosecution.
The Supreme Court overturned this decision, ruling that reasonable
persons should have known that such activities constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, and that the guards were thereby liable for their
actions.
The scene is striking, a man, attached to a metal bar, hands in shackles above him. He is dehumanized thoroughly, and in order to regain
his "freedom," he must emphatically state that he will choose to go
work on the chain gang. Why go to such perverse lengths to make the
prisoner" choose" work? On one hand, the insistence that the prisoner
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choose reaffirms the ideological connection between labor and citizenship. Prisoners will be punished until they are willing to use their reason, their "free will," as society would dictate. On the other hand, to
enact choice in such a fashion is actually quite dangerous. It is just as
easy to say that such an exercise reveals Hope's" choice" as entirely fabricated. Perhaps, after all, work is not really a choice.
Prison labor becomes a painful enactment of social normalcy in one
other way as well. Now that tougher economic times have hit the state,
Oregon voters do not like the idea that convicts are able to secure
employment when those on the outside are finding it increasingly difficult)8 Voters overwhelmingly amended Measure 17 in 1998, restricting the use of prison labor, and even further restrictions were
demanded by the AFL-CIO and ultimately delivered by the state in
2002. There is little talk anymore about the rehabilitative purpose of
prison labor. We want prisoners to labor, but we don't want them to
compete. Hence, we have the development of spectacularly unproductive labor.
In Alabama and Arizona, for example, wardens have decided to pay
for large boulders to be brought to prisons. Convicts break these boulders into gravel with hammers. The gravel, of no practical use, is
deposited into pits next to the prison.39 The prison pays to bring in
more boulders to be smashed. This is not work as rehabilitation or
training, this is not work that is generating profit. This is work as punishment. In Oregon, where the most public debate about the relationship between free and forced labor has occurred, some have even suggested that convicts should be employed in pushing boulders back and
forth over highways. The ultimate punishment devised by the gods for
the man, Sisyphus, who dared to scorn their rules migrates out of the
underworld onto the earth's surface.
But Camus reminds us that the primary distinction between Sisyphus and other workers is the hero's consciousness of the futility of his
labor. In chapter 2, I looked at what this passage says about consciousness and the limits of human rationality. Here I want to highlight the
element of labor in the myth.
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where
would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding
upheld him? The workman of today works every day in his life at
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the same tasks, and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at
the rare moments when it becomes conscious.40
To say that prison labor, particularly in this guise, is absurd is not to
dismiss the pain, both physical and mental, that such labor inflicts
upon those forced to engage in it. Unlike Camus, I cannot imagine prisoners smashing boulders as happy. But in the sense that recognition of
the absurd provides for an elevated level of consciousness, I present
these final manifestations of prison labor as the absurd in precisely that
spirit. The myopic view that all rational people will choose to labor at a
time when structural unemployment is becoming a permanent reality
is creating the need for farce. An insistence that participation in the
labor force is always a matter of rational choice, not social opportunity,
becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.
The U.s. political and economic systems have been sustained by the
ideology linking citizenship and labor. But maintaining this construction is requiring that a significant proportion of our population, particularly black men, be sacrificed. The unemployed are branded as criminals, removed from public view, and permanently crippled in their
attempts to participate in the workforce. Releasing prisoners from the
burden of maintaining this fiction for the rest of us should be enough
provocation to dismantle the links between choice, labor, and citizenship. In case it is not, we would do well to remember the origins of the
treadmill. Tocqueville points out that treadmills, "machines that work
without producing," were developed in English prisons in 1822 to provide constant activity for prisoners without undue competition for
other workers.4' At the time, it was inconceivable that such a machine
would find its way out of the prison. How curious, almost two hundred
years later, it has become a common metaphor for understanding the
experience of work and leisure, the rhythms of modem life, even outside the walls of the prison. Endorsing rock crushing, boulder pushing,
or any other form of labor, purely for the sake of laboring, shows how
far we have traveled from Locke's initial calculation that labor is fundamentally a matter of rationality.

CHAPTER

7

Punishment and the Spiral of Disorder
We have previously shown, and histories everywhere teach, that wars are
usually begun for the purpose of exacting punishment.
-Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis
The season is changing.
Return me my freedom!
Oppressive government and cruel treatmentOne day there will be revenge.
-Poem written on a wall of Angel Island Internment Center

The focus of this book has been punishment and the birth, development, or reconsolidation of political orders. Correct deployment of
punishment helps to establish the guiding principles of a regime and
establish legitimacy for an authority in a given populace. It can also
help shape the political economy of a regime, playing an integral role in
the material support of political order. But I would not want to perpetuate the idea that punishment only serves to bolster the power of the
state. Too frequently punishment has been understood as the expression of inviolable power, and naturally, this perception serves the
power of the state, as I argued in my discussion of sovereignty. Therefore, I want to conclude with a case study of how punishment can also
be a catalyst in the unraveling of regimes, and how it can at times
demonstrate the state's powerlessness.
Like all the other dynamics this book describes, the role that punishment plays in the creation of political disorder cannot be pinned down.
Definitive statements such as "whenever practices of punishment contradict a regime's political ideals, political instability occurs" are
impossible. After all, at times practices of punishment do contradict a
regime's stated ideals, and it causes no interest, critique, or disruption
whatsoever. Nor does the severity of punishment seem to play any
decisive role in whether a regime is stable, so it cannot be argued that

147

PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL ORDER

the specific form of punishment particularly matters. Instead, the perception of unjust punishment as emblematic of political power creates
instability. It is impossible to explain public perception in its totality,
but it is the key to the other elements of this argument. What transforms punishment into an injustice is perception. Once an instance of
punishment is perceived as an expression of the state's power, rather
than the criminality of the person being punished, a fundamental shift
has occurred. Punishment has ceased being an unquestioned and given
activity and become an opportunity to judge the state's exercise of its
given authority.
In conclusion to this book, I am going to discuss recent practices of
punishment by the United States in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. As
established in chapter 5, domestic penal practices are leniently viewed
as an exception to limited state power, and even the incarceration explosion has not served the same generally catalyzing role as events in these
prisons located abroad. U.S. penal practices have come to be emblematic
of the U.s. government in the international arena in a dynamic remarkably similar to the horror recounted by the travelers in More and Kafka.
The reverberations are also felt at home of course, but the horror over
Abu Ghraib largely results from the fact that U.S. citizens know that
people all around the world are scrutinizing these actions so closely.
Nothing brings on self-examination like the view of an outsider.
Transcripts of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guant<inamo Bay
demonstrate that they experience their abuse as a form of punishment.
Indeed, it is clear that Americans are asserting a command and control
over others through confinement. If the ability to punish could be simply equated to the power of command, then the extreme actions taken
in these confinement facilities would mark an ascendance in American
power. But this is not at all the case. In fact, I argue the exact reverse;
these instances of power reveal ill-conceived attempts to reassert
American control and reassert a clear causality within an ever deeper
spiral of disorder. The more vigorously American soldiers, commanders, agents, and guards try to construct a logic of America supremacy
in their prisoners and in the international arena as a whole through
punishment, the more powerless the country becomes.

Toward a Paradigm of Punishment and Political Disorder
Practices of punishment, and people's responses to them, are an indicator of the authority and legitimacy, hence stability, of a regime. Punish-
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ment reveals people's perceptions about their political order and at
times can galvanize sentiment in opposition to that regime. This is
because punishment offers a clear vision of how ideas of justice and the
exercise of power intermingle: punishment offers an opportunity for
everyone to see to what end a regime exercises its power. At times,
practices of punishment, as in the theories of Locke, reveal a ruler to be
a tyrant-it is no accident that the Soviet gulags, Saddam Hussein's torture chambers, and Chinese prisons are often cited as evidence of the
corrupt nature of these regimes. When punishment belies ideals, practices of punishment can undermine the stated principles of the state
and result in political disorder. Admittedly, this is not always the case.
Sometimes practices of punishment betray, for example, the doctrine of
equality, and yet the inequality reflected in practices of punishment
raises nary an eyebrow.
Therefore we cannot say that punishment simply demonstrates
whether a state has the power of command. Nor can we say that the
way a state punishes will determine whether it is perceived as legitimate. We need a more complex analytical paradigm that takes into
account three different dynamics in the relationship between authority
and punishment. First, authority and legitimacy are the result of a relationship rather than a unidirectional expression of force. As I established in my discussion of sovereignty, political power is contingent
upon relationships between the authorities and those subject to it.
Second, we also need to take into account the theatrical elements in
this relationship. Political authority needs to be presented as such and
cultivated as such; this is an insight central to political philosophy. This
is a more complex matter than first appears because any authority that
must pointedly assert itself is already weakened. Therefore the presence of authority needs to be perceptible, but without an overinsistence
upon itself. For example, if a parent needs to point out that he has
authority over his child, he has already lost his authority even though
stating his authority may appear to be an assertion of an existing hierarchy.
In the case of punishment, it may be tempting to use penal systems
to assert control that is lacking in other arenas. This logic is inherent in
all state punishment since crime is a lapse of legality, therefore punishment is a reassertion of the rule of law. Protesters who refuse the legitimacy of the government in general or some of its specific actions will
be met with punishment that reasserts the exclusive power of the law.
As we saw during the civil rights movement, if policemen assert the
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power of the state and go beyond the rule of law, for example, by beating generally peaceful protesters, punishment can actually catalyze
opinion against the state in favor of the protesters. Punishment as an
expression of authority can be counterproductive in given contexts.
This instance is related to my final point. In the case of state punishment, authorities need to demonstrate that they deserve their unique
privileges because they serve the larger interests of justice (or at least
have a presentation that they serve justice that convinces most people).
As soon as punishment is entirely about the power of command it
becomes counterproductive. Punishing to demonstrate a disparity of
power will quickly destroy the tenuous connection between power and
justice cultivated by all regimes.
Hannah Arendt's essay "On Violence" can provide some assistance
in elaborating this model. In this essay, Arendt complicates the common assumption that the state's capacity for violence serves as the
source of its authority. Like sovereignty, authority is relational and can
be undermined by those subject to it. Interestingly, Arendt argues that
the real source of authority comes from those subject to it, not those
holding it. If those subject to an authority cease to view it as such,
authority withers. She distinguishes between power and authority by
arguing that power comes only from the ability of people to act
together. It is the power of the people to grant authority to the state; the
state can never command authority through the gun, whip, or jail.
"Power and violence are opposites, where one rules absolutely, the
other is absent."l In situations of extreme violence there is no ability to
act together to assert collective power, and order is disrupted. Violence
may generate obedience, but according to Arendt, it cannot create
power. A battalion running through a village shooting guns may separate the inhabitants and send them running-but not until the battalion
comes together and starts to organize itself can we say that power has
changed hands. When the people rule absolutely there is little opportunity for violence. This is the principle behind town watch organizations
and mass demonstrations. "The extreme form of power is the rule of all
against one, the extreme form of violence is one against all."
Two valuable aspects of Arendt's essay are her insights about the
relational aspects of authority and the self-defeating impulse to use violence to maintain power. First, a person who has the power of command can lose it if her relationship with her audience changes. Authority's "hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to
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obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed."2 If you have to
explain why, for example, the state is allowed to punish criminals while
angry mobs are not, the state does not have exclusive political authority. "To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office.
The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt, and the surest
way to undermine it is laughter."3 If a policeman hands you a speeding
ticket and you laugh and rip it up, or if a person on trial giggles during
sentencing, authority is put into question.
How authorities react in such a situation is revealing. If the policeman then handcuffs and kicks the driver, his own authority becomes
further undermined. "To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished,
it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power."4 Every instance
of criminality provokes this dilemma. An infraction of the law is a
provocation to political authority. The punishment will work to reinforce that authority or it could undermine it. In some instances it is conceivable that the state, feeling absolute certainty of its authority, would
barely respond to those that challenge it. As Nietzsche observed, "As
the power and self-confidence of a community increase, the penal law
always becomes more moderate ... it is not unthinkable that a society
might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the
noblest luxury possible to it-letting those who harm it go unpunished."5 Imagine a social structure so strong that there was no need to
punish to prove might, right, or law. The giant has no need to swat at
the gnat. On the other hand, a state could respond vehemently, insisting upon order for even the slightest infraction. The now popular "broken windows theory" comes to mind here: if you let small things slide,
then the larger ones are sure to follow. If you draw a line in the sand
refusing to tolerate any asocial behavior, then accordance with the
larger issues will come even more naturally. Such vehement policing
demonstrates political power remarkably unsure of itself.
But these are the extreme examples, and most of the likely instances
of punishment fall between these two poles of vigilance and laxity.
Arendt also equivocates from her original position: though power and
violence are distinct they "usually appear together."6 Punishment is a
combination of authority and violence; the state's authority, bestowed
by others, allows its representatives to inflict pain and to commit acts of
violence that are not perceived as such.
One can think of instances of punishment as a sort of Rorschach
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test-incidents that reveal different people's relationship to a given
political authority. Punishment is seen as violence if the state is not recognized as legitimate. For example, take Emma Goldman's critique of
prisons and call for their abolition.? Because in her eyes the state has no
legitimacy as an institution of justice, Goldman looks upon confinement as a form of kidnapping, and a constraint of human bodies that
goes against natural rights. On the other hand, those who see the state
as legitimate beyond question will never perceive punishment as a
form of violence. 8 In both of these scenarios, the given view of the state
determines how the punishment is perceived; it does not depend upon
the particular practices of punishment.
A third possibility most accurately captures the dynamics of state
punishment and the generation of authority, however: instances of
punishment can either build up the legitimacy of a regime or undermine it in the eyes of those who are not strongly inclined toward either
of these ideological poles. An insecure authority who punishes to
demonstrate the power of command seeks to reassure her sense of
authority and demonstrate to the world that she has power. Punishment most evidently intended as a demonstration of command will
most likely fail to generate authority. So while punishment can reveal a
perception of a regime, it can also change one's perception of that
regime. If a practice of punishing appears to be too strident, questions
emerge as to whether the state uses its entrusted powers wisely. If a
state goes out of its way to be particularly humane in practices of punishment, as practiced in Philadelphia in the years immediately following the American Revolution, legitimacy may be accrued.
The necessary element of pain in punishment makes it a dangerous
exercise for the state. As political authority has become ever more
abstract, decentralized, and bureaucratic, thus lessening any potential
resistance to the exercise of political power, state punishment becomes
more and more of an anomaly. Because punishment serves to lessen the
authority of the person doing it, the distinction between the sovereign
and the person who acts in the name of the sovereign becomes crucial.
The agency behind punishment today is occluded since there is a representative of the state, rather than the state itself, inflicting pain.
Nonetheless, punishment does assert a relationship between the state
and the body of a citizen; furthermore, it is the one instance where the
state deliberately inflicts pain upon someone subject to it. All of the disciplinary mechanisms in the world do not change these basic realities of
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state punishment. For this reason, the authority of the state is most at
risk when it exercises the prerogative to punish.
Because punishment generates resistance, we would assume that
those who have been punished would have a less than favorable view
of the state. Beyond that, systemic instability comes when even those
who witness practices of punishment become disturbed by the manifestation of power. Once this happens, the legitimacy of the political
order is at stake. A dramatic example of this dynamic is provided by
the public response to incidents of prisoner abuse in occupied Iraq and
Guantanamo Bay. Here the assertion of U.S. power in the punishment
of prisoners and detainees has led to an unraveling of U.s. political
power in the world. It currently appears that the effects of prisoner
abuse shall remain limited to the international arena and have not led
to a delegitimation of the regime domestically, though the scandals
caused a significant drop in support for the war in Iraq among civilians
in the United States.
Punishment at Abu Ghraib

They took me to the room and they signaled me to get on to the floor.
And one of the police he put a part of his stick that he always carries
inside my ass and I felt it going inside me about two centimeters
approximately. And I started screaming, and he pulled it out and he
washed it with water inside the room. And the two American girls
that were there when they were beating me, they were hitting me
with a ball made of sponge on my dick. And when I was tied up in
my room, one of the girls, with blonde hair, she is white, she was
playing with my dick. I saw inside this facility a lot of punishment
just like what they did to me and more. (Sworn statement provided
by Detainee #151365)
The seemingly ever-widening prison abuse scandal in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay reveals the importance of perception in maintaining political authority and the danger that punishment
can pose to the legitimacy of political power. When Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Abu Ghraib only days after the
scandal broke in May 2004 he referred to the pictures and reports of
sadism and torture and declared, "This does not represent us." The
problem for Rumsfeld and the United States is that, very quickly, the
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images of prisoner abuse did come to represent America in the minds
of many Muslims in the Middle East and around the world. For those
who found the power and intentions of the United States already suspect, the photos proved beyond any doubt that the United States is
morally corrupt and sexually uncontrolled, and uses power for selfgratification rather than justice. It would have been impossible to imagine a more effective propaganda campaign for recruitment to the resistance. Even two years after the original scandal of prisoner abuse had
been made public, in February 2006 Australian news services created
another round of outrage around the world and discomfort for the U.s.
government when it broadcast additional images from 2003 that had
not before been made public.
The prison abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib broke just as I was completing the plans for this book. I vacillated whether a discussion of the
events was appropriate in the context of punishment. After all, it was
never called "punishment" in our newspapers, but rather "torture" or
"interrogation techniques." The United States had captured people, but
they had not been sentenced. The United States confined people to fight
terrorism, not to punish terrorists. But in most of the sworn affidavits of
prisoners from Abu Ghraib that were reproduced in a collection of documents pertaining to the abuse, Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel's
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, prisoners described the
actions taken against them as "punishment." While the terminological
difference may be due to the translators, it becomes clear from studying
the stories of the prisoners why the framework of punishment fits the
patterns of abuse in Iraq and Cuba.
When reading the affidavits of prisoners who were abused in Abu
Ghraib, they refer to different episodes during their confinement as
"punishment." This is remarkably different from the public discussion
of these events in the United States. Those particularly outraged by the
abusive practices have labeled them "torture," hoping to shame the
U.S. government into reform. Administration officials refer to the practices as "interrogation techniques." These two labels are not as different
as they sound since both imply a motive in administering pain outside
the logic of reciprocity inherent in punishment. Torture is employed
when a state wants to break down resistance, neutralize political opposition, generate obedience, and demonstrate its power in the clearest
possible fashion. The state asserts complete control over the body of the
subject in custody, demonstrating that the exercise of its political power
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is unbounded by anything-including the rule of law or any conception of human, political, or natural rights.
"Interrogation techniques" implies a state of war or emergency
when the rule of law is formally suspended-either in a general or
highly specific manner-in order to perpetuate sovereignty. In a state
of emergency, a state may suspend the normal procedures of law under
the assumption that this suspension is necessary to protect the regime.
This follows the logic of "sovereign exceptionalism" as described by
Schmitt and, more recently, Agamben. In a state of war, the state and
the military may violate the rights of others who are suspected of
endangering the lives and rights of other citizens because they are considered enemies of the state and therefore enjoy none of the usual political rights. The administration has justified abuse of detainees in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay with this rationale. Under pressure
from Congress to consider closing Guantanamo facilities in June 2005,
Vice President Dick Cheney said that the remaining detainees were
"bad people" and also that an untold number of terrorist attacks have
been prevented through the detentions and interrogations. However,
he also defended interrogation practices at the facility in terms of executive power, claiming that any attempt to regulate treatment of prisoners would be a "restriction" on executive power, making it more difficult to fight the War on Terror.
To see the prisoner abuse as torture or interrogation techniques is
actually less disconcerting than to think of it as punishment, precisely
because wartime strategies and torture are understood to be outside of
the normal political order. Looking at these episodes as punishment
assumes that these policies and actions reflect our political order, our
method of rule, and our commitment to the rule of law. Referring to an
action as punishment implies that it is a more or less sanctioned activity to establish a relationship between a regime and those subject to its
punishments. When a state punishes, it does so intending to correct
behavior on the part of the person deemed an offender, to send a message to other potential offenders and deter future crimes, or in retribution for the pain caused by the offender. Even though it is done through
extralegal channels, what has happened in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo
Bay, Afghanistan, Camp Nama, and most likely other detention facilities that we do not know about reveals a combination of all three of
these impulses. 9 Looking at these activities as punishment helps to
establish the pattern and logic, and ultimate danger, of the violence.
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One of the more interesting aspects about contemporary prisoner
abuse by the United States is how it has come to be managed in relationship to the law. The U.s. administration has done everything in its
power to define these activities as extralegal. Doing so will allow the
state to plead for the clemency afforded by exceptionalism, and it also
helps to make the case for the necessity of these actions. The central
claim is that our current political situation is so dangerous that extralegal actions are necessary; however, the relationship can be reversed
as well: the fact that we are doing extralegal actions must mean that our
current political situation is exceptionally dangerous. Through the
establishment of these extralegal channels, the administration simultaneously achieves a carte blanche to punish without any boundaries and
can claim that these practices do not reflect our interpretation of the
law, rights, or justice.
Though we have seen the suspension of the rule of law and the right
of habeas corpus before in the United States with President Lincoln's
startling assertions of executive war privilege, there are some new elements in this episode. The government has created a special area,
Guantanamo Bay, where the United States can exercise sovereignty
extraterritorially. The United States can do things to prisoners in these
spaces that it would not be able to do on American soil. The government is separating the exercise of sovereignty from its boundaries of
the nation-state, and whether this shall be a precedent or an exceptional
circumstance remains to be seen. Since the Geneva Convention applies
to prisoners of war, and fundamental political rights apply to prisoners
within the United States, it would appear that international and domestic law would provide all the necessary protections to individuals.
However, the special category "enemy combatant" allows for prison
abuse to happen outside of normal legal channels. Through these
administrative categories the state can engage in the abuse of prisoners
without being in direct conflict with the law.
The legal maneuvers that make it possible to explain in complex
detail why no laws have been broken, and why exactly these practices
stand outside the United States' human rights record, may be technically correct. U.S. courts may continue to grant exceptional status to
these practices, ironically enough, providing legal protection for these
extralegal activities. But it is clear that world opinion does not accept
that these images and activities are somehow exceptional and necessary. Instead, the detention facilities have come to represent the U.S.
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government around the world. Furthermore, it is widely assumed that
the abuses have official government sanction and reflect clear intention. In other words, unlawful detainment and prisoner abuse is
regarded as state punishment by the world audience, and any state that
punishes in such a manner is clearly unjust.
The prison abuse scandal and penal practices have damaged the reputation of the United States and limited its ability to serve as a check on
other regimes' abuses. In March 2006, China took the unprecedented
step of producing a rebuttal to Washington's annual report on human
rights abuses that labeled China as one of the world's most systematic
offenders against human rights. In its press release, China urged the
United States to spend its energies examining its own problems, including the enormous incarcerated population, discrimination against
minorities in the judicial process, and police and prison abuse. The
report also mentioned the abuse of human rights by the U.s. government, "both in and outside the U.S.," referring to prisons and confinement centers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba.lO
In Iraq, a public opinion survey completed in May 2004, just weeks
after the photos of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib were publicized,
demonstrates that the scandal caused a rapid deterioration in the perceived legitimacy of American forces in Iraq. Sixty-one percent of those
interviewed assumed no one would be punished for the abuse at all.
Fifty-four percent of respondents assumed that "all Americans"
behaved like the guards in Abu Ghraib who were responsible for the
humiliation and deaths of detainees.
Soldiers too were profoundly affected by the scandal. It is important
for military morale for soldiers to feel that their mission is just, that
their sacrifices and privations are for a greater cause. As soon as the
photos became widely circulated, surveys of the troops found that
morale had dropped significantly. Soldiers in Iraq quickly recognized
that these images of abuse would define the occupation in minds
around the world. They fretted that all of the good work that had been
done in Iraq was forgotten at the very least and completely undermined in some regard. How could they be confident that they stood for
human rights, justice, moderation, and peace? The public's perception
was also dramatically changed by the images of prisoner abuse. In a
CNN/USA Today poll taken the week after the scandal broke, for the
first time a majority of Americans expressed discomfort with our role in
Iraq, and the majority felt that our mission was compromised.
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World opinion sees the abuse of detainees as sanctioned by the U.s.
government and hence perceives this as state punishment. Examining
the transcripts of testimony taken from prisoners in Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay, it becomes evident that there is good reason for the
prisoners to experience abuse as pursuing both retributive and
reformist logic. The prisoners who provided statements about their
experiences in Abu Ghraib present them in terms of punishment. When
Charles Graner beats, starves, and handcuffs one detainee, he responds
by saying, "Then I told him I did not do anything to get punished this
way so when I said that he hit me hard on my chest and he cuffed me
to the window of the room about 5 hours and did not give me any food
that day and I stayed without food for 24 hours."ll Another detainee
recounts a series of incidents with his guards as a series of invented
punishments. "The first punishment was bringing me to Room #1,
where they cuffed me high for 7 or 8 hours ... And one day in November, they started different type of punishment, where as American
Police came into my room and put the bag over my head."12 They experience the treatment as having a rationale, a cause and effect. At times,
even the Americans collecting the affidavits from prisoners and MPs in
Abu Ghraib fall into the same terminology, for example asking about
activities during "punishment time."
The detainees assume that their treatment is punishment that is
administered for a reason. They were on the losing side of the war, the
Americans do not like their religion, and their pain is a clear demonstration of the fact that they are now subject to American authority.
Remarkably, virtually none of the affidavits mention that the MPs are
asking them questions or trying to obtain information from them.
Though the appeal for special powers rests upon the need to extract
information, the abuse of prisoners does not seem to be consistently
related to gathering information.
One striking element of the texts describing the abuse of prisoners at
Abu Ghraib is the hostility toward the Islamic religion. Looking at the
actions outside of their dubious relationship to the law, you can begin
to see an unacknowledged logic at work. Their actions make it clear
that religion is perceived as the barrier between these detainees and
their acceptance of the power of the United States. In a memo concerning one prisoner in Abu Ghraib, the commanding officer Pappas provides the following assessment.
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Detainee is at the point where he is resigned to the hope that Allah
will see him through this episode in his life, therefore he sees no
need to speak to interrogators. Detainee will not answer open-ended
questions, has a smug attitude and is running counter approaches on
interrogators. Detainee needs to be put in a position where he will
feel that the only option to get out of jail is to speak with interrogators.13
Their treatment is meant to be rehabilitative, getting them to
renounce their religion, to see that their God has failed them, and to
change their perception of how the universe is ordered from a religious
model to a secularized one. Over and over, guards worked to fundamentally restructure the belief systems of their detainees and have
them accept American power as more fundamental than their religious
belief. The Qur'an is sullied, specific rituals are denied, and regulations
are broken including contact with women, forced grooming, and public nakedness. 14 The punishments seem calculated to replace a belief in
transcendental authority with an acceptance of worldly power. Punishment is the restructuring of perception, the inscription of cause and
effect, and the demonstration of sovereignty. However, it is apparent
that trying to force a conversion from the worldview of Job to that of
Hobbes is counterproductive to say the least.
In another regard, the abuse can be seen as an attempt, not to produce reformation, but rather as deterrence. Terrorist attacks made the
United States look and feel vulnerable. In order to prevent future terrorist attacks, it needs to demonstrate its might. Stated differently, the
detentions and abuse may be a declaration of U.S. sovereignty in a
Schmittian sense: the government suspends the law, not because it
needs to, but to demonstrate that the U.S. government can, and wilU5
The extraterritorial jurisdictions in Guantanamo Bay and the abuse in
Afghanistan and Iraq might not only be about avoiding legal restrictions, but it may also be construed as a demonstration of the geographical expanse of American sovereignty.
The UN report on Guantanamo Bay observed that the U.S. military
serves as defense, judge, and executioner" in the cases of the
detainees. 16 The bizarre structure of legal proceedings, largely engineered with the help of the U.S. court system in response to challenges
such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, almost seems determined to produce just
II
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this impression of totalistic power. The policy on detentions and tolerance of prisoner abuse may not actually be aimed at extracting information, especially since torture produces only the most suspect knowledge in any circumstances, but rather the logic of deterrence. The
images of abuse in Abu Ghraib and stories from Guantanamo Bay are
contemporary equivalents of heads placed on spikes next to the fortress
walls, all done in the name of a Leviathan unrestricted by territory.
Or this may be simply retribution. The prisoners assume that they
are being punished in retaliation, and in some indirect sense, they are
correct. The abuses in Abu Ghraib must be viewed in relation to the
inability of occupying forces to exert control over the rest of the country. Several transcripts recounted that specific instances of abuse were
presented as retaliation for roadside bombings and insurgent attacks
on u.s. armed forces in Iraq. In February 2006, a Guantanamo Bay
detainee stated in an interview with the BBC: "If anything bad happens
to the United States anywhere in the world, they immediately react to
us and treat us badly, like animals. It's understandable they would
treat us that way."1? Lack of control outside these facilities leads the
United States to exact revenge upon those vulnerable to its control. This
impulse to revenge is palpable in Iraq, which is why the continued perception on the part of the American public that there was a direct connection between the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and
the invasion of Iraq is not as misguided as it initially appears.
The Abu Ghraib case demonstrates many of the elements of my theoretical discussion about sovereignty, perception, the rule of law, and
the exercise of political power. The primary way that the state can punish and cause pain without appearing to be violent is to do so within
the bounds of law. They will punish no more nor less than the letter of
the law: in this way the state demonstrates it is rationally prescribed
how they go about punishing, rather than being motivated by fear or
anger. The spirit of punishment is presumably legal, not personal, and
therefore the pain and violence is fundamentally different than the pain
and violence inflicted by one individual or group of individuals upon
others.
When punishment appears to go outside the bounds of law, a state
can save face by proclaiming that the law was broken, and that those
who broke the law will be punished. In doing this, they will stand for
the rule of law, even persecuting those among their own ranks who fail.
This is reminiscent of Machiavelli's counsel when it comes to using
strict discipline to supplicate a given population. It may upon occasion
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be necessary to use cruelty to supplicate an intransigent population.
But Machiavelli wisely counsels that then the instrument of cruelty
needs to be sacrificed. Cesare Borghia provides this example in The
Prince.
And as he knew that the harshness of the past had engendered
some amount of hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people
and to win them over completely, he resolved to show that if any
cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but through the
harsh discipline of his minister. And having found the opportunity
he had him cut in half and placed one morning in the public square
at Cesena with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife by his
side. 18
In contrast, President Bush announced on May 20, 2005, that full justice

had been done to the few miscreants in the service of the U.S. military,
the day after yet another damaging report of prison abuse in
Afghanistan had been leaked. "Regardless of rank, every person has
been held accountable," he claimed. This assertion is belied by the fact
that the commanding officer in charge of military interrogations at Abu
Ghraib was issued a written reprimand. 19 Others have noted that the
Bush administration has actually rewarded those responsible for promoting the policies leading to the abuse. Some congressional representatives understand the symbolic importance of the handling of the
prison abuse scandal. On June 22, several Republican and Democratic
senators called for a congressional inquiry into prison abuse, stating,
"we need to prove that we are a rule of law nation."20
Though reform seems slow in coming, as the administration insists
that these quasi-legal practices are necessary, nonetheless there is a
new concern to at least appear as though the United States respects the
rule of law in other regards. Since the prison abuse scandal broke, there
has been more attention paid to whether soldiers are fighting according
to the rules of engagement. "By any means necessary" is no longer
acceptable, at least in front of the American public. There are points
where the strength of the actions themselves can break through the
interpretive model that is provided to situate them. The deployment of
prisoner abuse photos and stories has accomplished this task. It has
changed the frame of reference by which we understand the U.S. role in
Iraq.
The need to assert our authority in relationship to the law is driven
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by the context of the Iraq war. The United States invaded Iraq without
the blessing of the United Nations. This invasion was largely predicated upon the failure of Hussein's regime to follow the rule of law;
hence he was considered a danger to the world at large. Like the emergency suspension, our invasion was justified on the grounds that it
would ultimately create a more stable international regime. In these circumstances it is particularly important to prove that our actions do fall
within the bounds of international law.
In other circumstances, when the legitimacy and authority of a government's regime are not in question, there is no need to demonstrate
adherence to the rule of law-it is taken as a given. This fact explains
the divergence in public opinion between the prison abuse scandal in
Iraq and the conditions in supermax prisons in the United States. Has
anything happened at Abu Ghraib that would be unthinkable in a maximum-security prison in the United States? The sexual sadism, the
humiliation, deprivation, humiliation? Charles Graner worked as a
guard in a prison in the United States before being sent to Iraq. We can
watch degradation and torture within our native penal system
depicted in gruesome detail on cable television in shows such as Oz,
but that is normalized within our own expectation of criminality and
punishment in the United States. Many people have a fascination with
the violence, sexual sadism, health problems, and denial of humanity
involved in prison life in the United States. Reports of inmates being
beaten to death, raped, dying from lack of health care, and even used in
battles in Gladiator Days in California prisons are shocking, but routine. To then have the same group of people announce that they are
appalled to find that such things happen in prisons run by the United
States abroad is surprising indeed.
Whether the shock of seeing such displays of governmental power
abroad will encourage American citizens to question what they take as
a given at home remains to be seen. The audience of world opinion has
certainly brought a new element to considerations of American practices of punishment, just as it did in More's utopian treatise. If pressure
from Europe and China continues, extending from punitive practices
abroad to those at home, we might see a renewed perception on the
part of the America public that could spur reform.
The actions of the U.s. government and its agents in detaining suspects and torturing prisoners can be understood in no other terms
except using punishment to demonstrate the power of command. Yet
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what distinguishes this demonstration of power is that the government
is using punishment to create command over citizens of other countries. This surely exceeds the boundaries of what can be considered
appropriate expressions of power. But these incidents also demonstrate
why using state punishment to try to create the power of command is
particularly disastrous. Just as Arendt explained, authority is strongest
when it has no need to draw attention to itself or defend its exercise.
Here, the U.S. government uses punishment to visibly and forcibly
order what it experiences as a chaotic world, yet it only succeeds in creating ever more disorder.
This growing resistance to assertions of U.S. power means that I can
end this book on an optimistic note, even though current policies offer
little hope for immediate redemption. The promise of political order is
a harmonious balance between the concentration of human capacities
in the development of government and the circumscription of these
powers by ideals and principles. History presents countless examples
of regimes that have failed to maintain this balance, generally favoring
the exercise of power over adherence to a set of ideals. It seems it is particularly tempting to violate this balance in conducting state punishment, as the recipients have so little power or sympathy. Abusing this
prerogative has consistently disastrous effects for a regime, however.
History shows that no political regime has been able to balance the
requirements of power and justice perfectly, but it also demonstrates a
persistent resistance to state injustice on the part of subjects. When
states give in to the temptations of power and punish merely for the
sake of command, punishment may sow obedience but will ultimately
reap resistance.
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